Working Paper BETA #2019-17
 

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Auteur(s) : Pierre Dehez, Victor Ginsburgh

Title : Approval voting and Shapley ranking

Abstract : Approval voting allows electors to list any number of candidates and their scores are obtained by summing the votes cast in their favor. Equal-and-even cumulative voting instead follows the One-person-one-vote principle by endowing electors with a single vote that they may evenly distribute among several candidates. It corresponds to satisfaction approval voting introduced by Brams and Kilgour (2014) as an extension of approval voting to a multiwinner election. It also corresponds to the concept of Shapley ranking introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2012) as the Shapley value of a cooperative game with transferable utility. In the present paper, we provide an axiomatic foundation of Shapley ranking and analyze the properties of the resulting social welfare function.

Key-words : approval voting, equal-and-even cumulative voting, ranking game, Shapley value

JEL Classification : D71, C71