Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks

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Abstract

The current international regime that regulates maritime oil transport calls for financial contributions by oil firms once an oil spill has occurred. Their percentage contribution to the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund depends only on their level of activity. In this paper, we show that this compensation regime would be more efficient if contributing oil companies adopted financial strategies to hedge against oil pollution risks. The optimal coverage contract is such that standard insurance is useful to manage small and medium oil spills, while investments on financial markets help to cover large oil spills, less frequent but much more catastrophic for society. We also show that the prevention of oil spills increases when insurance is combined with a financial hedging strategy. This positive effect on prevention is further enhanced if firms have the opportunity to send signals about their risk-reducing activities to potential investors.

Key-Words: oil spill, legislation, insurance, capital markets, prevention, catastrophe.

JEL Classification: D80, G22, Q25.
1 Introduction

The maritime transport of oil is regulated by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention in most countries of the world\(^1\), except mainly for the United States, which has its own Convention\(^2\). In this paper, we focus on the compensation system implemented when an oil spill is registered in the territorial sea of any member of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention. Since oil spills can create severe damages to the environment but also to human activities near the coast, they may result in very large claims, which cannot be covered without a compensation system adapted to such catastrophic losses. Hence, we will show that the current International regime would benefit from a reorganization involving both standard insurance and financial hedging. To date, neither standard insurance nor financial hedging were considered as means to improve the indemnification of victims of oil spills. Furthermore, the economic literature on catastrophic risks does not provide formal analyses about the impact of hedging on the prevention of large risks. We examine both of the later in this paper. We also take into account the (bad) reputational effect that oil firms have to bear each time an oil spill is announced.

The 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (1992 IOPC Fund) participates in the compensation of victims of an oil spill if the payment already granted by the insurer of the owner of the tanker is not sufficient. The contributions of oil firms to the Fund are proportional to the quantity of oil received in a year and they are due each time an oil spill has occurred in the territorial waters of a member, whatever the flag of the tanker and whatever the citizenship of the oil firm. Hence the IOPC Fund enables the compensation of victims even if the owner of the tanker is not a citizen of a member state and empirical evidence shows that the IOPC Fund seems to be rather efficient in minimizing the time between the oil spill event and the effective compensation of victims. However, funds are levied at random dates and expenses are not smoothed through time. Hence we will show that within the current international regime, oil firms would bene-

\(^1\) 81 states ratified the 1992 Civil Liability Convention.
fit from the capital markets and utilizing appropriate financial instruments. Financial mechanisms improve and complement the hedging provided by insurance policies which prove to be insufficient alone to cover large risks related to maritime oil transport.

There are several reasons why the oil industry should use hedging mechanisms to make the current compensation regime more efficient. Without adequate risk management, oil firms lose efficiency in their activities and the cost resulting from this inefficiency is lost to victims’ compensation. In particular, the 1992 IOPC Fund, as it stands, does not rely on the risk transfer principle. By defining contributions on the basis of the aggregate risk of the pool, only the mutuality principle (Borch, 1962; Wilson, 1968) is applied. Nevertheless, the aggregate risk is still variable because of the possibly huge consequences of an incident and because of the limited number of contributing members in the Fund. Consequently, the mutuality principle is no longer sufficient to spread all the risk on the oil firms.

Doherty (2000) provides several arguments that insurance is profitable for firms, and stresses the fact that insurance mechanisms have to be completed by some investment on capital markets when dealing with large risks. Froot (2001) also provides different reasons why markets are more efficient than insurers in global risk reductions. One important point is that securitization may reduce transaction costs such as administrative fees or costs related to agency issues.

In harmony with Doherty and Dionne (1993), Schlesinger (1999), Doherty and Schlesinger (2002) and in Mahul (2002), we show that insurance combined with a financial hedging performs better than standard insurance only. However, our economic context is different from these studies. In our framework, each individual firm bears a percentage of the aggregate risk of the pool (here, the IOPC Fund) and an individual risk of bad reputation that is positively correlated to the aggregate risk and non insurable. To date, the literature has focused essentially on risks that can be split into idiosyncratic risk,

3 A large part of total contribution is made by a small number of oil companies. This can be explained by the concentration of the oil sector and the exoneration of contributions of companies belonging to states having ratified the 1992 Convention and receiving less than 150,000 tons of oil a year.
specific to the individual and easily insurable, and a systematic risk, independent from the idiosyncratic one.

Losses induced by reputation constitute an important variable in our model; reputation and its impact on firms’ value has become a major concern for firms involved in environmentally risky activities for the environment as shown by Lanoie et al. (1998). This issue is even more crucial for oil companies in the wake of a large oil spill. Hence taking into account losses induced by (bad) reputation constitutes a progress compared to the previous literature.

Another important and original point of our analysis deals with prevention, which is here combined with insurance. This point is important when focusing on the current discussions that are being held at the European Commission about the evolution of the financing of the IOPC Fund. Especially, it is argued that an increase of individual contributions may improve the safeness of ships chartered by oil firms and allow it to fully compensate the victims of infrequent large oil spills. In contrast to this argument, we will show that prevention against maritime oil pollution becomes more valuable if oil firms apply adequate financial strategies.

The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the current regime of the IOPC Fund. In the third section, we present the basic model and introduce standard insurance mechanisms in order to define the optimal insurance contract that an oil firm (or the Fund) can buy from an insurer. It entails a deductible with coinsurance for all losses higher than the deductible. In the fourth section, we show that financial hedging may be a good way to cover the residual risk still retained by oil firms after insurance. When incorporating this point in the insurance contract, the risk premium asked by the insurer decreases and more (standard) insurance becomes available for small and medium oil spills, while capital markets are useful for hedging large oil spills. Another important point is that financial markets may provide incentives to invest in prevention by allowing firms to give positive signals to potential investors. We end Section 4 by discussing the characteristics of the financial assets that would fit with the mixed hedging strategy obtained in our model. Section five concludes. Proofs are given in Appendix.
2 The IOPC Fund and risk mutualization

In this section we present the main features of the current legislation and we provide some insights about how the current financing of the IOPC Fund can be improved. The issues we focus on are formalized in Sections 3 and 4.

Since 24 May 2002, International maritime transport (except for the United States) is exclusively regulated by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC in the course) and by the 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) Convention\(^4\).

The Fund is financed by contributions of the oil industry of member states receiving more than 150,000 tons of oil per year after sea transport. The contribution of each company is proportional to the annual tonnage received by sea and is directly payable to the Fund. Contributions, decided each year by the Assembly of the Fund, cover administrative costs and estimated compensation payments for passed pollutions. Hence no provision is made ex ante and each oil firm pays an ex post indemnity equal to a percentage of the losses induced by all oil spills registered until this date: The sum of these oil spills can be considered as the aggregate loss of the IOPC Fund, which is shared among its members. Note that, under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, only the owner of the tanker is held financially liable for the catastrophe. The convention obliges him to buy pollution insurance, provided by P&I Clubs which are non-profit making mutual insurance associations. These mutual groups offer insurance depending on the size of the boat and not directly on the damages that may be induced by a wreck. Hence, insurance may be limited, as it was the case for the Erika’s wreck on the French coast in December 1999 (7\% of the total available funds).

This International compensation regime seems to be rather efficient: It has improved the protection of sea environment against oil pollution by inducing a decrease of the number of large oil spills in the last two decades\(^5\). Also, it facilitates claims settlement for

\(^{4}\)Actually, the first Civil Liability Convention dates from 1969 and the Fund was created in 1971. Both were amended in 1992. For details, see the companion paper of Schmitt and Spaeter (2003).

\(^{5}\)The number of large oil spills (spilling more than 700 tons) was 7.3 per year on average during
victims of pollution and it has increased the compensation available for them. Although claims for damage to the ecosystem are not admissible, compensation is granted to a wide range of costs (clean-up operations, property damages, economic losses, ...). Besides, it has been often argued that contributions to the 1992 Fund borne by the oil industry are fair compared to the revenues induced by oil activities\textsuperscript{6}.

Nevertheless this regime also shows its limits regarding the total compensation available for victims\textsuperscript{7} and the incentives to enhance environmental prevention through the chartering of safe boats. Indeed, while the shipowner is solely held liable through the Civil Liability Convention, the whole oil industry participates in compensations through the IOPC Fund Convention: no direct compensation between the owner of the oil leaked from the boat and victims can be established. From a theoretical point of view, Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) show that such considerations may lead firms to subcontract risky activities, here the maritime transport of oil, in order to escape from prosecution in the case of an accident. Moreover, the contribution to the Fund is upper bounded, and this kind of limited liability may induce oil firms to charter boats with medium, or even low, levels of quality.

Besides, the shipowner is also protected by limited liability, which benefits mostly low market value firms as shown by Dionne and Spaeter (2003) and by Schmitt and Spaeter (2002)\textsuperscript{}. Consequently, risk-reducing activities may still be worsened.

\textsuperscript{5}From 1996 to 2001, the annual contributions represented at most 0,05\% of the price per ton of crude oil received.

\textsuperscript{6}From 1996 to 2001, the annual contributions represented at most 0,05\% of the price per ton of crude oil received.

\textsuperscript{7}Only partial compensation was available to victims after the wrecks of Nakhodka (1997), Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002). In the case of Erika, the percentage of compensation was the highest one among these three catastrophes: About 80\% of the total losses estimated by the experts of the IOPC Fund. Concerning the Prestige incident, the Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund decided in May 2003 to limit compensation to 15\% of the loss actually suffered by the respective claimants. On 31th of March 2004, this level of payments was maintained.
As a last important point, the 1992 Fund will be complemented by a Supplementary Fund, which is expected to enter into force before the end of year 2004. Its aim is to significantly increase the levels of compensation if compensation available through the Civil Liability Convention and the IOPC Fund should prove insufficient. Only states that receive more than 1 million tons of oil are able to ratify the new convention so that the number of members of the Supplementary Fund will be significantly lower than the number of the 1992 Fund. Small countries will be excluded from this new additional compensation mechanism even if a large oil spill is registered in their territorial waters. This new Supplementary Fund will also cast doubt on the fact that contributions to the Funds are relatively fair since fewer firms will contribute significantly more.

3 Basic model and insurance

Now we propose to analyze the introduction of insurance mechanisms, first, and of insurance and financial hedging, second, as ways to improve the compensations mechanisms related to oil spills. In a first paragraph, we consider the current situation of the IOPC Fund, where no insurance is available. Then we introduce hedging mechanisms.

3.1 (Catastrophe) Risk mutualization

Consider $n$ oil firms located in states that are members of the Fund. We denote $\tilde{x}_i$ the risk of loss borne by Society when Firm $i$ charters a given boat for the transport of its oil. This random loss $\tilde{x}_i$ takes the strictly positive value $x_i$ with probability $p_i$ and equals zero with probability $(1 - p_i)$. Probability $p_i$ of incident is affected by the level of prevention $e_i$ decided by the oil firm that means, here, by the safeness of the chartered boat: $p_i = p(e_i)$ with $p'(e_i) < 0$. The cost of prevention is defined as $c(e_i) = e_i$. Namely, $e_i$ increases as the safeness of the ship chartered by the oil firm increases. We suppose that the charterer, i.e. the oil firm, controls the quality of the boat and the competence of
Finally the aggregate risk of the Fund is \( \tilde{X} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tilde{x}_i \) with values in \( [0, L] \) and with distribution function \( F(X/e) \), where \( e \) is the vector of all individual investments in prevention: \( e \equiv (e_1, ... e_n) \). An increase in the level of individual prevention of, at least, one firm improves the distribution in the sense of the first order stochastic dominance, but at a decreasing rate: \( F_{e_i} > 0, F_{e_i,e_i} \leq 0, \forall X \in [0, L[ \) and \( F_{e_i}(0/e) = F_{e_i}(L/e) = 0 \).

As it works currently, each time an accident is registered in the territorial waters of its members, the Fund calls for contributions by each oil firm. The percentage of contribution of Firm \( i \), denoted \( \alpha_i \), is applied to the level of the aggregate loss \( X \) of the pool, up to a maximum value \( \tilde{X} \), which is assumed to be less than the amount of losses registered if all chartered boats would have an accident in the same period\(^{10} \): \( \tilde{X} < L \).

The amount of money available from the IOPC Fund is bounded so that firms benefit from a kind of limited liability.

In this system, whose characteristics are similar to the ones of the mutuality principle, a given firm does not bear all the risk directly linked to the boat it charters since it is spread across all members of the Fund.

In addition to the risk \( \alpha_i \tilde{X} \), firms have to bear a second risk related to (bad) reputation. Indeed, each time an oil spill occurs, the whole industry is affected by the harsh public opinion. Nevertheless, the effect of bad reputation is stronger for the firm that owned the spilled oil because of the bad advertising which is made around its brand. Finally, each firm bears a bad reputational effect composed of an individual effect, which is zero if the firm is not implied in the wreck, and a general effect which is positive for any incident\(^{11} \). Formally, the random variable describing the total reputational effect is

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\(^8\)This may look as a bold hypothesis knowing that maritime oil transport is largely subcontracted to shipowners. However, charterers get a precise information on the safeness of a boat through the classification society that has checked it.

\(^9\)Here, \( L \) is simply equal to the sum of the strictly positive values of all oil spill variables: \( L = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \).

We assume that \( n \) is sufficiently large so as to consider \( \tilde{X} \) as a continuous variable.

\(^{10}\)This is assumed to reflect the fact that the IOPC Fund, as it works, is not able to compensate for all oil spills.

\(^{11}\)Blacconiere and Patten (1994) obtain similar conclusions by studying empirically the impact of the
denoted $-g(\tilde{X}, \tilde{x}_i)$ with $0 < g_X < g_{x_i}$ and $g_{XX} < 0$. The preferences of the firm are represented by a Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function $u(.)$ and it owns an initial non random wealth $w_i$.

Under the current functioning of the IOPC Fund, the oil firm can only choose the level of quality $e_i$ of the boat to be chartered. It chooses it in order to maximize its expected net utility:

$$
\max_{e_i} R = \int_0^{\tilde{X}} u(w_i - \alpha_i X - g(X, \tilde{x}_i))f(X/e) dX
+ \int_{\tilde{X}}^L u(w_i - \alpha_i \tilde{X} - g(X, \tilde{x}_i))f(X/e) dX - e_i,
$$

(1)

where $g(X, \tilde{x}_i)$ is the expected value of the reputational effect evaluated with respect to $\tilde{x}_i$:

$$
g(X, \tilde{x}_i) = p(e_i)g(X, x_i) + (1 - p(e_i))g(X, 0), \quad \forall X \in [0, L]
$$

(2)

In the course of the text, we adopt the following notations: $w_f = w_i - \alpha_i X - g(X, \tilde{x}_i)$, $\tilde{w}_f = w_i - \alpha_i \tilde{X} - g(X, \tilde{x}_i)$, $g_{e_i} = g_{e_i}(X, \tilde{x}_i)$ and $g_X = g_X(X, \tilde{x}_i)$. For given prevention levels of the other oil firms, the optimal level of prevention $e_i^*$ of Firm i satisfies the following first order condition:

$$
- \int_0^{\tilde{X}} g_{e_i}.u'(w_f)f(X/e) dX - \int_{\tilde{X}}^L g_{e_i}.u'(\tilde{w}_f)f(X/e) dX
+ \int_0^{\tilde{X}} (\alpha_i + g_X).u'(w_f)F_{e_i}(X/e) dX + \int_{\tilde{X}}^L g_X .u'(\tilde{w}_f)F_{e_i}(X/e) dX = 1
$$

(3)

It is obtained thanks to a differentiation of (1) with respect to $e_i$ and thanks to integrations by part of the terms in $f_{e_i}(.)$. The left term of Equality (3) is the expected Bhopal incident in India (1984) on the stock value of chemical firms in general and on Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), which was responsible of the pesticides leak, in particular. See also Freedman and Stagliano (1991) who show that firms with a high level of disclosure about their risk-reducing activities suffer from a smaller decrease in their stock price after an incident.
marginal cost of prevention. From our assumptions, this amount is certain and equal
to one. The right-hand-side term is the expected marginal benefit of prevention. First,
chartering safer boats will reduce the risk of bad reputation (first and second term)
because the probability for Firm $i$ to be directly involved in an accident (probability $p_i$)
decreases as $e_i$ increases. Second, prevention has also a positive impact on the aggregate
risk of the Fund since it improves its distribution. Firm $i$ will benefit from an additional
reduction of bad reputation due, this time, to the reduction of the aggregate risk of the
pool (third and fourth term). Lastly, the presence of $\alpha_i$ in the third member of the
right-hand-side term represents the direct benefit of prevention: increasing prevention
reduces the risk $\alpha_i \bar{X}$ borne by Firm $i$.

This first order condition is useful to discuss the impact of a variation of the upper
bound $\bar{X}$ of the pool on the willingness of firms to charter safer boats.

**Proposition 1** An increase of the upper bound $\bar{X}$ of the funds available for clean-up
and compensation through the pool induces an increase in the level of prevention of Firm
$i$, other things being equal.

Now we are able to analyze the impact on firms’ behavior of a change in the upper
limit $\bar{X}$ of the Fund. Historically, the cap of the IOPC Fund has been increased just
after the Erika incident, once again during the year 2003, and will still be increased
at the end of 2004 through the implementation of the Supplementary Fund$^{12}$. In our
theoretical framework, an increase of $\bar{X}$ yields an increase in the level of prevention by
Firm $i$, other things being equal. Having to pay more for large accidents is similar for
the firm to bearing more risk. Thus the marginal benefit of prevention increases, while
the monetary marginal cost of prevention remains unchanged: The price of chartering
safe boats is not affected. Finally, the oil firm has incentives to increase the level of
preventive investment $e_i$.

$^{12}$Once this Supplementary Fund enters in force, the total amount of compensation available for
pollution damage in the States that will have ratified the Protocol will be 750 million SDR (US$ 1
100 million), including the 203 million SDR (US$ 300 million) available under the 1992 Conventions
(Jacobsson, 2004)..
Hence increasing the maximum level of contribution by oil firms to the Fund may be a good way to increase both the available funds in case of an oil spill and ex ante prevention. However, this fragilizes the mutuality principle since more aggregate loss is borne by each individual firm. Furthermore, small firms may have some difficulties to fulfill their commitments if their contributions become too high.

Up to now, only the mutuality principle was considered and no insurance in the sense of risk transfer was available. In what follows, we introduce standard insurance as a way to increase contributions to the Fund.

3.2 Optimal standard insurance contract

The idea is that firms may be able to contribute more to the Fund if their random contributions were insured. From a theoretical point of view, standard insurance could be bought by each individual firm or by the pool. Nevertheless, the staff who is in charge of the management of the IOPC Fund in London has no decision power about the strategies of oil transport or of boat chartering that the oil firms may adopt, so that it is reasonable to assume that oil firms take insurance decisions, rather than the IOPC Fund.

Assume that the oil firm can transfer a part or the whole of its risk $\alpha_iX$ to an insurer. The compensation function is denoted $C(\alpha_iX)$. The insurance premium $Q$ is equal to the expected costs and indemnities that the insurer will have to take in charge:

$$Q = (1+\gamma)E[C(\alpha_iX)]$$

where $\gamma$ represents the administrative costs of the insurer plus the risk premium per unit of transferred risk and $E$ the expectation operator over $X$. The Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function of the insurer is denoted $v(.)$ with $v'(.) > 0$ and $v''(.) \leq 0$ and $W$ is his initial wealth. The compensation function $C(.)$ is defined over $[0, \alpha_iL]$. 

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The maximization program of the oil firm subject to the participation constraint of the insurer becomes:

\[
\max_{\hat{C}(\cdot)} R^C = \int_0^L u(w_i - \alpha_i(X.1_{\{X \leq \hat{X}\}} + \hat{X}.1_{\{X > \hat{X}\}})) + C(\alpha_i X) - Q - g(X, \hat{x}_i))f(X/e) dX - e_i
\]

subject to \(\int_0^L v(W + Q - (1 + \lambda)C(\alpha_i X))f(X/e) dX \geq v(W)\) \(\quad\) (4)

We use optimal control to solve this maximization program. The random variable \(X\) plays the role of time, \(C(\cdot)\) is the control variable while the state variable is \(z(X) = \int_0^L v(W + Q - (1 + \lambda)C(\alpha_i t))f(t/e) dt\). Its evolution is described by the system:

\[
\begin{cases}
\dot{z}(X) = v(W + Q - (1 + \lambda)C(\alpha_i X))f(X/e) \\
z(0) = 0 \\
z(L) = v(W)
\end{cases}
\]

The Hamiltonian of Program (4) is

\[
H(X) = \left(u(w^C_i(X, \hat{X})) - e_i + \mu(X)v(W + Q - (1 + \lambda)C(\alpha_i X))\right)f(X/e), \quad (5)
\]

with \(w^C_i(X, \hat{X}) = w_i - \alpha_i(X.1_{\{X \leq \hat{X}\}} + \hat{X}.1_{\{X > \hat{X}\}}) + C(\alpha_i X) - Q - g(X, \hat{x}_i)\) and \(\mu\) the Lagrange function. The contract \(C^*\) that maximizes \(H\) is presented in Proposition 2 hereafter.

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\(^{13}\)Function \(1_{\{\cdot\}}\) is the indicator function, taking value one if the condition into brackets is satisfied, zero otherwise.
Proposition 2

(i) The optimal insurance contract displays a positive deductible when administrative costs are increasing in the level of indemnities. Marginal compensations for damages beyond the level of deductible but lower than $\hat{X}$ are given by

$$C^*(\alpha_i X) = \frac{\left(1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i}\right) R_u}{R_u + (1 + \lambda)R_v},$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

with $R_u$ and $R_v$ the absolute risk aversion ratios of, respectively, the insured and the insurer. For damages higher than $\hat{X}$, marginal indemnities are given by

$$\tilde{C}^*(\alpha_i X) = \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} R_u \frac{R_v}{R_u + (1 + \lambda)R_v}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

(ii) The optimal contract presents a disappearing deductible for losses lower than $\hat{X}$ if the insurer is risk-neutral and an upper limit for losses beyond a level $\hat{X}$, with $\hat{X} < \overline{X}$. If the insurer is risk averse, the coverage may display a coinsurance rate smaller than one for damages beyond the deductible and an upper limit of coverage.

Equation (6) is close to the one that Raviv (1979) obtained in a model with one insurable risk and to that obtained by Gollier (1996) with background risk. But in our model, the risk of bad reputation is uninsurable and it depends positively on the insurable risk (we have $g_X > 0$). Thus we should expect that the insured firm accepts to pay for a higher coverage of the first risk in order to protect itself against its background risk if it is prudent in the sense of Kimball (1990). Here, we obtain a similar result, but prudence is not necessary. In our model the second risk, $g_X$, is completely defined by the first one, $X$, so that for a given $x_i$, both variables have the same distribution. Formally, the fact that the insured firm asks for more insurance than in a case without reputationnal effect is illustrated by the presence of $g_X$, positive, at the numerator of $C(.)$. It is as if the insured firm would bear an individual “aggregate” risk, $\alpha_i X + g(X, \tilde{x}_i)$, which cannot be completely insured. Besides, the presence of the uninsurable reputational risk explains why indemnities can increase with $X$ even if the insurable loss borne by the firm (its
contribution to the Fund) is fixed and equal to $\alpha_i \tilde{X}$. This result is also due to the positive correlation between $g$ and $\alpha_i X$.\footnote{For $g_X = 0$, we would have $\tilde{C}^*(.) = 0$ for any $X$ larger than $\tilde{X}$ and $\tilde{X} = X$.}

What is different from the literature on background risk is that we are dealing with catastrophe risks. Hence an insurer whose portfolio contains the aggregate risk of the Fund bears an additional risk of insolvency following a catastrophe that he has accepted to cover. Besides, empirical facts show that reinsurance groups that accept to cover pollution damages ask for high insurance premia, which entails high risk premia. It is often argued that the management of large risks entails additional transaction costs, due to risks of insolvency or to the complexity of audits and of claims settlements. This may justify the significant increase in the price of classical insurance. In such an economic environment, it is unreasonable to assume that the insurer behaves as a risk-neutral agent. He is more likely to be risk averse and his administrative costs related to the management of catastrophe risks are sufficiently high to argue that, in most cases, the optimal insurance contract displays coinsurance between the insurer and the insured firm beyond a deductible level. In other terms, a disappearing deductible, which induces that indemnities increase more rapidly than the loss, is seldom the best contract. This result is rather intuitive since such a contract would compell the insurer to pay really high indemnities in the case of a catastrophic event. Figure 1 displays the coinsurance contract.

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Figure 1 about here

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It is still interesting to notice that a contract with coinsurance beyond a deductible may also be the best risk sharing when the insurer bears convex administrative costs, as shown by Raviv (1979).. If the convexity assumption is not the most plausible when dealing with classical risks such as car- or house-insurance risks, it is much more closer...
to reality when we focus on large risks. Consequently, convex costs may also explain the optimality of coinsurance in the management of large risks\textsuperscript{15}.

Another important result of this section deals with the optimal level of prevention when insurance is available. Formally, after a differentiation of (4) with respect to $e^C_i$, integrations by part applied to the terms in $f_{e_i}(.)$ yield the following first order condition for the optimal level of prevention, denoted now $e^C_i$:

$$
1 = -\int_0^L (g_{e_i} + Q_{e_i}).u'(w^C_f(X, \hat{X})).f(X/e^C)dX
+\alpha_i \int_0^{\hat{X}} (1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} - C'(\alpha X)).u'(w^C_f)\tilde{F}_{e_i}(X/e^C)dX
+\alpha_i \int_0^L \left(\frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} - C''(\alpha X)).u'(w^C_f)\tilde{F}_{e_i}(X/e^C)dX
\right)
$$

(8)

**Proposition 3** When the insurer can obtain information on the risk-reducing activities of the firm, the optimal level of prevention decided by the firm increases compared to a situation where no insurance is available.

This last result is not surprising. Here, the insurer can obtain information about the level of prevention decided by the firm: When a given boat is chartered, its capacity and its safeness become common knowledge because maritime authorities diffuse the results of the control. Consequently, the insurer is able to define a premium which depends on the level of prevention chosen by the oil firm\textsuperscript{16}. If insurance is available, an increase in the level of prevention decreases the level of the premium. In our model, an increase

\textsuperscript{15}This assumption is not retained here. With a cost function more general than the one we are using, the parameter $\lambda$ would be replaced by the first derivative of the cost function and the second derivative would appear at the denominator of Equation (6).

\textsuperscript{16}In other words, the insurance premium depends on the safeness of the chartered boat in our approach. This characteristic implies that the insurance contrat is self-enforcable: Once the contract is underwritten, the insured firm has no incentive to choose a level of care lower than the one considered by the insurer when defining the price of insurance. This is consistent with the maritime oil insurance sector. Indeed only a few companies are specialized in such a coverage so that the sector is relatively
in prevention has also an effect on the marginal indemnities through its impact on the non insurable risk. Indeed, the marginal level of the bad reputation risk \( g \) appears in \( C'(\alpha_iX) \). Hence as in standard models with complete information on prevention, the firm improves the prevention when it has access to insurance.

Finally, when only standard insurance is available, insurers may ask for high risk premia for accepting to manage a catastrophe risk and the optimal contract displays some coinsurance: As the damage increases, oil firms are less well covered and have to bear more and more residual risk. Hence our aim, which was to use insurance coverage in order to provide more available funds in the case of a huge incident (which means that the cap \( \hat{X} \) of the pool could have been increased) can be difficult to achieve. If standard insurance is too costly, oil firms may prefer not to be insured at all.

4 Providing a better hedging strategy through capital markets

In this section, the issue is to find complementary mechanisms that are able to diversify risks over a wider range of individuals and to transfer risk to agents such as financial investors. In this way, it will be possible to reduce the residual risk borne by the firm after (standard) insurance and to increase available funds for victims in case of an accident.

In a first paragraph, we provide our results related to mixed hedging strategies. In the second subsection, we discuss the financial implications.

4.1 The optimal mixed strategy

A more complete hedging strategy would consist in combining several coverage instruments. Doherty and Dionne (1993) and Mahul (2002) provide such an approach by concentrated. In such a situation if a firm cheats, the insurer will break the contract and the firm will have many difficulties to find another insurer who accepts to offer it an insurance contract with a fair price. Besides, cheating will have a negative impact on the reputation of the oil firm.
dividing the risk into two components: an idiosyncratic risk, which can be related to
the specific activities of a given firm, and a systematic risk, related to the risk of the
industry as a whole. While the individual risk can be insured by a standard insurance
policy, the systematic risk is managed through a participating contract. A participating
contract is a policy with a variable premium based on the realized systematic loss. In a
second stage, the variability of the insurance premium is hedged either through standard
insurance or thanks to adequate financial instruments.

Our framework is different from the ones of Doherty and Dionne (1993) and Mahul
(2002) because 1) The oil industry does not bear an insurable idiosyncratic risk since the
effect of bad reputation, which plays this role, is non insurable, 2) The individual risk of
the oil firm is correlated to the risk of the Fund, while in the quoted analyses both are
independent, and 3) Prevention is absent from the models of Doherty and Dionne and
of Mahul while it plays an important role in our work.

Now, assume that the oil Fund, representing all contributing firms, has to pay for all
oil spills, whatever their size. This means that no upper limit of compensation exists (\( \hat{X} \)
does no longer hold) and, as a direct consequence, that oil firms are no longer protected
by limited liability. Nevertheless, the firm can still transfer part of its risk to an insurer,
and it can also invest on financial markets in order to cover losses (contributions to the
Fund) in excess of the insurance coverage\(^{17} \). Here we want to limit the implication of the
insurer in the coverage of large risks in order to mitigate his bankruptcy risk. Recall that
in the previous section we have shown that sufficient risk aversion of the insurer leads him
to offer a contract with an upper limit of insurance when dealing with catastrophe risks.
We take this result as given here: We denote \( I(.) \) the indemnity schedule and \( \bar{X} \) the
level of damage such that any contribution higher than \( \bar{X} \) induces the same indemnity.

\(^{17} \)Another way to deal with such a configuration would be to let firms be protected by limited liability,
that means that individual contributions are still limited to \( \alpha_1 \hat{X} \). Nevertheless the Fund would have to
pay for all damages so that it would have strong incentives to go on financial markets in order to find
the additional needed funds. However such a configuration would have no impact on the oil firms in
terms of prevention, so that we do not consider it here.
Formally, when an oil spill occurs and after having contributed to the Fund, the oil firm obtains an indemnity \( I(\alpha_i X) \) if its contribution is less than \( \alpha_i \bar{X} \) and the fixed amount \( \bar{T} = I(\alpha_i X) \) for any larger contribution.

Still assume that the firm can sell to an external investor a part \( \beta \) of its residual risk minus the deductible\(^{18}\), which is always to be borne by the firm in order to avoid moral hazard problems\(^{19}\), for any damage higher than \( \bar{X} \): \( \alpha_i X - \bar{T} - D^3 \).\(^{20}\) The price of this risk transfer is denoted \( \pi \): It depends on \( \beta \) and also on the level of prevention \( e_i \) adopted by the firm. In this model, financial markets can obtain some information about environmental policies adopted by the firms\(^{21}\). We have \( \pi = \pi(\beta, e_i) \) and it satisfies the properties \( \pi_\beta > 0 \) and \( \pi_{e_i} < 0 \).\(^{22}\) Lastly, the insurer’s unit cost of insurance is now \( \delta \) and it depends on \( \beta \): if the insured commits to cover the worst states of nature on financial markets, the insurer takes into account this information when evaluating the insurance premium. Such a behavior implies that firms communicate with the insurer on their financial strategy. From an empirical point of view, this is rather usual when looking at the pollution insurance market. Insurers ask for more and more informations about the risk-reducing activities of the firms and firms collaborate most of the time in order to obtain adequate coverage. In our model, the consequences of a catastrophe are now

\(^{18}\)By buying and selling puts and calls of appropriate underlying securities. See the discussion at the end of this section.

\(^{19}\)Indeed this allows us to avoid some discontinuity of the indemnity schedule at point \( D^3 \) (see Figure 2).

\(^{20}\)Thanks to the forthcoming results on the design of the optimal indemnity function for losses less than the upper bound \( \bar{X} \), we will be able to show that the scalar \( \alpha_i X - \bar{T} - D^3 \) is always positive. Indeed, \( D^3 \) is the deductible imbedded in the indemnity function so that \( I(\alpha_i X) = h(\alpha_i X) - D^3 \). Furthermore we will have that \( h(\alpha_i X) > D^3 \) for any loss \( \alpha_i X \in [D^3, \alpha_i L] \) and that \( 0 \leq h'(\alpha_i X) < 1 \) at optimum. Hence we have that \( \bar{T} < \alpha_i X - D^3 \).

\(^{21}\)See Lanoie et al. (1998) for details about how those informations are released on financial markets and their impact.

\(^{22}\)The decrease of \( \pi \) as prevention increases reflects the fact that financial investors are sensitive to the environmental policies adopted by the firms and that they take them into account when they evaluate the riskyness of the firms’ activities. Several financial works have proven that this point holds in reality (see for instance Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Cormier and Magnan (1997) and Lanoie et al. (1998)).
split between the insurer and financial markets. As a direct consequence, the costs of risk management for the insurer are lower than in the previous case because of a decrease in the risk premium. Formally, we have: \( \delta(\beta) > 0, \delta(0) = \lambda \) and \( \delta(\beta) < \lambda \forall \beta > 0 \).

The maximization program of the oil firm becomes

\[
\max_{(I, \beta)} R^\beta = \int_0^\overline{X} u(w_i - \alpha_i X - Q^\beta + I(\alpha_i X) - g(X, \tilde{x}_i) - \pi(\beta, e_i)) f(X/e) dX \\
+ \int_{\overline{X}}^L u(w_i - \alpha_i X - Q^\beta + \overline{I} + \beta [\alpha_i X - D^\beta - \overline{I}]
- g(X, \tilde{x}_i) - \pi(\beta, e_i)) f(X/e) dX - e_i
\]

subject to

\[
\int_0^\overline{X} v(W + Q^\beta - (1 + \delta(\beta)) I(\alpha_i X)) f(X/e) dX \\
+ v(W + Q^\beta - (1 + \delta(\beta)) \overline{I})(1 - F(\overline{X}/e)) \geq v(W),
\]

with \( Q^\beta = (1 + \delta(\beta)) E[I(\alpha_i X)] \) the insurance premium. The firm has to choose the combined hedging strategy \((I(.), \beta)\) that maximizes its expected net utility subject to the participation of the insurer.

**Proposition 4**

(i) The optimal indemnity function displays a positive deductible \( D^\beta \). Marginal indemnities for losses between the deductible level and the bound \( \alpha_i \overline{X} \) are given by:

\[
I''(\alpha_i X) = \frac{1 + \frac{\delta x}{\alpha_i}}{R_u + (1 + \delta(\beta)).R_v},
\]

with \( R_u \) and \( R_v \) the absolute risk aversion ratios of, respectively, the insured and the insurer.

(ii) For given risk attitudes of both agents and positive hedging from the financial market, the optimal coverage is higher than the one obtained when only standard insurance is available: \( D^\beta < D \) and \( I''(\alpha_i X) > C''(\alpha_i X) \) for any loss \( \alpha_i X \) partially covered and less than \( \alpha_i \overline{X} \).
(iii) For a given insurance deductible $D^\beta$, an increase in the financing of large losses by financial markets increases standard insurance of medium losses.

Point iii) suggests that firms should use the wide diversification capability of financial markets to manage the potential large consequences driven by catastrophe risks and they should buy standard insurance for small and medium losses. In the specific framework of the oil industry, what we commonly call the 1992 IOPC Fund is composed of two distinct funds. The first one, the general Fund, is dedicated to the payment of the current administrative costs and to the compensation of small oil spills (less than 4 millions SDRs with one Special Drawing Right = US$ 1.46375 on 5 May 2004), while the main claims Fund is dedicated to large oil spills. Finally the general Fund should negotiate some coverage conditions offered by standard insurers, while the main claims Fund should rather be managed through interventions on capital markets.

Figure 2 displays an example of an optimal combined contract.

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Figure 2 about here

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For convenience we use in what follows the notation $g(X, \bar{x}_i) \equiv g$ and $\pi(\beta, e_i) \equiv \pi$.

**Lemma 1** Partial financial hedging is optimal if and only if

$$\pi_\beta. \int_0^L u'(\omega_\beta^\beta) f(X/e) dX = \int_0^\infty I_\beta(\alpha X).u'(\omega_1^\beta) f(X/e) dX + \int_0^L (\alpha X - D^\beta - \bar{T}).u'(\omega_2^\beta) f(X/e) dX$$

$$- \int_0^L Q_\beta.\omega_\beta^\beta f(X/e) dX, \quad \text{(11)}$$

with

$$\begin{cases} w_1^\beta = w_i - \alpha_i X - Q^\beta + I(\alpha_i X) - g - \pi \\ w_2^\beta = w_i - \alpha_i X - Q^\beta + \bar{T} + \beta [\alpha_i X - D^\beta - \bar{T}] - g - \pi \\ w_3^\beta = w_i - \alpha_i X - Q^\beta + I(\alpha_i X).1_{\{X \leq \bar{x}\}} + [\bar{T} + \beta (\alpha_i X - D^\beta - \bar{T})].1_{\{X > \bar{x}\}} - g - \pi \end{cases}$$

Function $1_{\{\cdot\}}$ is the indicator function, which takes value one if the condition into brackets is satisfied, zero otherwise.
Equation (11) is obtained by differentiating (9) with respect to $\beta$. (Partial) external financing is optimal if the expected marginal cost of an increase in $\beta$ (left-hand-side-term) equals the expected marginal benefit, obtained thanks to an increase in the coverage of the small and medium losses (first member in the right-hand-side-term), to the direct increase of the coverage of large losses (second member) and to the decrease of the price of standard insurance (third member).

Lastly, we have to discuss the level of prevention adopted by the firm in the case of a joint hedging contract. A differentiation of (9) with respect to $e^\beta$, the level of prevention in this model, and integrations by part lead to the following first order condition:

\[
1 = -\int_0^L (g_{e_i} + \pi_{e_i} + Q_{e_i}) \cdot u'(w_i^\beta) f(X/e) dX \\
+ \alpha_i \int_0^L (1 + \frac{gX}{\alpha_i} - I''(\alpha_i X) \cdot 1_{X \leq \overline{X}} - \beta \cdot 1_{X > \overline{X}}) \cdot u'(w_i^\beta) F_{e_i}(X/e) dX
\]

(12)

**Proposition 5** The level of prevention adopted by the firm is higher than the one obtained in the model with standard insurance when the opportunity of announcing its risk-reduction policy to markets induces easier access to external financing ($\pi_{e_i} < 0$).

### 4.2 Financial insights

So far, we have demonstrated the conditions under which financial hedging may supplement insurance mechanisms to enhance the management of oil pollution risk. Two main topics remain to be discussed. First of all, we show why these conditions are likely to be met empirically, i.e. why financial instruments may be attractive to both investors and oil companies. Then, we discuss the design of the financial instruments adapted to oil pollution risks and its consequences on the level of environment prevention.

One reason that is often evoked to explain the limited ability of reinsurance companies to handle catastrophe risk is the insufficient available funds of the sector compared to the size of capital markets (see for instance Froot (2001)). This problem of credit risk
translates into the inability of the reinsurer to fulfil its obligation to oil companies if a catastrophe should occur. Although losses incurred under the current international maritime regime are far lower than hurricane or earthquake losses, the implementation of the Supplementary Fund\textsuperscript{23} will make oil companies even more sensitive to oil pollution risk. According to some executives of the Marsh Company, a world leader of business risk management and insurance broking, even the biggest oil companies are now aware of the needs to hedge this kind of risk. Indeed, the Supplementary Fund introduces a third tier that sets the total amount of compensation payable for any incident to a combined total of 750 million Special Drawing Rights (just over US$1,000 million) including the amount of compensation paid under the existing CLC/Fund Convention. This is more than three times as large as the current limit. Furthermore, this third tier will be taken over by a few companies since the supplementary fund is likely to be ratified only by European countries and Japan\textsuperscript{24}. This in turn means that the mutuality principle is weakened and splitting the total risk by issuing adequate financial instruments is likely to become less costly than insurance coverage.

On the supply side, investors are likely to be attracted by instruments of which distributions of payoffs have a weak (nil) correlation with other financial assets. This offers a unique opportunity for diversification. Actually, this argument applies to all kinds of catastrophe risk. The only difference is the anthropic feature of oil pollution risk: It depends on weather conditions, on the location of the wreck but also on human activity through the safeness of the chartered boats or an act of sabotage. But one can hardly imagine that this could challenge the opportunity to invest in such assets. The amount \(X\) of compensation available is assessed by independent experts and eligibility for compensation could be easily rejected if a specific incident should be proven to be deliberate. Opportunities to influence financial quotations seem to be very unlikely.

\textsuperscript{23} See Footnote 4.

\textsuperscript{24} As already mentioned earlier in the paper, recall that the protocol will enter in force three months after eight countries at least ratified it. Only countries receiving more than 1,000,000 tons a year can join the Supplementary Fund convention. By May 20th 2004, Norway and Denmark have ratified the Supplementary Fund.
The development of catastrophe assets is also explained by their ability to reduce transaction costs, especially they mitigate the moral hazard problem at the expense of increasing the basis risk. For instance, the CBOT contracts are defined on various industry indice losses, so that an individual firm (an insurance company) has no (or a weak) incentive to declare excess losses because it will only marginally benefit from this behavior. This argument of agency cost mitigation is less appealing in the context of oil pollution risks since the IOPC Fund already applies the mutuality principle. The total amount of compensation $X$ is assessed from all incidents that occurred within a year and its estimation is not contested by oil companies. In this perspective, there is no clear advantage of financial instruments compared to reinsurance. Note however that financial instruments suitable with the coverage of oil pollution risk do not increase basis risk.

Figure 2 depicts the optimal hedging strategy when both insurance policies and financial instruments are available. It also shows the shape of the payoffs of the financial instruments that will fit with oil pollution risks. The coverage provided by financial instruments $(\beta(\alpha_iX - D^\beta - I))$ corresponds to the design of a call option. The underlying asset would correspond to $X$ (or more precisely $\alpha_iX$), that is the total compensation paid by the oil industry during a year within the international regime. The strike price could be set to $\hat{X}$. One main difference would be the slope of the payoff ($\beta$) which is lower than 1, the slope of usual option contracts. This simply means that instead of getting the difference between the index value and the striking price, the buyer of the option would get only a percentage $\beta$ from it.

To enhance the attractiveness and the liquidity of such contracts, one can imagine to build stop loss contracts. In the option context, this would correspond to a bundle of call options. For instance, one can create a bull spread by buying a call option on the index $X$ with a certain strike price and selling a call option on the same index with a higher strike price. This is a good example of the advantages of securitization which allows to decompose and repackage risk (see Doherty and Schlesinger (2002) for a general presentation). Indeed, the call option on $X$ can be decomposed in a set of adequate bull spreads, as illustrated on Figure 3.
This decomposition has at least two advantages. On the one hand, the investor would limit his risk exposure. On the other hand, it facilitates standardization. Indeed, among the characteristics of the call option that we described just above, most of them were specific to each company. The percentage of contribution to the IOPC fund $\alpha_i$ depends on the level of activity of Firm $i$ whereas $\overline{X}$ results from the maximization program of Firm $i$. The decomposition of total risk enables each firm to limit its basis risk by selling the desired risk exposure.

Earlier on, we have supposed that the cost $\pi$ of the financial instruments depends on the level of prevention $e_i$ of Firm $i$. Unless tailored-made financial contracts are proposed to a firm, a successful market of oil pollution hedging instruments requires standardization. The latter is reckoned as a key advantage of financial markets since it enables to reduce transaction costs and increase liquidity. This implies that the cost $\pi$ will depend on the prevention adopted by the whole sector ($e$) and not only on $e_i$.

5 Conclusion

The new firms' management of risks tries to encompass all types of risks. Firms have to cope with numerous sources of uncertainties, linked to the production process, to unanticipated market evolutions, non expected internal organization issues and also with uncertainties related to the existence of large risks. Large risks are often catastrophe risks. These are characterized by low frequency but may induce very large economic consequences, irreversible ecological damages and sometimes loss of human lifes. This is the case for the maritime transport of oil. To manage oil spills, the 1992 IOPC Fund calls for ex post contributions by each oil firm belonging to a member state of the Fund. However, no insurance mechanism is designed and only the mutuality principle is applied: The individual contribution corresponds to a percentage of the aggregate risk
of the Fund. Because of the limited number of members and also of the huge financial consequences induced by some oil spills, the aggregate risk cannot be fully spread across the oil firms. Hence it is useful to think about other diversification and/or coverage instruments that would help to smooth the payments of firms through time and also to increase the funds available for compensation. In this paper, we have shown that transferring part of the aggregate risk, namely the part related to catastrophic losses, to investors that have access to capital markets makes standard insurance of small and medium oil spills less costly. The mixed strategy, which consists in using the properties of standard insurance for risks that are reasonably insurable and the wide capability of financial markets to diversify risk across many people in the world for catastrophic losses, seems to be a good compromise. Moreover if firms can send to markets signals on their environmental policies, financing hedging creates additional incentives to invest in risk-reducing activities.
Figure 1. Optimal Compensation Function when only standard insurance is available
Figure 2. An example of optimal hedging strategy
(At fixed premium)
Figure 3. An example of stop loss contracts with strike prices $X, X_1, X_2$ and $X_3$
APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 1

Recall that $w_f = w_i - \alpha_i X - g(X, \hat{x}_i)$, $w_f = w_i - \alpha_i \hat{X} - g(X, \hat{x}_i)$, $g_{ei} = g_{ei}(X, \hat{x}_i)$, $g_X = g_X(X, \hat{x}_i)$. The effect on prevention of a variation in $\hat{X}$ is obtained thanks to a total differentiation of $R_{e_i}$ given by (3) with respect to (w.r.t) $e_i$ and to $\hat{X}$:

$$\frac{de_i}{d\hat{X}} = \frac{\alpha_i}{|R_{e_i}|} \left[ \int_{\hat{X}}^{L} g_{ei}.u''(w_f) f(X/e)dX + u'(w_i - \alpha_i \hat{X} - g(\hat{X}, \hat{x}_i)).F_{e_i}(X/e) \right.$$

$$- \int_{\hat{X}}^{L} g_{X}.u''(w_f) F_{e_i}(X/e)dX \right]$$

(13)

With $R_{e_i}$ the derivative of $R_{e_i}$ with respect to $e_i$.

From (2) we have that $g_{ei} < 0$. By definition we also have that $g_X > 0$: An increase in the aggregate loss $X$ of the Fund deteriorates the reputation of all firms. Finally, with $F_{e_i}$ positive the numerator of (13) is strictly positive for a risk-averse, or risk-neutral, oil firm. The denominator is obtained thanks to a differentiation of (3) w.r.t. $e_i$. With $g = g(X, \hat{x}_i)$ and\(^{25}\) $w_f(X, \hat{X}) = w_i - g(X, \hat{x}_i) - \alpha_i X 1_{\{X \leq \hat{X}\}} - \alpha_i \hat{X} 1_{\{X > \hat{X}\}}$ we have:

$$R_{e_i} = - \int_{0}^{L} g_{ei}.u'(w_f(X, \hat{X}))(X/e)dX + \int_{0}^{L} g_{ei}.u''(w_f(X, \hat{X})) f(X/e)dX$$

$$+ \int_{0}^{L} g_{Xei}.u'(w_f(X, \hat{X})) F_{e_i}(X/e)dX - \int_{0}^{L} g_{ei}.u'(w_f(X, \hat{X})) f_{e_i}(X/e)dX$$

$$- \int_{0}^{L} (\alpha_i + g_X).g_{ei}.u''(w_f) F_{e_i}(X/e)dX - \int_{0}^{L} g_X.g_{ei}.u''(w_f) F_{e_i}(X/e)dX$$

$$+ \int_{0}^{L} (\alpha_i + g_X).u'(w_f) F_{e_i} F_{e_i}(X/e)dX + \int_{0}^{L} g_X.u'(w_f) F_{e_i} F_{e_i}(X/e)dX$$

\(^{25}\)Function $1_{\{\cdot\}}$ is the indicator function, taking value one if the condition into brackets is satisfied, zero otherwise.
From the definition (2) of $g(X, x_i)$, we have that $g_{\alpha X} = g_{Xe_i} = 0$. Finally, an integration by part of the second term in the second line leads to:

$$R_{e_i e_i} = -\int_0^L g_{e_i e_i} u'(w_f(X, \tilde{X})) f(X/e) dX + \int_0^L g_{e_i e_i}^2 u''(w_f(X, \tilde{X})) f(X/e) dX$$

$$-2 \int_0^L (\alpha_i + g_X) g_{e_i} u''(w_f) F_{e_i}(X/e) dX - 2 \int_0^L g_X g_{e_i} u''(w_f) F_{e_i}(X/e) dX$$

$$+ \int_0^L (\alpha_i + g_X) u'(w_f) F_{e_i e_i}(X/e) dX + \int_0^L g_X u'(w_f) F_{e_i e_i}(X/e) dX$$

By assumption, we have $F_{e_i e_i} \leq 0$, $g_X > 0$ and $u'' < 0$. Besides, $g_{e_i e_i}$ is equal to $p_{e_i e_i} (g(X, x_i) - g(X, 0))$ (see Equation (2)). Function $g(X, \cdot)$ is increasing in $x_i$ and $p_{e_i e_i}$ is positive or equal to zero, so that $g_{e_i e_i}$ is positive. Finally $R_{e_i e_i}$ is negative (the second order conditions are satisfied) and $de_i/d\tilde{X}$ given by (13) is positive. Proposition 1 is demonstrated.

**Proof of Proposition 2**

The optimality conditions related to optimal control that must be satisfied are

$$\begin{align*}
(i) \quad H_z &= -\mu'(X) \\
(ii) \quad H_\mu &= \dot{z}(X) \\
(iii) \quad z(0) &= 0 \\
(iv) \quad z(L) &= v(W)
\end{align*}$$

and $H_C = 0, \forall X$ such that $0 < C(\alpha_i X) < \alpha_i X$. From (5) we have $H_z = 0$ so that $\mu$ is constant. Conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) are also satisfied. Because $f(X/e)$ is always positive by definition, it is possible to work with the simplified Hamiltonien $H^* = H/f(X/e)$. We have for any $X$ such that $0 < C(\alpha_i X) < \alpha_i X$:

$$H_C^* = 0$$

$$\iff u'(w_f^C(X, \tilde{X})) - \mu(1 + \lambda)u'(W_f^C) = 0$$

(14)
with \( w_f^C(X, \tilde{X}) = w_i - \alpha_iX1_{\{X \leq \tilde{X}\}} - \alpha_i\tilde{X}1_{\{X > \tilde{X}\}} + C(\alpha_iX) - Q - g(X, \tilde{x}_i) \) and \( W_f^C = W + Q - (1 + \lambda)C(\alpha_iX) \).

First, we have to show that the optimal contract displays a positive deductible. Let us define as \( J(X) \) the function given by (14) and evaluated at \( C(\alpha_iX) = 0 \) and \( K(X) \) the same function but evaluated at \( C(\alpha_iX) = \alpha_iX \). By differentiating them w.r.t. \( X \) it is easy to show that \( J(X) \) is increasing in \( X \) and \( K(X) \) is decreasing. Moreover, both functions are equal at point \( X = 0 \). Denote them \( m \) at this point: \( m = u'(w_i - Q) - \mu(1 + \lambda)v'(W + Q) \). Two cases must be considered: either \( m \) is negative or \( m \) is positive (the trivial case for which \( m = 0 \) is not analyzed).

\( \blacklozenge m > 0 \)

Since \( J(\cdot) \) is increasing in \( X \), \( m \) is the smallest value it can take. Thus \( J \) is always positive and \( C(\alpha_iX) = 0 \) is never optimal\(^{26}\). Besides, \( K(\cdot) \) is decreasing in \( X \). Then there exists a positive level of damage \( \bar{X} \) such that \( K \) is positive on \([0, \bar{X}]\) and \( C(\alpha_iX) = \alpha_iX \) is optimal on this interval. For damages higher than \( \bar{X} \), \( K \) becomes negative: from this point, coverage must be constant and an upper limit of insurance is optimal.

\( \blacklozenge m < 0 \)

In this case, \( K(X) \) is always negative and full coverage is never optimal. Besides, there exists a level of damage \( D \) such that \( J(X) \) is negative on \([0, D]\) and presents partial coverage for any damage higher than \( D \). A positive deductible \( D \) is optimal.

Following Raviv (1979), we can show that, at fixed insurance premium, a contract with full insurance of small losses and an upper limit for larger damages is always stochastically dominated by pure coinsurance when insurance is costly (namely when \( \lambda > 0 \)). The intuition is that the risk averse insured prefers a transfer of indemnities of small damages to higher ones when insurance is costly. In the same spirit, a deductible contract dominates a pure coinsurance contract in the sense of the second order stochastic dominance (Gollier and Schlesinger (1996)). Hence, the optimal contract displays a strictly positive deductible as long as the marginal cost of insurance \( \lambda \) is positive.

\(^{26}\)We have \( H_{CC}^* = u''(w_f^C) + \mu(1 + \lambda)^2v''(W_f^C) < 0 \). The second order conditions are satisfied and the result holds.
Now, we have to define the optimal marginal indemnities beyond the deductible level. This is done first on $D, \tilde{X}$ and second on $\tilde{X}, L$. By differentiating Equality (14) w.r.t. $X$ on $D, \tilde{X}$ and using it to define $\mu$ we must have, for any loss partially covered on $D, \tilde{X}$:

$$(-\alpha_i + \alpha_iC''(\alpha_i X) - g_X)u''(w_f^C) + (1 + \lambda)^2 \cdot \alpha_iC''(\alpha_i X) \cdot \mu v''(W_f^C) = 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow C''(\alpha_i X) = \frac{(1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i})u''(w_f^C)}{u''(w_f^C) + (1 + \lambda)\cdot \frac{v''(W_f^C)\cdot u'(w_f^C)}{v'(W_f^C)}}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow C''(\alpha_i X) = \frac{(1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i})\cdot R_u}{R_u + (1 + \lambda)\cdot R_v}$$

With $R_u = -u''(w_f^C)/u'(w_f^C)$ and $R_v = -v''(W_f^C)/v'(W_f^C)$. Equation (6) of Point i) is demonstrated. Equation (7) in Point i) is obtained thanks to an identical reasoning, but with $X$ in $\tilde{X}, L$ and $w_f^C = w_i - \alpha_i \tilde{X} + C(\alpha_i X) - Q - g(X, \tilde{x}_i)$. If the insurer is risk neutral we have $R_v$ equal to zero and $C''(\alpha_i X) = 1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i}$ for losses less than $\tilde{X}$ and $C''(\alpha_i X) = \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i}$ for losses higher than $\tilde{X}$. Since all terms are positive, the slope of the compensation function for any damage $X$ in $0, \tilde{X}$ and partially covered is larger than one. The deductible disappears progressively as the damage increases. For losses in $\tilde{X}, L$ $I''$ is still positive but it decreases as $X$ increases because $g_{XX}$ is negative. Consequently, from a level of damage $\overline{X}$ larger than $\tilde{X}$, marginal indemnities are close to zero and the compensation function displays a kind of upper limit.

If the insurer is risk averse and asks for a large risk premium, which means that $\lambda$ is large, the value of $C''(\alpha_i X)$ may be less than one so that coinsurance for any partially indemnified loss on $D, \tilde{X}$ is optimal. Point (ii) of Proposition 2 is demonstrated.

**Proof of Proposition 3**

A differentiation of (8) w.r.t. $e_i$ and $C$ yields:
\[
\frac{d\varepsilon_i}{dC} = \frac{1}{-R_{C\varepsilon_i}} \left[ -\int_0^L (g_{\varepsilon_i} + Q_{\varepsilon_i}) \cdot u''(w_f^C(X, \hat{X})) f(X/e^C) dX \\
- \int_0^L Q_{\varepsilon_i} \cdot u'(w_f^C(X, \hat{X})) f(X/e^C) dX \\
+ \alpha_i \int_0^{\hat{X}} (1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} - C'(\alpha_i X)) (1 - Q_C) \cdot u''(w_f^C) F_{\varepsilon_i}(X/e^C) dX \\
+ \alpha_i \int_{\hat{X}}^L (\frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} - \tilde{C}'(\alpha_i X)) (1 - Q_C) \cdot u''(w_f^C) F_{\varepsilon_i}(X/e^C) dX \right]
\] (15)

Marginal compensations \( C'(\alpha_i X) \) are always lower than or equal to \( 1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} \) at optimum (see Equation (6)), while \( \tilde{C}'(\alpha_i X) \) is always lower than or equal to \( \frac{2g_X}{\alpha_i} \) (see Equation (7)). The premium \( Q \) is equal to \( \hat{X} \int_0^L (1 + \lambda) C(X, \hat{X}) f(X/e^C) dX \), with \( C(X, \hat{X}) \equiv C(,) \) on \( [0, \hat{X}] \) and \( C(X, \hat{X}) \equiv \tilde{C}(,) \) on \( [\hat{X}, L] \). Consequently, \( Q_{\varepsilon_i} = \hat{X} \int_0^L (1 + \lambda) C(X, \hat{X}) f_{\varepsilon_i}(X/e^C) dX = -\alpha_i \int_0^L (1 + \lambda) C(X, \hat{X}) F_{\varepsilon_i}(X/e^C) dX \), which is negative. We also have that \( Q_C = (1 + \lambda) \) and \( Q_{\varepsilon_i} \) equals zero. Equation (15) becomes:

\[
\frac{d\varepsilon_i}{dC} = \frac{\lambda}{-R_{C\varepsilon_i}} \left[ \int_0^L (g_{\varepsilon_i} + Q_{\varepsilon_i}) \cdot u''(w_f^C(X, \hat{X})) f(X/e^C) dX \\
- \int_0^{\hat{X}} (1 + \frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} - C'(\alpha_i X)) \cdot u''(w_f^C) F_{\varepsilon_i}(X/e^C) dX \\
- \int_{\hat{X}}^L (\frac{g_X}{\alpha_i} - \tilde{C}'(\alpha_i X)) \cdot u''(w_f^C) F_{\varepsilon_i}(X/e^C) dX \right]
\]

The second order conditions of this problem are satisfied (the computation is similar to the one presented in the proof of Proposition 1), so that \( R_{C\varepsilon_i} \) is negative. Finally, \( \frac{d\varepsilon_i}{dC} \) is positive and Proposition 1 is demonstrated.
Proof of Proposition 4

The control variable is \( I(\alpha_i, X) \) and the state variable is \( z(X) = \int_0^X v(W + Q^3 - (1 + \delta(\beta))I(\alpha_i, t))f(t/e)dt \). The simplified Hamiltonian of Program (9) is

\[
H^\beta = u(w^1_i)1_{\{X \leq \bar{X}\}} + u(w^2_i)1_{\{X > \bar{X}\}} - e_i + \gamma(X)v(W^\beta_i),
\]

(16)

with \( \gamma(X) \) the Lagrange function, \( w^1_i = w_i - \alpha_i X - Q^3 + I(\alpha_i X) - g(X, \bar{x}_i) - \pi(\beta, e_i) \), \( w^2_i = w_i - \alpha_i X - Q^3 + \bar{T} + \beta [\alpha_i X - D^3 - \bar{T}] - g(X, \bar{x}_i) - \pi(\beta, e_i) \) and \( W^\beta_i = W + Q^3 - (1 + \delta(\beta))I(\alpha_i, X) \). Parameter \( D^3 \) is the optimal level of the deductible in this model. Function \( 1_{\{X > \bar{X}\}} \) is the indicator function, which takes value 1 when the condition into brackets is satisfied, zero otherwise. Still here, the Lagrange function is a constant \((H^\beta = 0)\). We have for any \( X \) in \( ]0, \bar{X}[ \) such that \( 0 < I(\alpha_i X) < X \):

\[
H^\beta_i = 0
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow u'(w^1_i) - \gamma(1 + \delta(\beta))v'(W^\beta_i) = 0
\]

(17)

Thanks to a proof similar to that proposed for Proposition 2, we can first show that the optimal level \( D^3 \) is positive as long as insurance is costly (\( \delta > 0 \)).

Second, by differentiating Equality (17) w.r.t. \( X \) and using it to define \( \gamma \) we must have, for any \( X \) in \( ]D^3, \bar{X}[ \) such that \( 0 < I(\alpha_i X) < X \),

\[
(-\alpha_i + \alpha_i I''(\alpha_i X) - gX).u''(w^1_i) + (1 + \delta(\beta))^2.\alpha_i.\gamma.\gamma.v''(W^\beta_i) = 0,
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow I''(\alpha_i X) = \frac{(1 + \frac{u''(w^1_i)}{\alpha_i})}{u''(w^1_i) + (1 + \delta(\beta)).v''(W^\beta_i)}
\]

\[
\Leftrightarrow I''(\alpha_i X) = \frac{(1 + \frac{u''(w^1_i)}{\alpha_i}).R}{R_u + (1 + \delta(\beta)).R_v}
\]

(18)

With \( R_u = -u''(w^1_i)/u'(w^1_i) \) and \( R_v = -v''(W^\beta_i)/v'(W^\beta_i) \). Point i) is demonstrated. For point ii), we know that \( \delta \) is decreasing in \( \beta \) and that \( \delta(0) = \lambda \). The marginal indemnities \( I'' \) and \( C'' \) (given by (6)) differ from the term \( \delta \) that appears at the denominator of \( I'' \). Hence \( I'' \) is always higher than \( C'' \) when \( \beta \) is positive. Furthermore, at
point $X = D$ we have that the derivative of the Hamiltonian associated to the standard insurance program (in Section 3), $H_C^*|_{X=D}$, equals zero:

$$H_C^*|_{X=D} = u'(w - Q - \alpha_i D - g(D, \tilde{x}_i)) - (1 + \lambda)\gamma v'(W + Q) = 0 \quad (19)$$

Besides, the derivative of the Hamiltonian associated to the mixed strategy program and evaluated at $X = D$ and $I = 0$ is written:

$$H_I^*|_{X=D} = u'(w - Q - \alpha_i D - g(D, \tilde{x}_i) - \pi) - (1 + \delta)\gamma v'(W + Q^\beta) \quad (20)$$

Now we follow the reasoning for a fixed insurance premium. In other words, we are wondering about the variation of the deductible level as mixed hedging strategies become available but for a same cost of insurance as in the standard case. Knowing that $\delta < \lambda$, $\pi \geq 0$ and that $u'(.)$ is decreasing in wealth, a comparison of (19) and (20) allows us to conclude that $H_I^*|_{X=D}$ is positive. By deriving this expression with respect to $D$, we obtain that $H_I^*|_{X=D}$ is increasing in $D$, so that the deductible must decrease in (20) in order to obtain satisfied first order conditions ($H_I^*|_{X=D^\beta} = 0$). Hence we have that $D^\beta < D$.

Point iii) is immediate. From (18), marginal indemnities increase as $\beta$ increases and, at a fixed premium, the deductible decreases. Indeed, a total differentiation of (17) evaluated at $X = D^\beta$ leads to:

$$\frac{dD^\beta}{d\beta} = -\frac{\pi_\beta u''(.) + \delta_\beta \gamma v'(.)}{(\alpha_i + \frac{\partial g(D^\beta, \tilde{x}_i)}{\partial D^\beta}).u''(.)} < 0,$$

Proposition 4 is demonstrated.

**Proof of Proposition 5**

The structures of Condition (8) and (12) differ only by the term $-\pi_{e_i} \int_0^L u'(w^\beta_j) f(X/e) dX$, which is positive. By taking this positive term into account when looking at the expected marginal benefit of prevention and by applying the same reasoning as in the proof of Point ii) of Proposition 3, Proposition 5 is demonstrated.
References


