« Fiscal shocks in a two sector open economy with endogenous markups »

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FISCAL SHOCKS IN A TWO SECTOR OPEN ECONOMY WITH ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS

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Abstract

We use a two-sector neoclassical open economy model with traded and non-traded goods and endogenous markups to investigate both the aggregate and the sectoral effects of temporary fiscal shocks. One central finding is that both the sectoral capital intensities and endogenous markups matter in determining the response of key economic variables. In particular, the model can produce a drop in investment and in the current account, in line with empirical evidence, only if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Irrespective of sectoral capital intensities, a fiscal shock raises the relative size of the non-traded sector substantially in the short-run. Additionally, allowing for the markup to depend on the number of competitors, the two-sector model can account for the real exchange rate depreciation found in the data. Finally, markup variations triggered by firm entry can raise the real wage, albeit under certain circumstances, and modify substantially the sectoral composition of GDP in the short-run.

Keywords: Non-traded Goods; Fiscal Shocks; Investment; Current Account.
JEL Classification: F41, E62, E22, F32.
1 Introduction

There has recently been a revival of interest among policy makers in the fiscal policy tool. The fiscal transmission mechanism has also attracted considerable attention in the academic literature. A number of papers have explored the ability of quantitative business cycle models, both of the neoclassical and of the new Keynesian variety to account for the data, see e.g., Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher [2004], and Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles [2007]), respectively. However, most of the analyses have been confined to closed economy models and to one-sector frameworks. In the present paper we take up the following question instead: to what extent can an open economy version of the two-sector neoclassical model account for the time-series evidence on fiscal policy transmission mechanism?

Our paper focuses on one key dimension of the fiscal policy transmission, namely the responses of investment and the current account. Assuming that government spending is predetermined relative to the other variables included in the vector autoregression (VAR) model, as suggested by Blanchard and Perotti [2002], Cardi and Müller [2011] establish that an exogenous increase in government spending lowers both investment and the current account. Such findings are consistent with the conclusions reached by Corsetti and Müller [2006], Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen [2008], and Monacelli and Perotti [2010]. In this paper, we show that an open economy with a traded and a non-traded sector can account for the simultaneous decline of investment and the current account.

The two-sector dimension of the open economy framework plays a major role in accommodating empirical findings. To see this, consider an exogenous, but temporary increase of government spending. As stressed in the classic paper by Baxter and King [1993], a representative household responds to the higher tax burden (which we assume to be lump-sum) by lowering consumption and increasing labor supply. This induces households to reduce savings, as they try to avoid a large reduction in consumption and/or a large increase in labor supply. Reduced savings imply a decline of investment or the current account, or both. Since inputs can move freely between the two sectors, the return on domestic capital remains unaffected as long as the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, so that agents find optimal to reduce both domestic capital and traded bonds. By contrast, in a small open economy model, higher labor raises the marginal product of capital.

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1 Hall [2009] compares the predictions of the neoclassical model with those derived from a new Keynesian framework.

2 The sample of countries considered by Cardi and Müller [2011], Monacelli and Perotti [2010], comprises four countries: the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia. In Cardi and Müller [2011], the period runs from 1980:1 to 2007:4, and in Monacelli and Perotti [2010] from 1980:1 to 2006:4. Bénétrix and Lane [2010] consider a panel of eleven member countries of the euro area over the period 1970-2005. All these papers adopt the identification procedure of fiscal shocks proposed by Blanchard and Perotti [2002]. The trade balance deterioration after a government spending shock is robust to the VAR identification procedure (see Gambetti [2011]).
above the return on foreign bonds so that investment is crowded in while the open economy runs a large current account deficit. Considering a two-sector rather than a one-sector model can therefore accommodate the empirical evidence mentioned above, albeit under certain conditions. When the non-traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector, higher government spending appreciates the real exchange rate which lowers sectoral capital-labor ratios. As a result, the return on domestic capital increases above the return on traded bonds so that investment is crowded in instead of being crowded-out.

A second dimension of the fiscal policy transmission that our paper addresses relates to the responses of the real wage and real exchange rate to a rise in government spending. Using a sample which comprises four countries (the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia) and running from 1954:1 to 2003:1, Perotti [2007] documents an increase in the real wage.\textsuperscript{3} Additionally, Monacelli and Perotti [2010] and Enders et al. [2011] find that the real exchange rate tends to depreciate in response to expansionary government spending shocks.\textsuperscript{4} Both the one-sector and the two-sector small open economy model fail to account for the real exchange rate depreciation and the rise in the real wage. In a one-sector model, the expansion of labor supply implies that the real wage falls dramatically as the demand for labor is downward sloping. Keeping the markup fixed, the predictions of the two-sector model also run counter to the two stylized facts mentioned above. The real wage is unaffected if the traded sector is more capital intensive or falls when the sectoral capital intensities are reversed. The reason is that in the former case, the relative price and thereby the sectoral capital-labor ratios remain unchanged while in the latter case, the relative price of tradables appreciates which drives down the sectoral capital-labor ratios.

To account for the real exchange rate depreciation and the increase in the real wage following government spending shocks, we follow Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] in allowing for the markup to be endogenous. Considering that only a limited number of intermediate good producers operate in the non-traded sector, the price-elasticity of demand and thereby the markup faced by each firm depends on the number of competitors. As the rise in government spending boosts non-traded output, profit opportunities trigger the entry of new firms. Hence, the markup falls, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. As producers perceive a more elastic demand, they are induced to raise output which gives rise to a competition effect. When the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, the competition channel produces an excess supply in the non-traded good market so that the real exchange rate depreciates. In the same time, by raising sectoral capital-

\textsuperscript{3}While Perotti’s [2007] conclusions are in line with those of Rotemberg and Woodford [1992] and Pappa [2009] for the U.S., Ramey [2011] finds that hours worked increase but real wages can rise or decline on impact, depending on the period considered. Yet, in both cases, the real wage exceed its initial level after two years.

labor ratios, the decline in the markup can boost the real wage, although only under certain circumstances. We find numerically that the duration of the fiscal shock plays a key role in determining the response of the real wage. More precisely, the competition channel predominates and the cumulative response of the real wage rate two years after the fiscal shock becomes positive only if the fiscal shock is either short-lived or long-lived.\(^5\) When the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the two-sector model fails to account for the real exchange rate depreciation and the positive response of the real wage. While the competition channel boosts non-traded output, the decline in the markup is not large enough to produce a real exchange rate depreciation. Both the relative price appreciation and the fall in the markup drive down the sectoral capital-labor ratios and thereby the real wage.

The last dimension of the fiscal policy transmission we explore is the sectoral effects of a rise in government spending. This analysis is motivated by recent estimates provided by Bénétrix and Lane [2010] which reveal that fiscal shocks have a significant impact on the sectoral composition of aggregate output and disproportionately benefit the non-traded sector. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, our numerical results show that a fiscal expansion has an expansionary effect on non-traded output but only in the short-run. In the long-run, GDP growth is mostly driven by the rise in traded output as the open economy must run a trade balance surplus to service the debt accumulated along the transitional path.

Our neoclassical framework builds on Turnovsky and Sen [1995] and Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003]. Like Coto-Martinez and Dixon, we allow for the non-traded sector to be imperfectly competitive. Our work differs from that of Turnovsky and Sen [1995] and Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] in two major respects.\(^6\) They consider the effects of permanent fiscal shocks while we examine the impact of temporary fiscal shocks of different degrees of persistence. Beyond the fact that considering a transitory increase in public spending allows us to address the VAR evidence, the effects of temporary fiscal shocks can be different to those of a permanent shock.\(^7\) Moreover, in contrast to our study, Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] restrict their analysis to the case of fixed markups while we investigate the role of

\(^5\) A long-lived and a short-lived fiscal shock last 32 quarters and 8 quarters, respectively. In the baseline scenario, the fiscal shock lasts 16 quarters, in line with estimates by Cardi and Müller [2011] for the U.S. Ramey [2011] also find that a fiscal shock lasts 4 years.


\(^7\) The reason behind this result is that after a temporary fiscal shock, consumption falls much less than after a permanent fiscal shock due to consumption smoothing behavior. Hence, savings fall so that investment is crowded out rather than being crowded in as long as the shock is transitory.
endogenous markups as well.

Closely related to our paper is the study by Ramey and Shapiro [1998] who simulate a two-sector neoclassical model with costly capital reallocation. In a similar spirit, we achieve a better understanding of aggregate effects of fiscal shocks by investigating sectoral effects. In contrast to our study, they consider a closed economy so that they do not address the behavior of the current account or the real exchange rate. In addition, they do not discuss the role of sectoral capital intensities. Finally, whereas Ramey and Shapiro analyze the implications of costly capital mobility, we rather conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the duration of the fiscal shock and the elasticity of labor supply, considering a traded sector alternatively more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector, and contrasting the case of a fixed markup with that of an endogenous markup, and the case of free-entry with that of no-entry.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the specification of a two-sector model with traded and non-traded goods. While the non-traded sector is imperfectly competitive, our model encompasses three cases: free-entry with fixed markup, no-entry, and endogenous markup. In section 3, we analyze the effects of a permanent rise in government spending. In section 4, we abstract from endogenous markups and provides an analytical exploration of the effects of temporary fiscal shocks, focusing on the responses of investment and the current account. In section 5, we report the results of our numerical simulations. Section 6 explores the case of endogenous markups quantitatively, focusing on the reactions of the real exchange rate and the real wage. In Section 7, we summarize our main results and present our conclusions.

2 The Framework

We consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is small in terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given world interest rate, $r^\ast$. A perfectly competitive sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript $T$ that can be exported and consumed domestically. An imperfectly competitive sector produces a non-traded good denoted by the superscript $N$ which is devoted to physical capital accumulation and domestic consumption. The traded good is chosen as the numeraire.

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8More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided in an Appendix which is available from the authors on request.

9As stressed by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], allowing for traded capital investment would not affect the results (qualitatively). Furthermore, like Burstein et al. [2004], we find that the non tradable content of investment accounts for a significant share of total investment expenditure (averaging to 60%).

10The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small open economy.
2.1 Households

At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods denoted by $C^T$ and $C^N$, respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution function:

$$C (C^T, C^N) = \left[ \varphi \left( C^T \right) \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} + (1 - \varphi) \left( C^N \right) \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right] ^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $\varphi$ is the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle ($0 < \varphi < 1$) and $\phi$ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution ($\phi > 0$).

The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction $L(t)$ of this unit as labor, while the remainder, $l \equiv 1 - L$, is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working. Households decide on consumption and worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility:

$$U = \int_{0}^{\infty} \left\{ \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma_C}} C(t)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma_C}} - \gamma \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{\sigma_L}} L(t)^{1 + \frac{1}{\sigma_L}} \right\} e^{-\beta t} dt,$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $\beta$ is the consumer’s discount rate, $\sigma_C > 0$ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption, and $\sigma_L > 0$ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.

Factor income is derived by supplying labor $L$ at a wage rate $W$, and capital $K$ at a rental rate $r^K$. Households receive all the profits $\Pi^N$ from the firms in the non traded sector. In addition, they accumulate internationally traded bonds, $B(t)$, that yield net interest rate earnings of $r^*B(t)$. Denoting lump-sum taxes by $Z$, the households’ flow budget constraint can be written as:

$$\dot{B}(t) = r^*B(t) + r^K(t)K(t) + W(t)L(t) + \Pi^N - Z - P_C (P(t)) C(t) - P(t)I(t),$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where $P_C$ is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non-traded goods $P$. The last two terms represent households’ expenditure which includes purchases of consumption goods and investment expenditure $PI$. Aggregate investment gives rise to overall capital accumulation according to the dynamic equation

$$\dot{K}(t) = I(t) - \delta_K K(t),$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where we assume that physical capital depreciates at rate $\delta_K$. In the rest of this paper, the time-argument is suppressed to increase clarity.

Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (3) by $\lambda$ the first-order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:

$$C = (P_C \lambda)^{-\sigma_C},$$  \hspace{1cm} (5a)

$$L = \left[ (\lambda / \gamma) W \right]^{\sigma_L},$$  \hspace{1cm} (5b)

$$\dot{\lambda} = \lambda (\beta - r^*),$$  \hspace{1cm} (5c)

$$r^K/P - \delta_K + \dot{P}/P = r^*,$$  \hspace{1cm} (5d)
plus the appropriate transversality conditions. In an open economy model with a representative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect access to world capital markets, we impose $\beta = r^*$ in order to generate an interior solution. This standard assumption made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, $\lambda$, will undergo a discrete jump when individuals receive new information and must remain constant over time from thereon, i.e. $\lambda = \bar{\lambda}$.

The homogeneity of $C(.)$ allows a two-stage consumption decision: in the first stage, consumption is determined, and the intratemporal allocation between traded and non-traded goods is decided at the second stage. Applying Shephard’s lemma gives $C^T = (1 - \alpha_C) P_C C$ and $PC^N = \alpha_C P_C C$, with $\alpha_C$ being the share of non-traded goods in the consumption expenditure.

### 2.2 Firms

Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, $K^T$ and $K^N$, and labor, $L^T$ and $L^N$, according to constant returns to scale production functions, $Y^T = F(K^T, L^T)$ and $Y^N = H(K^N, L^N)$, which are assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal products. Both sectors face two cost components: a capital rental cost equal to $r^K$, and a labor cost equal to the wage rate $W$. The traded sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. As described in more details below, the non-traded sector contains a large number of industries and each industry is comprised of differentiated monopolistically competitive intermediate firms.\(^{11}\)

The final non-traded output, $Y^N$, is produced in a competitive retail sector with a constant-returns-to-scale production which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral non-traded goods.\(^{12}\) We denote the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral goods by $\omega > 0$. In each sector, there are $N > 1$ firms producing differentiated goods that are aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties within a sector is denoted by $\epsilon > 0$, and we assume that this is higher than the elasticity of substitution across sectors, i.e. $\epsilon > \omega$ (see Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]). Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one variety is a price setter. Output $X_{i,j}$ of firm $i$ in sector $j$ is produced using capital and labor, i.e.

\(^{11}\)This assumption relies upon observed empirical facts. The markups in the traded sector we estimated for a sample of 13 OECD economies average to 1.2 with small dispersion across countries whereas for the non-traded sector, the markups average to 1.4 with large dispersion across countries. Additionally, assuming that the traded sector is imperfectly competitive would not affect qualitatively the results, as long as the markup is fixed. Estimates of the markups charged by the traded sector are available on request while estimates for the non-traded sector are reported in Table 3.

\(^{12}\)This setup builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto’s [2008] framework which is a multi-sector extension of the Linnemann’s [2001] model of an endogenous markup. Details of its derivation are therefore relegated to the Appendix, which is available on request.
\( x_{i,j} = H(K_{i,j}, L_{i,j}) \). Each firm chooses capital and labor by equalizing markup-adjusted marginal products to the marginal cost of inputs, i.e. \( PH_K/\mu = r^K \), and \( PH_L/\mu = W \), where \( \mu \) is the markup over the marginal costs. At a symmetric equilibrium, non-traded output is equal to \( Y^N = N\chi = H(K^N, L^N) \).

We now show that under some assumptions, the markup is endogenous and depends on the number of competitors. According to the Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] assumption, the number of competitors is large enough within each sector to yield a fixed price-elasticity of demand. Yet, as emphasized by Yang and Heijdra [1993], this assumption is an approximation when the final good is aggregated by a finite number of intermediate goods. We depart from the usual practice, following Galí [1995], in assuming that the number of firms is large enough so that we can ignore the strategic effects but not so large that the effect of entry is minuscule on the firm’s demand curve. Consequently, the price elasticity of demand faced by a single firm is no longer constant and equal to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, but rather a function of the number of firms \( N \). Taking into account that output of one variety does not affect the price of final non-traded output \( P \), but influences the sectoral price level, in a symmetric equilibrium, the resulting price elasticity of demand is:

\[
e(N) = \epsilon - \frac{(\epsilon - \omega)}{N}, \quad N \in (1, \infty).
\]

Assuming that \( \epsilon > \omega \), the price elasticity of demand faced by one single firm is an increasing function of the number of firms \( N \) within a sector. Henceforth, the markup \( \mu = \frac{\epsilon}{\omega} \) decreases as the number of competitors increases, i.e. \( \mu_N < 0 \).

Using constant returns to scale in production and denoting fixed costs by \( FC \), producer’s profit in the non-traded sector is:

\[
\pi^N = P \left[ \frac{Y^N}{N} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) - FC \right].
\]

In the following, we consider three cases: i) free-entry and fixed markup, ii) no-entry, iii) free-entry and endogenous markup. In the first case, because the number of competitors is large, \( \epsilon \) is equal to \( \epsilon \). Hence, the producer of a variety charges a constant markup \( \mu = \frac{\epsilon}{\omega} \). Additionally, since at each instant, new intermediate good producers may enter and produce a new variety, each intermediate-good producer makes zero-profit. In the second case, profits are no longer driven down to zero as the number of firms is fixed. In the third case, we assume that a finite number of firms operate within each sector producing non-tradable varieties. Hence, the markup is endogenous while free-entry yields zero-profits.

Denoting by \( k^i \equiv K^i/L^i \) the capital-labor ratio for sector \( i = T, N \), enables us to express the production functions in intensive form, i.e. \( f(k^T) \equiv F(K^T, L^T)/L^T \) and \( h(k^N) \equiv H(K^N, L^N)/L^N \). Production functions are supposed to take a Cobb-Douglas

\(^{13}\)Details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.
form: \( f(k^T) = (k^T)^\theta^T \), and \( h(k^N) = (k^N)^\theta^N \), where \( \theta^T \) and \( \theta^N \) represent the capital income share in output in the traded and non-traded sectors respectively. Since inputs can move freely between the two sectors, marginal products in the traded and the non-traded sector equalize:

\[
\theta^T (k^T)^{\theta^T-1} = \frac{P}{\mu} \theta^N (k^N)^{\theta^N-1} \equiv r^K, \tag{8a}
\]

\[
(1 - \theta^T) (k^T)^{\theta^T} = \frac{P}{\mu} (1 - \theta^N) (k^N)^{\theta^N} \equiv W. \tag{8b}
\]

These static efficiency conditions state that the sectoral marginal products must equal the labor cost \( W \) and capital rental rate \( r^K \).

Aggregating labor and capital over the two sectors, gives us the resource constraints for the two inputs:

\[
L^T + L^N = L, \quad K^T + K^N = K, \tag{9}
\]

where \( L_N = N L_N \) and \( K_N = N K_N \).

2.3 Government

The final agent in the economy is the government which finances government expenditure by raising lump-sum taxes \( Z \) in accordance with the balanced condition:

\[
G^T + PG^N = Z. \tag{10}
\]

Public spending consists of purchases of traded goods, \( G^T \), and non-traded goods, \( G^N \). Since one prominent feature of the time series of government spending is that its non tradable content is substantial, at around 90%, in the following we therefore concentrate on the effects of a rise in public purchases of non-traded goods.\(^{14}\)

2.4 Short-Run Static Solutions

System (8a)-(8b) can be solved for sectoral capital-labor ratios: \( k^T = k^T (P, \mu) \) and \( k^N = k^N (P, \mu) \). Using the fact that \( W \equiv \theta^T (k^T)^{\theta^T-1} \), the wage rate also depends on \( P \) and \( \mu \), i.e. \( W = W (P, \mu) \), with \( W_P \gtrless 0, W_\mu \lesssim 0 \). An increase in the relative price \( P \) raises or lowers \( W \) depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Since a rise in \( \mu \) produces opposite effects on variables to those induced by a rise in \( P \), we concentrate on the relative price effects to save space.

Plugging sectoral capital-labor ratios into the resource constraints and production functions leads to short-term static solutions for sectoral output: \( Y^T = Y^T (K, L, P, \mu) \) and

\(^{14}\)The data for thirteen OECD countries summarized in Table 3 reveal that the non-tradable content of government spending averages about 90%. Government spending on traded goods \( G^T \) is considered for calibration purpose. The effects of a permanent and temporary fiscal expansion on \( G^T \) are explored in the Appendix, available on request.
\( Y^N = Y^N (K, L, P, \mu) \). According to the Rybczynski effect, a rise in \( K \) raises the output of the sector which is more capital intensive, while a rise in \( L \) raises the output of the sector which is more labor intensive. An increase in the relative price of non tradables exerts opposite effects on sectoral outputs by shifting resources away from the traded sector towards the non-traded output.

By substituting first \( W = W (P, \mu) \), eqs. (5a)-(5b) can be solved for consumption and labor supply as follows: \( C = C (\bar{\lambda}, P) \) with \( C_{\bar{\lambda}} < 0, C_P < 0 \), and \( L = L (\bar{\lambda}, P, \mu) \) with \( L_{\bar{\lambda}} > 0, L_P \geq 0, L_\mu \leq 0 \). A rise in the shadow value of wealth induces agents to cut their real expenditure and to supply more labor. By raising the consumption price index, an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables drives down consumption. Finally, depending on whether \( k^T \geq k^N \), a rise in \( P \) stimulates or depresses labor supply by raising or lowering \( W \).

### 2.5 Free-Entry Vs. No-Entry

Free-entry implies that profits are driven down to zero. The zero-profit condition determines the number of firms. Assuming that the number of competitors is large enough so that the markup is fixed, eq. (7) yields \( N = Y^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) / FC \). When the number of competitors is not so large, the zero profit condition (7) can be solved for the number of intermediate producers by substituting first \( Y^N = Y^N [K, L (\bar{\lambda}, P, \mu), P, \mu] \) and keeping in mind that \( \mu = \mu (N) \). We have:

\[
N = N (K, P, \bar{\lambda}) , \quad N_K \geq 0, N_P > 0, N_{\bar{\lambda}} \leq 0 . \tag{11}
\]

Since \( N \) co-varies with non-traded output \( Y^N \), a rise in \( P \) unambiguously stimulates entry while an increase in \( K \) (resp. in \( \bar{\lambda} \)) raises the number of competitors \( N \) if the non-traded sector is more (resp. less) capital intensive than the traded sector.

Under no-entry, the markup is fixed and profits can be positive. Substituting first the short-run static solution for non-traded output into (7), we can solve for aggregate profits in the non-traded sector denoted by \( \Pi^N = N \pi^N \):

\[
\Pi^N = \Pi^N (K, P, \bar{\lambda}) , \quad \Pi^K > 0, \Pi_P > 0, \Pi_{\bar{\lambda}} \leq 0 , \tag{12}
\]

where the signs of the profit function follows from the fact that profits are positively related with \( Y^N \) and thus depend on sectoral capital intensities.

### 2.6 Macroeconomic Dynamics

We now describe the dynamics. While the case of endogenous markups is analytically untractable, we discuss its implications when necessary. The adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-state is described by a dynamic system which comprises two equations.
First, the dynamic equation for the relative price of non-traded goods (5d) equalizes the return on domestic capital and traded bonds $r^*$. Second, the accumulation equation for physical capital clears the non-traded goods market along the transitional path. This can be written as:

$$
\dot{K} = \frac{Y^N(K, L, P)}{\mu} + \frac{\Pi^N(K, P, \lambda)}{P} - C^N(\lambda, P) - G^N - \delta_K K,
$$

(13)

where $L = L(\lambda, P, \mu)$ and $\mu = \mu[N(K, P, \lambda)]$ when the markup is endogenous.

Dynamic equations (5d) and (13) form a separate subsystem in $P$ and $K$. Inserting short-run static solutions, linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting the long-term values with a tilde, we obtain in a matrix form:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\dot{K} \\
\dot{P}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
b_{11} & b_{12} \\
b_{21} & b_{22}
\end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix}
K(t) - \tilde{K} \\
P(t) - \tilde{P}
\end{pmatrix},
$$

(14)

with

$$
b_{11} = \left(\frac{Y^N}{\mu} - \delta_K\right) + \frac{\Pi^N}{P} - \eta_{\mu,N} \frac{N_K}{N} \frac{Y^N}{\mu} \left(1 - \frac{Y^N}{{Y^N}}\right),
$$

(15a)

$$
b_{12} = \left(\frac{Y^N}{\mu} - C^P\right) + \left(\frac{\Pi^N}{P} - \frac{\Pi^N}{P^2}\right) - \eta_{\mu,N} \frac{N_P}{N} \frac{Y^N}{\mu} \left(1 - \frac{Y^N}{{Y^N}}\right),
$$

(15b)

$$
b_{21} = \eta_{\mu,N} \frac{N_K}{N} \frac{\tilde{P}h_k}{\mu} \left[1 + (1 - \theta^N) \frac{k_N^N}{k_N^N}\right],
$$

(15c)

$$
b_{22} = \frac{Y^T}{K} + \eta_{\mu,N} \frac{N_P}{N} \frac{\tilde{P}h_k}{\mu} \left[1 + (1 - \theta^N) \frac{k_N^N}{k_N^N}\right],
$$

(15d)

where $\eta_{\mu,N} \equiv \mu_N N/\mu$ represents the elasticity of the markup to the number of competitors.

When assuming free-entry and fixed markup, we have $\eta_{\mu,N} = 0$ and $\Pi^N = 0$. Then the sub-system possesses two eigenvalues (one positive and one negative) equal to $\left(\frac{Y^N}{\mu} - \delta_K\right)$ and $Y^T/\tilde{P}$. Assuming no-entry implies $\eta_{\mu,N} = 0$, so that the sub-system has two eigenvalues (one positive and one negative) equal to $Y^N_K - \delta_K$ and $Y^T/\tilde{P}$. Irrespective of the relative sizes of the sectoral capital-labor ratios, the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path, considering either free-entry or no-entry. Denoting the negative eigenvalue by $\nu_1$ and the positive eigenvalue by $\nu_2$, the general solutions for $K$ and $P$ are:

$$
K(t) - \tilde{K} = B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \quad P(t) - \tilde{P} = \omega_1^2 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \omega_2^2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},
$$

(16)

where $B_1$ and $B_2$ are constants to be determined and $\omega_i = (\nu_i - b_{11})/b_{12}$ is the element of the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue $\nu_i$ (with $i = 1, 2$). Two features of the two-sector economy’s equilibrium dynamics deserve special attention. First, as long as the

---

15To get (13), we used the fact that $Y^N - NFC = \Pi^N/P + Y^N/\mu$.

16Note that $\left(\frac{\Pi^N}{P} - \frac{\Pi^N}{P^2}\right) = Y^N_P \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mu}\right) > 0$.

17When assuming an endogenous markup, we have $\Pi^N = 0$ while $\eta_{\mu,N} < 0$. In this case, we cannot sign the determinant of the Jacobian matrix and we have to recourse to numerical analysis to determine transitional dynamics.
markup is fixed, if \(k^T > k_N\), the temporal path for the relative price remains flat for the no-arbitrage condition (5d) to be fulfilled. Hence, in this case, \(\omega_2^1 = 0\). If capital intensities are reversed, then \(\omega_2^1 < 0\). As a consequence, the relative price exhibits transitional dynamics; \(P\) and \(K\) move in opposite directions. While the transitional dynamics for \(P\) degenerate if \(k^T > k_N\) when the markup is fixed, an endogenous markup restores dynamics for the relative price. Second, transitional dynamics are quite different depending on whether government spending increases permanently or transitorily. After a permanent fiscal shock, to ultimately approach the steady-state \((\bar{K}, \bar{P})\) and to satisfy the transversality condition \(\lim_{t \to \infty} P(t)K(t)e^{-r^*t} = 0\), it is necessary to set the arbitrary constant \(B_2\) equal to zero.

When the expansionary policy is only transitorily implemented (i.e. the fiscal shock only lasts for \(T\) periods), two periods have to be considered, namely a first period (labelled period 1) over which the temporary policy is in effect, and a second period (labelled period 2) after the policy has been removed. While the small country converges towards its new long run equilibrium over period 2, i.e. \(B_2\) must be set to zero, the economy follows unstable paths over period 1. These are described by eqs. (16).

Substituting eqs. (13) and (10) into eq. (3), we obtain the dynamic equation for the current account (denoted by \(CA \equiv \dot{B}\)):

\[
\dot{B} = r^* B + Y^T (K, L, P, \mu) - C^T (\bar{\lambda}, P) - G^T, \tag{17}
\]

where \(Y^T - C^T - G^T\) correspond to net exports. Eq. (17) states that the current account is equal to the balance of trade denoted by \(NX\) plus interest receipts on outstanding assets. Linearizing (17) around the steady-state and substituting (16), the general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:

\[
B(t) = \bar{B} + \left[ (B_0 - \bar{B}) - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2 \right] e^{r^*t} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \Phi_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}. \tag{18}
\]

When the disturbance is temporary, we must take into account that assets (i.e. domestic capital and foreign bonds) have been accumulated (or decumulated) over the period 1. The time path for net foreign assets is described by eq. (18) during this unstable period. As stocks of assets are modified over period 1 (i.e. \((0, T)\)), we have to take new initial conditions (i.e. \(B_T\) and \(K_T\)) into account when the fiscal policy is removed.

### 2.7 Steady-State

We now discuss the salient features of the steady-state. Setting \(\bar{P} = 0\) into (5d), we obtain the equality between the return on domestic capital income and the exogenous world interest

\[
\frac{\bar{P}}{r^*} = \frac{\sigma_C}{\sigma_L} \left( 1 + \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\mu}} \left[ \sigma_C \bar{C}N - \sigma_L \bar{K}^T (v_2 + \delta_K) \right] \right). \tag{20}
\]

When assuming a fixed markup, if \(k^T > k_N\), then \(\Phi_1 = -\frac{\bar{P}_1}{\bar{P}_2} < 0\) and \(\Phi_2 = -\frac{\bar{P}_1}{\bar{P}_2} \left[ 1 + \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\mu}} \left[ \sigma_C \bar{C}N - \sigma_L \bar{K}^T (v_2 + \delta_K) \right] \right]\). If \(k^T > k_N\), then \(\Phi_1 = -\frac{\bar{P}_1}{\bar{P}_2} \left[ 1 + \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\mu}} \left[ \sigma_C \bar{C}N - \sigma_L \bar{K}^T (v_2 + \delta_K) \right] \right]\) and \(\Phi_2 = -\frac{\bar{P}_1}{\bar{P}_2} \left[ 1 + \frac{\bar{\lambda}}{\bar{\mu}} \left[ \sigma_C \bar{C}N - \sigma_L \bar{K}^T (v_2 + \delta_K) \right] \right]\). Following a permanent budget policy, the economy moves along a stable path; hence, the trajectory for \(B(t)\) is obtained by invoking the transversality condition \(\lim_{t \to \infty} \bar{\lambda}B(t)e^{-r^*t} = 0\) which implies that \(B_2 = 0\).
rate:
\[ h_k \left\{ k^N \left( \tilde{P}, \mu \left( \tilde{N} \right) \right) \right\} / \mu \left( \tilde{N} \right) - \delta_K = r^*. \]  (19)

According to this equality, the long-run level of \( P \) remains unaffected by a rise in government spending, as long as the markup is fixed.

Setting \( \dot{K} = 0 \) into (13) yields the market-clearing condition for the non-traded good:
\[ Y^N \left( \tilde{K}, \tilde{L}, \tilde{P} \right) / \mu \left( \tilde{N} \right) + \tilde{\Pi}^N / \tilde{P} = C^N \left( \tilde{\lambda}, \tilde{P} \right) + \tilde{I} + G^N, \]  (20)

where \( \tilde{I} = \delta_K \tilde{K} \) and aggregate profits in the non-traded sector are given by:
\[ \tilde{\Pi}^N = \tilde{P} \left\{ Y^N \left( \tilde{K}, \tilde{L}, \tilde{P} \right) \left[ 1 - \left( 1 / \mu \left( \tilde{N} \right) \right) \right] - NFC \right\}. \]  (21)

When assuming free-entry, the zero profit condition \( \tilde{\Pi}^N = 0 \) can be solved for the number of firms \( \tilde{N} \).

Setting \( \dot{B} = 0 \) into (17) leads to the market-clearing condition for the traded good:
\[ Y^T \left( \tilde{K}, \tilde{L}, \tilde{P} \right) = -r^* \tilde{B} + C^T \left( \tilde{\lambda}, \tilde{P} \right) + G^T. \]  (22)

For the country to remain ultimately solvent, we have to impose one single and overall intertemporal budget constraint:\(^{20}\)
\[ B_0 - \tilde{B} = \Phi_1 \left( K_0 - \tilde{K} \right), \]  (23)

where \( \Phi_1 < 0 \) describes the effect of capital accumulation on the the external asset position and \( K_0 \) and \( B_0 \) are the initial conditions.\(^{21}\) When assuming free-entry, the five equations (19)-(23) jointly determine \( \tilde{P}, \tilde{K}, \tilde{N}, \tilde{B}, \) and \( \tilde{\lambda} \). With a fixed number of firms, these five equations determine \( \tilde{P}, \tilde{K}, \tilde{\Pi}^N, \tilde{B}, \) and \( \tilde{\lambda} \).

### 3 Permanent Fiscal Expansion

To build intuition on fiscal policy transmission, it is convenient to explore first the effects of permanent fiscal shocks since the underlying mechanism is basically the same as after temporary fiscal shocks which are analyzed in section 4. For ease of computation, we provide analytical results only when the markup is fixed.\(^{22}\) We compare the case of free-entry with that of no-entry, but discuss the case of endogenous markups as well.

As long as the markup is fixed, the relative price \( \tilde{P} \) remains unaffected. Let us first assume that the traded sector is more capital intensive. A permanent fiscal expansion

\(^{20}\)Substituting first the short-run solutions, then linearizing the dynamic equation of the internationally traded bonds (17) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, substituting the solutions for \( K(t) \) and \( P(t) \) and finally invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint (23).

\(^{21}\)Since for all parameterizations, \( \Phi_1 \) is always negative, we assume \( \Phi_1 < 0 \) from now thereon. Hence, capital accumulation deteriorates the current account along the transitional path.

\(^{22}\)Only in this case are we able to derive analytical expressions for the impact and steady-state effects.
produces an increase in the shadow value of wealth as taxes must be raised to balance the budget which reduces households’ disposable income. The rise in the marginal utility of wealth is:

\[
\frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \bigg|_{perm} = \frac{\bar{\lambda} \bar{P}}{(\sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C P_C \tilde{C})} > 0. \tag{24}
\]

When \(k^T > k^N\), the dynamics for the relative price degenerate so that \(C\) and \(L\) adjust instantaneously to their steady-state levels. The negative wealth effect induces agents to permanently lower their consumption \(\tilde{C}\) and raise their labor supply \(\tilde{L}\). According to Rybczynski’s theorem, a rise in labor supply raises the output of the sector which is more labor intensive. The labor inflow stimulates investment as reflected by the first term (in the numerator) on the RHS of (25):

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{perm} = \frac{\left(\sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^N \nu_2 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T\right)}{(\sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C P_C \tilde{C})} \geq 0. \tag{25}
\]

Yet, because the decline in real expenditure is spread over the two goods, the fall in \(C^N\) is not large enough to more than offset the rise in \(G^N\). Hence, less resources can be devoted to capital accumulation as reflected by the second term (in the numerator) on the RHS of (25). If \(\sigma_L\) is not too small, investment is crowded-in on impact. As \(C\) and \(L\) adjust instantaneous to their new long-run levels, private savings remains unchanged. Hence, the investment boom leads to a current account deficit.

When \(k^N > k^T\), the effects of a permanent fiscal expansion on key macroeconomic variables remain qualitatively similar to those obtained with the reversal of capital intensities, although now the transitional adjustment of \(P\) produces a novel channel. More precisely, the rise in \(G^N\) raises the relative price of non-tradables \(P\) on impact. The initial appreciation in \(P\) drives down further consumption and induces agents to supply less labor. The reason is that the rise in relative price shifts resources towards the non-traded sector. Since the traded sector is relatively more labor intensive, the capital-labor ratios fall which in turn reduces the wage rate. Because labor income is smaller than if \(k^T > k^N\), the marginal utility of wealth rises further:

\[
\frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \bigg|_{perm} = \frac{\bar{\lambda} \left[ \bar{P} - \frac{\nu_1}{(\nu_2)^2} \tilde{\Psi} \right]}{(\sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C P_C \tilde{C}) + \frac{\nu_1}{(\nu_2)^2} \left( \tilde{\Psi} \right)^2} > 0, \tag{26}
\]

where \(\omega_1^1 < 0\), and \(\tilde{\Psi} = \left[ \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N \right]\) is positive if \(\sigma_L\) is not too small. While higher labor supply exerts a negative impact on investment by reducing \(Y^N\), a permanent fiscal expansion stimulates capital accumulation due to the appreciation in \(P\) which shifts resources towards this sector, as shown formally below:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{perm} = \frac{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^T \nu_1 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T \right)}{\nu_2 \left[ (\sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C P_C \tilde{C}) + \frac{\nu_1}{(\nu_2)^2} \left( \tilde{\Psi} \right)^2 \right]} > 0. \tag{27}
\]

\(^{23}\)Note that the term in square brackets in the denominator of (26) and (27) is positive.
The initial appreciation in $P$ also induces agents to lower private savings as they experience transitorily a fall in labor income. Both the investment boom and the drop in private savings deteriorate the current account.

Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, GDP increases on impact as labor supply rises. Overall output increases even more in the long-run due to capital accumulation.

When assuming no-entry, the effects of a permanent fiscal shock are qualitatively identical. It is worthwhile noticing that in this case, a rise in $G^N$ raises aggregate profits in the non-traded sector. More precisely, the present discounted value of profits unambiguously increases as shown formally below:

$$
\frac{d\Pi}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = -\frac{\hat{P}(1 - \frac{1}{\tilde{\eta}})(\nu_1 + \delta_K)}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)} \left\{ \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} \left[ \frac{\sigma_L \tilde{k}^T (r^* + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N}{\lambda} + 1 \right] \right\} > 0,
$$

(28)

where we assume that $k^T > k^N$ to preserve analytical tractability and $\Pi = \int_0^{\infty} \Pi^N(t)e^{-r^*t}dt$. According to the first term in braces on the RHS of (28), the wealth effect raises profits by increasing labor supply and thereby non-traded output. The second term shows that, all else equal, a rise in $G^N$ exerts a negative impact on capital accumulation which impinges positively on $\Pi$ along the transitional path. As the present value of profit rises, the shadow value of wealth increases less than under free-entry. When $k^T > k^N$, we have:

$$
\frac{d\lambda}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = \frac{\hat{P} \nu_2 \lambda}{(r^* - \nu_1)} \left[ \frac{1}{\left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} \right) + \tilde{\Gamma}} \right] > 0,
$$

(29)

where $\tilde{\Gamma} = \frac{\hat{P}(\nu_1 + \delta_K)}{r^* - \nu_1} \left[ \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{k}^T (r^* + \delta_K) \right] > 0$. Since $0 < \frac{\nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} < 1$ and $\tilde{\Gamma} > 0$, the increase in $\lambda$ given by (29) is moderated compared with (24). As a result, consumption declines by a smaller amount and labor rises less. This results in a lower GDP growth. Finally, while private savings are unaffected under free-entry, they increase with a fixed number of firms due to higher profits which in turn moderate the current account deficit.

Finally, an endogenous markup restores transitional dynamics for $P$ when $k^T > k^N$. More precisely, the increase in $G^N$ produces profit opportunities which triggers entry in the non-traded sector and thereby lowers the markup. As producers perceive a more-elastic demand, they are induced to produce more. Because the rise in $Y^N$ is larger compared with the case of a fixed markup, the real exchange rate depreciates on impact. In the same time, the drop in the markup is large enough to shift resources towards the non-traded sector. Since the traded sector is more capital intensive, capital-labor ratios rise which raise the wage rate. As a result, households are induced to supply more labor which raises further GDP compared with the case of a fixed markup.

\[24\] When $k^N > k^T$, both short-run and long-run effects are similar to those found with a fixed markup.
4 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: An Analytical Exploration

As the shocks identified in the VAR literature are transitory, in this paper, we focus the theoretical analysis on temporary increases in government spending. We therefore explore analytically the effects of a temporary fiscal expansion, focusing on the responses of investment and the current account. To save space, we discuss only the impact effects.\textsuperscript{25} As will become clear later, a two-sector model with fixed markups can account for the decline in investment and the current account deficit, in line with the evidence. We therefore assume that the number of operating firms is large enough so that the markup is fixed, which allows us to preserve analytical tractability. While the markup remains unchanged, we compare the responses under free-entry with those when the number of firms is fixed.\textsuperscript{26}

We suppose that at time $t = 0$, the government raises public spending on the non-traded good and at time $T$ it removes the expansionary budget policy.\textsuperscript{27} The higher $T$, the stronger the persistence of the shock.\textsuperscript{28}

4.1 Free-Entry and Transmission of Government Spending

We investigate first the impact effects of a temporary rise in $G^N$ under free-entry. In particular, we provide analytical results for initial responses of investment and the current account.

Let us first assume that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. As after a permanent fiscal shock, the drop in their disposable income induces agents to cut their real expenditure and supply more labor. Yet, the wealth effect is smaller as shown formally below:

$$\frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{temp} = \lambda_{GN} \left(1 - e^{-r^*T}\right) > 0,$$

where $\lambda_{GN}$ is given by (24). According to (30), the shorter the fiscal expansion (i.e. the smaller $T$), the less $\lambda$ increases. Since the increase in $G^N$ is only temporary, the present value of the necessary tax increase to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is less than for an equal but permanent increase in $G^N$. Because $L$ rises by a lower amount, non-traded output increases less. Additionally, the decline in $C^N$ is now moderated. Hence, higher public spending $G^N$ may crowd in or crowd out capital investment.

\textsuperscript{25}Steady-state effects are explored in section 5 when discussing the numerical results.
\textsuperscript{26}We focus on the reactions of the real wage and the real exchange rate in section 6 by considering endogenous markups.
\textsuperscript{27}We assume further that all agents perfectly understand at the outset the temporary nature of the policy change. Hence, at time $T$, there is no new information and thereby no jump in the marginal utility of wealth at this date.
\textsuperscript{28}To derive formal solutions after a temporary fiscal shock, we applied the procedure developed by Schubert and Turnovsky [2002].
Formally, the initial reaction of investment is ambiguous:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -\left\{1 + (1 - e^{-r^*T}) \left[ \frac{\sigma_L \bar{\lambda} \hat{k}^T \bar{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma C \bar{P} \tilde{C}^N}{\sigma C \bar{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma L \bar{W} \bar{L}} \right] \right\} \leq 0. \tag{31}
\]

Setting \(\sigma_L = 0\) in (31), then the reaction of investment becomes \(dI(0)/dG^N = \alpha_C (1 - e^{-r^*T}) - 1 < 0\); it is unambiguously negative as the fall in \(C^N\) is not large enough to compensate for the rise in public spending \(G^N\). As long as \(\sigma_L > 0\), the sign of (31) is no longer clear-cut. The less responsive the labor supply (i.e., the smaller \(\sigma_L\)) or the shorter the fiscal expansion (i.e., the lower \(T\)), the more likely it is that investment is crowded out by public spending.\(^{29}\)

Turning to the initial response of the current account, we obtain after computation:

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -\bar{P} e^{-r^*T} + \bar{P} \left[ 1 + (1 - e^{-r^*T}) \left[ \frac{\sigma_L \bar{\lambda} \hat{k}^T \bar{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma C \bar{P} \tilde{C}^N}{\sigma C \bar{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma L \bar{W} \bar{L}} \right] \right] \leq 0. \tag{32}
\]

The first term on the RHS of (32) represents the negative impact of consumption smoothing behavior on the current account. The second term on the RHS of (32) represents the influence of investment on the net foreign asset position. When setting \(\sigma_L\) to zero into (32), then the initial current account response, given by \(dCA(0)/dG^N = \bar{P} (1 - \alpha_C) (1 - e^{-r^*T})\), becomes unambiguously positive. The reason is that the decline in investment is large enough to more than offset the drop in private savings induced by the smoothing behavior. The more responsive the labor supply (i.e., \(\sigma_L\) is higher), the smaller the decline in investment on impact, and thereby the more likely it is that the open economy experiences a current account deficit. The length of the shock \(T\) exerts two opposite effects on the initial response of the current account. On the one hand, as the fiscal shock is shorter (i.e., \(T\) becomes smaller) agents are more willing to reduce private savings which amplifies the deterioration in the net foreign asset position. On the other hand, investment declines more which exerts a positive effect on the current account. The overall effect will be determined numerically.

We now analyze the adjustment of key macroeconomic variables when \(k^N > k^T\). As after a permanent fiscal shock, the marginal utility of wealth increases:

\[
\frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \lambda C^N \left\{ \left(1 - e^{-r^*T} \right) - \frac{r^* (\Phi_1 - \Phi_2) \left( e^{-r^*T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right)}{\nu_2 \bar{P} - r^* (\Phi_1 - \Phi_2)} \right\} > 0, \tag{33}
\]

where \(\Phi_1 - \Phi_2 = -\frac{\omega_1}{\rho_2} \left[ \sigma C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma L \hat{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right] < 0\). According to the first term in braces on the RHS of (33), the wealth effect after a temporary fiscal expansion is smaller than that following a permanent increase in \(G^N\). Yet, the second term on the RHS of (33) amplifies the wealth effect as workers lower savings since they know that the decline in wages driven by the real exchange rate appreciation is only transitory.

\(^{29}\)More precisely, when \(T\) is smaller than the critical date \(\hat{T} = -\frac{1}{r^*} \ln \left[ \frac{\sigma C G^T - \sigma L \hat{k}^T \rho_{\nu_2}}{\sigma L \hat{k}^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma C G^N} \right]\), then investment is crowded out by public spending.
While the wealth effect exerts a positive impact on labor supply, the real exchange rate appreciation counteracts this effect by driving down the wage rate. The shorter the fiscal expansion, the smaller the wealth effect and the more likely it is that labor supply falls.

As after a permanent fiscal shock, the real exchange rate appreciation impinges positively on investment by shifting resources towards the non-traded sector. Formally, we find that the rise in $P$ influences investment through two channels:

$$\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}_{temp} = \left(\nu_2 - \nu_1\right) \left(1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}\right) - \frac{\nu_1}{\nu_2} \frac{\bar{\psi}}{\lambda} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N}_{temp} - 1 \geq 0,$$

where $\bar{\psi} = \left[\sigma_L \bar{L} \bar{k}T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \bar{C}N\right]$ is positive if $\sigma_L$ is not too small. The first term on the RHS of (34) represents the positive impact on $I$ triggered by the appreciation in $P$ arising from the rise in $G^N$ which produces an excess of demand in the market. The second term on the RHS reinforces the relative price effect on investment as the wealth effect raises labor which reduces $Y^N$ and thereby amplifies the excess of demand. As a result, $P$ appreciates more. The last term on the RHS of (34) reflects the rise in $G^N$ that withdraws resources from physical capital accumulation. While after a permanent a fiscal shock, investment unambiguously increases, investment may respond negatively to a temporary rise in $G^N$ since the real exchange rate appreciation is smaller.

Finally, compared with a permanent fiscal shock, the initial current account reaction is ambiguous:

$$\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N}_{temp} = -\bar{P} e^{-r^* T} + \frac{\nu_1}{\nu_2} \frac{\bar{\psi}}{\lambda} \frac{dP(0)}{dG^N}_{temp} - \bar{P} \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}_{temp} \leq 0.$$

As shown by the first term on the RHS of (35), because agents are induced to smooth consumption, the consecutive fall in savings lowers the current account. The second term on the RHS of (35), which is absent if $k^T > k^N$, reinforces the negative influence on the current account. The reason is that the real exchange rate appreciation lowers labor revenues which in turn induces agents to reduce private savings. The last term reflects the influence of investment on the net foreign asset position. The relationship between $CA$ and the length of the shock is unclear due to ambiguous effects on savings. The shorter the fiscal expansion, the larger the smoothing behavior but the lower the initial real exchange rate appreciation and thereby the smaller the decline in wages. If these two opposite effects on savings offset each other, the open economy should experience a smaller current account deficit since it is more likely that investment declines when the fiscal shock is short-lived.

4.2 No-Entry and Transmission of Government Spending

We now investigate the impact effects of a temporary rise in $G^N$ by assuming no-entry. To preserve analytical tractability, we assume that $k^T > k^N$.\(^\text{30}\)

\(^\text{30}\)The effects of temporary fiscal shocks under free-entry are qualitatively similar to those with a fixed number of firms, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. Hence, to save space, we restrict our discussion to
Following a temporary fiscal expansion, it can be shown after some calculation that the change in the present discounted value of profits is smaller than that after a permanent rise in $G^N$:

$$\frac{d\Pi}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \left(1 - e^{-r^* T}\right) \frac{d\Pi}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{perm}} > 0.$$  

(36)

Because the rise in the present value of profit moderates the increase in $\tilde{\lambda}$, labor supply increases less than under free-entry. As a result, $Y^N$ rises by a smaller amount. Moreover, agents are less willing to cut real expenditure which moderates the decline in $C^N$. Hence, it is more likely that investment is crowded out by public spending. The initial reaction of investment enables us to show this point formally:

$$\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -\left\{ 1 + \frac{\nu_2}{r^* - \nu_1} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T}\right) \left[ \frac{\sigma_L \tilde{\lambda} \tilde{L} \tilde{K} \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta L) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} N}{(\sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \tilde{\Gamma})} \right] \right\} \leq 0.$$  

(37)

As reflected by the second term in braces on the RHS of (37), since $\tilde{\Gamma} > 0$ and $0 < \frac{\nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} < 1$, the positive influence on investment induced by higher labor supply and smaller consumption in non tradables is moderated under no-entry.\(^{31}\)

The fall in private savings is dampened due to increased profits which moderates the initial decline in the current account. Formally, the response of the current account is:

$$\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -\frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} e^{-r^* T} - \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} \leq 0.$$  

(38)

Because $0 < \frac{\nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} < 1$, the first term on the RHS of (38) shows that the smoothing behavior with a fixed number of firms exerts a smaller negative impact on the current account as the disposable income falls less. The second term reflects the influence of investment response given by (37) on the current account. Since the term $\frac{\nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)}$ is smaller than one, the impact of investment on the current account is moderated compared to that under free-entry. More precisely, the second term on the RHS can be decomposed into two parts. The first component corresponds to the direct effect of capital accumulation on the current account which is also present under free-entry. Formally, this component is equal to $-\tilde{P} \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}}$. The second component is equal to $-\frac{\Pi^N_N}{r^* - \nu_1} \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}}$.\(^{32}\) It reflects the influence of capital accumulation on savings, and thereby on the current account, through the change in profits. If capital falls, $\Pi^N$ rises which in turn induces agents to consume more and thereby to disave. Hence, if investment drops by the same amount as under free-entry, its positive influence on the current account is smaller with a fixed number of firms.

\(^{31}\)However, with a fixed number of firms, the economy adjusts more rapidly towards the steady-state, which is reflected by a larger $|\nu_1|$. This is turn produces a greater reaction of labor on impact and thereby it is less likely that investment is crowded out by public spending.

\(^{32}\)To decompose the second term on the RHS of (38) into two parts, we used the fact that $\nu_2 = r^* - \mu_1 + Y^N_K \left(1 - \frac{1}{\nu}\right)$ which implies that $\frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} = \tilde{P} + \frac{\Pi^N_N}{r^* - \nu_1} \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}}$ since $\tilde{P} Y^N_K \left(1 - \frac{1}{\nu}\right) = \Pi^N_K$. 


5 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: A Quantitative Exploration

In this section, we analyze the effects of a temporary rise in government spending quantitatively. For this purpose we solve the model numerically. We therefore discuss parameter values first, before turning to the long- and short-term effects of the fiscal shock.

5.1 Baseline Parametrization

We start by describing the calibration of consumption-side parameters that we use as a baseline. The world interest rate which is equal to the subjective time discount rate $\beta$ is set to 1%. One period of time corresponds to a quarter. The elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods $\phi$ is set to 1.5 (see e.g. Cashin and Mc Dermott [2003]). The weight $\varphi$ of consumption in tradables is set to 0.5 in the baseline calibration to target a non tradable content in total consumption expenditure (i.e., $\alpha_C$) of 45%, in line with our empirical evidence.\(^{33}\) The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption $\sigma_C$ is set to 0.5 because empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggest values smaller than one. One critical parameter is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply $\sigma_L$. In our baseline parametrization, we set $\sigma_L = 0.5$, in line with evidence reported by Domeij and Flodén [2006].

We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical capital depreciates at a rate $\delta_K = 1.5\%$ to target an investment-GDP ratio of 20%. The shares of sectoral capital income in output take two different values depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. In line with our estimates, if $k_T > k_N$, $\theta_T$ and $\theta_N$ are set to 0.4 and 0.3, respectively.\(^{34}\) Alternatively, when $k_N > k_T$, we choose $\theta_T = 0.3$ and $\theta_N = 0.4$. Setting the elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods, $\omega$, to 1 and the elasticity of substitution between varieties, $\epsilon$, to 4 yields a markup $\mu$ charged by the non-traded sector of 1.35, which is close to our estimates (see Table 3).

We set $G_N$ and $G_T$ so as to yield a non-tradable share of government spending of 90%, and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%.\(^{35}\) We consider three different scenarios for the duration of the fiscal shock: a short-lived ($T = 8$), a medium-lived ($T = 16$), and a long-lived ($T = 32$) fiscal shock. As the baseline scenario, we take the medium-lived fiscal shock, i.e. a shock that lasts 16 quarters. In this case, the cumulative increase in government spending

\(^{33}\)Table 3 shows the non tradable content of GDP components for thirteen OECD countries.

\(^{34}\)Table 3 gives the values of $\theta^j$ ($j = T, N$) for thirteen OECD countries. The values of $\theta_T$ and $\theta_N$ we have chosen correspond roughly to the averages for countries with $k_T > k_N$. For these values, the non tradable content of GDP and labor are 63% and 66%, respectively. When $k_N > k_T$, we can use reverse but symmetric values for $\theta_N$ so that the size of $k_T - k_N$ remains unchanged. For $\theta_T = 0.3$ and $\theta_N = 0.4$, the non tradable content of GDP and labor are 69% and 65%, respectively.

\(^{35}\)Close to the average of the values reported in Table 3, the ratios $G_T/Y_T$ and $G_N/Y_N$ are 6% and 28% in the baseline calibration.
spending corresponds approximately to the cumulative increase in US government spending six years after an exogenous spending shock by one percentage point of GDP according to the estimates reported by Cardi and Müller [2011]. For \( T = 16 \), we also conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the elasticity of labor supply (i.e. we set \( \sigma_L \) to 0.1 and 1).

5.2 Long-Run Effects

A temporary increase in government spending has permanent or long-run effects, because the model features the zero-root property.\(^{36}\) Since government spending reverts back to its initial level at time \( T \), in the long-run (i.e. in the steady-state) changes are only driven by the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth. Confronted with a fall in their disposable income, agents are induced to permanently lower their consumption and increase hours worked. Panel A of Table 1 gives the numerical results for the long-run effects of a temporary fiscal expansion. In the baseline scenario, agents cut real expenditure by 0.07% of GDP while they raise labor supply by 0.12% as a result of the decrease in real disposable income.

The open economy accumulates physical capital in the long-run, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. When \( k^T > k^N \), higher labor and lower consumption produces an excess supply in the non-traded good market which leads to a rise in \( \tilde{K} \). If \( k^N > k^T \), an excess of demand arises only if \( \sigma_L \) is not too small which requires an increase in the capital stock. Hence, a fiscal shock boosts unambiguously GDP in the long-run. Importantly, a temporary fiscal shock raises traded output since to service the debt accumulated over the transition, the economy must run a trade balance surplus which is achieved through an increase in \( \tilde{Y}T \).

By contrast, a temporary fiscal shock may give rise to a contraction in non-traded output as government spending returns back to its initial level and \( C^N \) declines.

Panel A of Table 1 also gives the numerical results with a fixed number of firms (see the sixth and the twelfth column). In this case, we find that, regardless of sectoral capital intensities, a fiscal expansion increases the present value of profit \( \Pi \) given by:\(^{37}\)

\[
\Pi = \int_0^T \Pi^N(t)e^{-r^*t}dt + \int_T^{\infty} \Pi^N(t)e^{-r^*t}dt,
\]

where we have to consider two sub-periods, i.e., \((0, T)\) and \((T, \infty)\). As shown in the last line of panel A, a temporary fiscal expansion increases \( \Pi \) by 4.28% of initial non-traded output if \( k^T > k^N \) and by 3.96% if \( k^N > k^T \). Higher \( \Pi \) moderates the increase in the marginal utility of wealth. Hence, as shown in the first line of panel A, consumption falls less while labor increases by a smaller amount. This mitigates the rise in \( \tilde{K} \). As increases in labor and capital are lower when assuming no-entry, GDP rises less.

\(^{36}\) Technically, this follows from the assumption that \( \beta = r^* \) which requires the joint determination of the transition and the steady-state.

\(^{37}\) More details about the computation of (39) can be found in the Appendix.
5.3 Short-Run Effects

We now turn to the short-run effects of the fiscal expansion. We take the medium-lived spending shock as our baseline scenario, but we also refer to short-lived and long-lived fiscal shocks, as the length of fiscal stimulus may vary across countries (see e.g., Cardi and Müller [2011]). Panels B and C of Table 1 show the results for this situation, as well as for a number of alternative scenarios. While panel B gives the response on impact, panel C displays the cumulative responses over the first two years (i.e. eight quarters) after the shock.

Before analyzing in the detail the role of sectoral reallocation in shaping the short-run dynamics in response to a temporary increase in government spending, we should mention the set of empirical evidence established by Cardi and Müller [2011]. It is found that in all the countries in their sample, an exogenous increase in government spending raises output, and induces a simultaneous decline of investment and the current account. In the following, we discuss the predictions of our model for the behavior of these variables when $k_T > k_N$ and when $k_N > k_T$.

While employment and thereby GDP increase in all the scenarios where $k_T > k_N$, labor supply and output rise slightly or decrease when the sectoral capital intensities are reversed. The reason is that when $k_T > k_N$, agents are induced to supply more labor as a result of the wealth effect. By contrast, when $k_N > k_T$, the appreciation of the real exchange rate drives down the wage rate which in turn counteracts the wealth effect. Interestingly, we find that employment and thereby GDP falls on impact if $\sigma_L$ is raised from 0.5 to 1. The reason is that for a given change in the shadow value of wealth, the relative price must appreciate more as a result of the larger labor outflow. Hence, the consecutive decrease in $W$ is large enough to induce agents to supply less labor, which reduces GDP by 0.05% on impact.

In the model, the initial reaction of investment is ambiguous as long as labor supply is elastic. Numerically, we find that its short-run response depends heavily on sectoral capital intensities. On impact, an increase in $G^N$ crowds out investment only if the traded sector is more capital intensive. While non-traded output expands as a result of the increase in labor supply, the rise in public spending $G^N$ produces an excess of demand which must be eliminated by a drop in investment. As shown in the seventh line of panel B of Table 1, the less elastic labor supply is, the larger the crowding-out effect of investment. Note that with a fixed number of firms, the size of the crowding-out of investment is similar. By contrast, if the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the increase in $G^N$ triggers an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables $P$ which stimulates $Y^N$ and thereby investment, in all scenarios. The cumulative responses reported in the third line of panel C of Table 1 show that a fiscal expansion crowds in investment by about 3.22% of initial
GDP if \( k^N > k^T \), while investment is crowded out by 3.16% if \( k^T > k^N \). The investment boom when \( k^N > k^T \) triggers a positive cumulative response of output, as summarized in the fifth line of panel C in Table 1. By contrast, the decline in investment when \( k^T > k^N \) implies a smaller cumulative response of GDP, across all scenarios.\(^{38}\)

As shown in the eight line of panel B of Table 1, the open economy experiences a current account deficit, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. In both cases, agents smooth consumption by reducing private savings which in turn deteriorate the net foreign asset position. When \( k^T > k^N \), the decline in the current account triggered by the fall in savings is moderated by the drop in investment. The longer the fiscal expansion (i.e., \( T = 32 \)) or the more responsive labor supply is (i.e., \( \sigma = 1 \)), the larger the current account deficit. In both cases, investment falls less which amplifies the decline in the current account. When the sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the current account deteriorates more, i.e., by -1.90% of initial GDP instead of -0.20%, due the increase in investment and the real exchange rate appreciation which lowers wages by reducing sectoral capital-labor ratios and thereby induces agents to decrease savings. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, with a fixed number of firms, the size of the current account deficit is smaller because savings fall less due to higher profits.

### 5.4 Transitional Adjustment

We now discuss the dynamic effects. The transitional paths of key variables under the baseline and alternative scenarios are displayed in Figure 1. The responses of GDP, investment and current account are expressed in percentage of the initial steady-state output, while the real exchange rate is given as the percentage deviation from the initial steady state. Horizontal axes measure quarters. When the reaction of the variable is sensitive to the elasticity of labor supply, we compare the baseline scenario (solid line) to alternative scenarios. The dashed-dotted line gives the results for a low labor supply elasticity (i.e., \( \sigma = 0.1 \)), the dotted line for a high labor supply elasticity (i.e. \( \sigma = 1 \)), and the dashed line for the case of no-entry.

We start with the adjustment of labor which is displayed in the third line. If the traded sector is more capital intensive, the temporal path for \( L \) is flat as the relative price \( P \) remains unaffected. With a fixed number of firms, the wealth effect is smaller so that labor increases less. When \( k^N > k^T \), the dynamics for \( L \) no longer degenerate as a result of the depreciation in the real exchange rate (after its initial appreciation) along the transitional path. The consequent increase in the wage rate \( W \) induces agents to supply more labor.

---

\(^{38}\) As shown in the fifth line of panel C in Table 1, the cumulative response of GDP at a two-year horizon is negative in two scenarios when \( k^T > k^N \): when \( \sigma \) is low and when the fiscal shock is short-lived. In these two scenarios, the response of labor supply is limited, \( Y_N \) rises less, and the excess demand in the non-traded good market becomes larger, which in turn produces a larger decline in investment.
during the transitional period.

The transitional path of investment is also quite distinct, depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Along the transitional path, capital accumulation clears the non-traded good market. When \( k^T > k^N \), the size of the crowding-out of investment reduces over time, but when \( k^N > k^T \), investment decreases monotonically as the depreciation in the relative price \( P \) lowers non-traded output. After about 2 years, the investment flow becomes negative and the open economy decumulates physical capital until the fiscal policy is removed. At time \( T \), government spending \( G^N \) reverts back to its initial level which releases resources for capital accumulation. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, investment is crowded in.

The temporal path for GDP is driven by the adjustments in both labor and capital. In the case \( k^T > k^N \), the dynamics for GDP are the mirror image of capital accumulation: the slowdown in GDP growth as government spending is raised originates from the crowding out of investment. By contrast, when \( k^N > k^T \), the temporal path of output is hump-shaped: GDP growth first increases as labor supply rises, and then slows down as a result of the decline in investment which starts after about two years. At the time the fiscal policy is removed, the economy experiences an investment boom which boosts GDP in both cases. While in a one-sector model, the response of output increases with labor supply responsiveness (as stressed by Baxter and King [1993]), this is not the case when we consider a two-sector model. Considering that \( k^T > k^N \) and raising \( \sigma_L \) from 0.5 to 1 increases the cumulative GDP response from 0.32\% to 0.55\%. By contrast, when \( k^N > k^T \), the reaction of GDP decreases from 0.69\% to 0.58\%, as a result of the drop in the wage rate which depresses labor supply. With a fixed number of firms, the cumulative GDP response is smaller (0.20\% against 0.32\% when \( k^T > k^N \) and 0.59\% against 0.69\% when \( k^N > k^T \)), because labor supply increases less.

Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, the current account stays in deficit while government spending is raised. In the case \( k^T > k^N \), the decumulation of foreign bonds reflects the negative impact of consumption smoothing behavior on the current account, even though the crowding out of investment counteracts this effect. When assuming no-entry, the consumption smoothing behavior is smaller which moderates the current account deficit. If the sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the depreciation in the relative price of non tradables reduces investment which exerts a positive impact on the current account. Yet, in the latter case, the current account deficit at an horizon of two years is almost three times larger than if \( k^T > k^N \), as shown in the fourth line of panel C of Table 1.
5.5 Sectoral Decomposition of the Effects of Fiscal Shocks

The sectoral decomposition of the effects of fiscal shocks sheds light on the propagation mechanism in an open economy. The impact and cumulative responses of sectoral outputs are summarized in the last two lines of panels B and C of Table 1, respectively. Interestingly, the sectoral outputs change in opposite directions, both on impact and along the transitional path. In the benchmark scenario, assuming that $k^T > k^N$, agents raises the labor supply by 0.12% which induces a shift of employment towards the more labor intensive sector. As a result, non-traded output increases by 0.32% of GDP while traded output declines by 0.24% of GDP. If sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the appreciation in the relative price of non-tradables is large enough to more than offset the Rybczynski effect which boosts non-traded output by 1.92% of initial GDP while the traded sector experiences a decline by the same amount. Hence, GDP remains unchanged on impact in the case $k^N > k^T$. Interestingly, raising $\sigma_L$ amplifies the dispersion of sectoral output responses.

While the same picture emerges with a fixed number of firms, the dispersion of sectoral output responses is moderated, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. When $k^T > k^N$, as labor supply increases less, the Rybczynski effect exerts a smaller impact on sectoral outputs. If $k^N > k^T$, the real exchange rate appreciates less which reduces the expansionary effect on $Y^N$ and moderates the contraction in $Y^T$.

The fifth line of Figure 1 depicts the transitional paths of sectoral outputs expressed as percentage deviations from the initial steady-state values scaled by the initial GDP. The solid line depicts the transitional path for traded output while the dotted line shows the dynamics for $Y^N$. Along the transitional path, sectoral outputs vary in opposite directions as a result of the reallocation of inputs across sectors. When $k^T > k^N$, capital decumulation produces a fall in traded output while non-traded output expands. Whereas sectoral outputs diverge in this configuration, $Y^T$ and $Y^N$ converge when $k^N > k^T$. More precisely, the relative price depreciation raises traded output and drives down non-traded output. Finally, as shown in the fifth and sixth line of panel A of Table 1, long-run GDP growth is driven by traded output growth. The rise in traded output is required in the long-run to produce an improvement in the balance of trade, regardless of sectoral capital intensities.

5.6 Taking the Model to the Data

Since time-series evidence on the effects of fiscal shocks, in particular on key variables like investment, current account, and GDP, is now available, we decided to compare our model’s predictions with the empirical results.

Three notable papers have estimated the effects of fiscal shocks on the trade balance: Beetsma, Giuludori and Klassen [2008], Cardi and Müller [2011], Monacelli and Perotti [2010]. While the first paper includes only GDP and trade variables in its VAR model, the
other two also include components of GDP such as investment. All these papers use the Blanchard-Perotti identification scheme that assumes that government spending is predetermined within the quarter relative to the other variables included in the VAR model. Yet, they differ in their sample of countries: Beetsma et al. [2008] consider fourteen European Union countries and use a panel vector auto-regression approach; Cardi and Müller [2011] and Monacelli and Perotti [2010] estimate the effects of fiscal shocks for four countries: Canada, Australia, the UK and the US. All three papers find that an exogenous increase in government spending raises output and lowers the current account. Additionally, Cardi and Müller and Monacelli and Perotti report a substantial decline in investment following a fiscal expansion. The ability of our model to predict such empirical facts is mixed, as it relies upon sectoral capital intensities.

A rise in government spending crowds out investment only if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Intuitively, households lower savings to avoid a large reduction in consumption and/or a large increase in labor supply. Reduced savings imply a decline of investment or the current account, or both. Since inputs can move freely between the two sectors, the return on domestic capital remains unaffected in a two-sector model as long as $k^T > k^N$ so that agents find optimal to reduce both domestic capital and traded bonds. When $k^N > k^T$, the real exchange rate appreciates which lowers sectoral capital-labor ratios and thus raises the return on domestic capital. As a result, agents find optimal to accumulate physical capital and to decumulate traded bonds. It is worthwhile noting that a one-sector small open economy model (see e.g., Karayalçın [1999]) cannot produce a drop in investment after a fiscal shock because the increased labor supply raises the marginal product of capital which leads to more investment.

We find that the current account deteriorates in all our model scenarios, in line with empirical evidence. In the model, the short-run worsening in the foreign asset position originates from the drop in the private savings. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, the consumption smoothing behavior induces households to decumulate foreign bonds. If $k^N > k^T$, the current account deteriorates further as savings fall more and investment rises instead of decreasing.

Empirical studies generally find that a fiscal expansion tends to raise output. Our model produces a significant increase in GDP on impact in the benchmark scenario if $k^T > k^N$ since the real wage does not decrease in this case. If $k^N > k^T$, output is almost unaffected. Yet, in this case, the cumulative response of GDP at an horizon of two years becomes substantial across all scenarios, as shown in the fifth line of panel C of Table 1.

It is interesting to compare our results when $k^T > k^N$ (panel C of Table 2) with the numbers documented in empirical studies. By estimating a VAR model on quarterly time-series data for the U.S., Australia, the U.K, and Canada, covering the period 1980-
2007, Cardi and Müller [2011] find that cumulative impulse responses after two years range between 0.3 and 1.1 for output, between -0.1 and -1.1 for investment, and -0.1 and -1.8 for the current account. While our model overpredicts both the crowding out of investment and the current account deficit, it predicts pretty well the GDP response, falling in the range of VAR evidence.

Finally, since our model predicts the sectoral impact of fiscal shocks, it is interesting to compare our results with empirical data in this area. Only a few previous studies have estimated the effects of a boost to government spending on sectoral outputs. Among these, Bénétrix and Lane [2010] find that fiscal spending shocks generate a shift in the sectoral composition of output as public purchases disproportionately benefit the non-traded sector. This finding is in line with our numerical results reported in the two last lines of panel B of Table 1. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities and across all the scenarios, a rise in government spending boosts non-traded output, more so if the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, and less so if the number of firms is fixed.

< Please insert Table 1 about here >

< Please insert Figure 1 about here >

6 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: The Case of Endogenous Markup

Several papers have stressed that the variation in the number of competitors and the consecutive change in the markup provides an important magnification mechanism, see e.g., Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008], Wu and Zhang [2000], Zhang [2007], all of whom consider one-sector models. We therefore decide to revisit quantitatively the effects of temporary fiscal shocks by allowing for the markup to be endogenous. Since the long-run effects remain almost unchanged compared to those in the case of fixed markup, we will not discuss them further. Rather, we will concentrate on how an endogenous markup modifies the short-run adjustment of key variables, in particular the real wage and the real exchange rate, and influences the sectoral composition of GDP.

Before we proceed any further, we recall the conclusions of empirical studies. Perotti [2007] finds that the real wage responds positively to a fiscal shock. Estimates by Monacelli and Perotti [2010] show that the real exchange rate depreciates in the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and Canada, while Enders et al. [2011] confirm this finding for the U.S. As
shown in section 5, a two-sector model can produce the positive impact on output and the simultaneous drop in investment and the current account after a fiscal shock as long as the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. However, it fails to produce the real exchange rate depreciation or the rise in the real wage. Since markup variations affect the relative price $P$ and the wage rate $W$, we decide to investigate whether the predictive power of the two-sector model would improve if the markups were endogenous.

### 6.1 Short-Run Effects

We analyze the short-term effects of fiscal shocks when the markup is endogenous, focusing on the shift in the real exchange rate and the adjustment of the real wage. The latter has been estimated as the ratio of the wage rate to the consumption price index. Numerical results for impact and cumulative effects are summarized in panels B and C of Table 2.\(^{39}\) The baseline calibration is identical to that described in section 5.1. Figure 1 depicts the transitional paths when the markup is endogenous.

**Case $k^T > k^N$**

We first consider the situation when the traded sector is more capital intensive. As the number of firms, and thereby the markup, adjusts over time, the dynamics for the real exchange rate are restored and driven by the no-arbitrage equation according to which the return on domestic capital must be equalized with the return on traded bonds:

$$
\frac{h_k \{k^N [P, \mu(N)]\}}{\mu(N)} + \frac{\dot{P}}{P} - \delta_K = r^*.
$$

The markup $\mu$ depends on the number of firms $N$ which drives profits down towards zero in the non-traded sector at each instant of time.

As shown in the second line of panel B of Table 2, $P$ drops on impact across all scenarios, as long as $k^T > k^N$. Intuitively, because a temporary fiscal shock has an expansionary effect on non-traded output, profit opportunities trigger firm entry which reduces the markup. As firms perceive a more elastic demand, they produce more. Hence, an excess supply now arises in the non-traded good market so that the real exchange rate depreciates on impact.

While the initial decline in $P$ is fairly small, the first line of panel C of Table 2 reveals that the real exchange rate depreciation becomes substantial at an horizon of two years. The reason is as follows. The real exchange rate depreciation shifts resources towards the traded sector. Since the non-traded sector is more labor intensive, the sectoral capital-labor ratios fall which in turn raises the return on capital (since $k^N$ is lower). According to (40), for the no-arbitrage condition to hold, the real exchange must decline over time, i.e., $\dot{P}/P < 0$. However, at some date, the decline in the markup is large enough to offset the

\(^{39}\)To aid comprehension, panel B of Table 2 also shows the initial reaction of the wage rate $W$.
impact of the relative price on the return of capital. As shown in the sixth line of Figure 1, when $k^T > k^N$, after eight quarters, the real exchange appreciates.

The reaction of the wage rate is the result of two opposite effects. The real exchange rate depreciation exerts a negative impact on $W$ by reducing sectoral capital-labor ratios. By contrast, the decline in the markup increases $W$. As shown in the third line of panel B of Table 2, the wage rate decreases on impact as the relative price channel predominates. The second line of panel C shows that the two-year horizon cumulative response of the real wage is negative for the baseline scenario. Yet, as displayed in Figure 1, the dynamic path for the real wage shows that it increases along the transitional path and exceeds its initial level after about 6 quarters. Only if the fiscal shock is short-lived or long-lived (i.e., $G^N$ is raised over 8 or 32 quarters), does the cumulative response of the real wage becomes positive. After a long-lived fiscal shock, both non-traded output expansion and, as a consequence, firm entry are larger. Hence, the decline in the markup is large enough to produce a positive cumulative response of the real wage. Following a short-lived fiscal shock, the real exchange rate appreciates rapidly after its short-term depreciation, and it has a positive impact on the wage rate.

Let now investigate how the markup variations modify the responses of key economic variables, relative to those obtained with a fixed markup. First, as a result of the initial drop in the wage rate, labor supply increases more moderately. Second, the real exchange rate depreciation induces a shift of resources towards the traded sector. As shown in the tenth line of panel B of Table 2, traded output now expands (instead of declining) in all scenarios, except that of a long-lived fiscal shock. Third, as shown in the two last lines of panel B of Table 2, while non-traded output increases very slightly on impact in the baseline scenario, $Y^N$ decreases substantially if the fiscal shock is short-lived (i.e., $T = 8$) or the labor supply is weakly responsive (i.e., $\sigma_L = 0.1$), because the wealth effect is smaller or the labor supply reacts less to the wealth effect. As a consequence, investment is crowded out by a larger amount (almost 1% of initial GDP rather than 0.66% when the markup is fixed). Hence, the open economy experiences a small current account surplus on impact; yet, panel C of Table 2 reveals that the external asset position worsens very rapidly and dramatically in the short-run. Fourth, as labor supply increases less, the cumulative response of GDP summarized in panel C remains smaller than if the markup was fixed.

To summarize, the two-sector model can produce a real exchange rate depreciation but fails to trigger a positive cumulative response of the real wage for the baseline duration of the fiscal shock, i.e. for $T = 16$. The cumulative response after two years of the real wage becomes positive only when the fiscal expansion is short-lived or long-lived.

**Case $k^N > k^T$**

While the two-sector model does a fairly good job of accommodating most of the evi-
dence reported by empirical studies if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, the predictive power of the two-sector model is weak if sectoral capital intensities are reversed.

As discussed above, a fiscal shock lowers the markup. As demand becomes more elastic, non-traded output increases further which exerts a negative impact on $P$. However, as shown in the second line of panel B of Table 2, the real exchange rate appreciates instead of depreciating. Hence, the competition channel is not large enough to lower $P$ on impact. Both the real exchange appreciation and the fall in the markup produce a fall in sectoral-capital labor ratios which in turn raises the return on domestic capital. Hence, according to the no-arbitrage condition (40), the real exchange rate must depreciate over time. Since $P$ remains above its initial value, the real exchange rate appreciates substantially after two years, as shown in the first line of panel C of Table 2, which enters in sharp contradiction with empirical evidence.

How does the real wage react to a temporary fiscal expansion? The decline in sectoral capital-labor ratios drives down the wage rate. While $W$ falls by 0.28% in the baseline scenario as shown in the third line of panel B of Table 2, the real wage declines further (i.e., by 0.32%) because the cost of consumption goods increases. The last line of Figure 1 reveals that the real wage fails to exceed its original value along the transitional path.

The GDP response to a fiscal shock when $k_N > k_T$ is negative in most of scenarios, due the substantial decline in the real wage which exerts a negative impact on labor supply. More precisely, $L$ increases only if $\sigma_L$ is low or the fiscal shock is long-lived. Furthermore, the competition channel amplifies the increase in investment. The reason is that a more elastic demand produces a larger increase in non-traded output than if the markup was fixed so that investment is crowded in further. Consequently, the open economy experiences a larger current account deficit. Whereas non-traded output expands substantially, traded output falls dramatically across all scenarios as a result of the appreciation in the real exchange rate and the markup’s decline.

< Please insert Table 2 about here >

6.2 Sectoral Effects

We now turn to the sectoral impact of fiscal policy. This will allow us to investigate whether the competition channel amplifies or reduces the heterogeneity in sectoral output responses.

When $k_T > k_N$, the competition channel modifies the distribution of the increase in GDP across sectors substantially, as summarized in the tenth and eleventh line of panel B of Table 2. With a fixed markup, traded output falls in all scenarios, while the fiscal shock
boosts non-traded output. But if $\mu$ is endogenous, the real exchange rate depreciation is strong enough to boost traded output on impact, as long as the fiscal shock does not last too long. The reason is that when the fiscal shock is long-lived, the wealth effect is substantial and thereby counteracts the negative impact on $L$ of the decline in $W$. As a consequence, the labor supply increases substantially and shifts towards the non-traded sector.

With regard to the transitional dynamics, as shown in the sixth line of Figure 1, while the real exchange rate continues to depreciate, the crowding-out of investment together with the rise in labor supply boost $Y^N$ but depress $Y^T$. The results displayed in the two last lines of panel C of Table 2 show that with an endogenous markup, the cumulative responses of traded and non-traded output are -3.84% and 4.05% of initial GDP respectively, while the cumulative responses are -4.11% and 4.42%, respectively, with a fixed markup. Hence, when $k^T > k^N$, the decline in $\theta$ reduces the heterogeneity in the responses of sectoral outputs.

If $k^N > k^T$, the patterns of the transitional adjustment of sectoral output remain approximately the same as those found with a fixed markup. Yet, the competition channel amplifies the dispersion of sectoral output responses. More precisely, non-traded output rises by 2.2% of initial GDP (rather than about 1.9% when the markup is fixed).

7 Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that the open economy version of the two-sector neoclassical model with traded and non-traded goods can account for the empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal shocks, but only if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. In particular, a robust conclusion emerging from empirical papers is that government spending tends to crowd out both investment and the current account. Considering both traded and non-traded goods enables the model to account for this finding, whereas the standard one-sector small open-economy framework cannot. In addition, by enabling the markup to depend negatively on the number of competitors, the model can generate a counter-cyclical markup which is pivotal to producing the real exchange rate depreciation which has recently been documented in the empirical literature. The subsequent decline in the consumption price index and the positive impact of the lower markup on the wage rate produces an increase in the real wage, although only if the fiscal shock is short- or long-lived, not if it holds for a medium term.

In addition to the ability of the two-sector economy model to provide a better understanding of the fiscal transmission mechanism in an open economy, it delivers interesting insights into the sectoral effects of fiscal shocks. The numerical analysis reveals that the relative size of the non-traded sector increases substantially in the short-run, in line with the evidence reported by Bénétrix and Lane [2010]. Our numerical results also show that in
the long-run, the relative size of the traded sector increases to service the debt accumulated in the short-run. Hence, GDP growth is mostly driven by the rise in traded output in the long-run.

Moreover, our model sheds light on the role of firm entry in driving the effects of fiscal shocks. Comparing the effects under free-entry with those when the number of firms is fixed, we find that increased profits moderate the wealth effect in the latter case. As a consequence, labor rises less which mitigates the expansionary effect on GDP. In the same time, as savings decline by a smaller amount, both the crowding out of investment and the current account deficit are smaller when the traded sector is more capital intensive.

The duration of the fiscal shock plays also a pivotal role in driving the responses of both aggregate and sectoral variables. In all the scenarios, both labor supply and GDP increase more when the fiscal expansion is implemented over a long rather than a short period. The multiplier can exceed one only in this case, while the dispersion of responses of sectoral outputs is amplified.

In conclusion, we must stress a number of caveats. If the non-traded sector is assumed to be the more capital intensive sector, the model fails to match the evidence along a number of dimensions. Notably, in this case, the two-sector model cannot account for the crowding-out of investment which is one of the most consistent responses to a fiscal shock documented in the empirical literature. Additionally, if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, the model fails to produce a positive cumulative response of the real wage in the baseline scenario. Finally, due to our assumption of perfect mobility across sectors, traded and non-traded output vary in opposite direction while evidence by Bénétrix and Lane [2010] mostly predict that sectoral outputs co-vary. Further analysis of these issues has to be left for future research.
Figure 1: Effect of government spending shocks. Notes: variables are measured in percentage points of output, with the exception of employment, the real exchange rate and real wage which are scaled by their initial steady-state values.
Table 1: Quantitative Effects of a Temporary Fiscal Expansion (in %): The Case of a Fixed Markup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>$k^T &gt; k^N$</th>
<th>$k^N &gt; k^T$</th>
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<tr>
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<td>($\sigma_L = 0.1$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A.Long-Term</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Labor, $dL$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital, $dK$</td>
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<td>Real wage, $dW(0)/P_C(0)$</td>
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<td>3.32</td>
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Notes: We consider a temporary rise in $G^N$ which raises total government spending by one percentage point of GDP. Impact and steady-state deviations are scaled by initial GDP, exception with the real exchange rate, wage rate, labor, and capital which are scaled by their initial steady-state values. $\Pi$ represents the present discounted value of profits in the non traded sector scaled by initial non traded output (measured in terms of the traded good). A short-lived, medium-lived and long-lived shock lasts 8, 16, 32 quarters respectively.
Table 2: Quantitative Effects of a Temporary Fiscal Expansion (in %): The Case of an Endogenous Markup

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>RER, $dP$</td>
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<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
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<td>Real wage, $dW/P(0)$</td>
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<td>4.43</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>13.15</td>
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Notes: We consider a temporary rise in $G^N$ which raises total government spending by one percentage point of GDP. Impact and steady-state deviations are scaled by initial GDP, exception with the real exchange rate, wage rate, labor, and capital which are scaled by their initial steady-state values. A short-lived, medium-lived and long-lived shock lasts 8, 16, 32 quarters respectively.
A Data

In this Appendix, we describe how we split output, labor and GDP components into a traded sector and a non-traded sector. Table 3 shows the non-tradable content of GDP, employment, consumption, gross fixed capital formation and government spending. Table 3 also shows the share of government spending on the traded and non-traded good in the sectoral output, the shares of capital income in output in both sectors, and the markup charged by the non-traded sector for 13 OECD countries. The choice of these countries has been dictated by data availability. For the countries of our sample, the period runs from 1970 to 2004.\(^{40}\)

For output and employment, we used the methodology proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994], who treat Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Total Manufacturing, Transport and Storage and Communication as traded goods. Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services, Community Social and Personal Services are classified as non-traded sectors (Source: EU KLEMS [2007]). The non-tradable shares of output and labor, shown in the first and second column of Table 3, average to 65% and 63%, respectively.

To split consumption expenditure into consumption in traded and non-traded goods, we made use of the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) published by the United Nations (Source: United Nations [2007]). Among the twelve items, the following ones are treated as consumption in traded goods: Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages, Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco and Narcotics, Clothing and Footwear, Furnishings, Household Equipment, Transport, Miscellaneous Goods and Services. The remaining items are treated as consumption in non-traded goods: Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Fuels, Health, Communication, Recreation and Culture, Education, Restaurants and Hotels. The non-tradable share of consumption shown in the third column of Table 3 averages to 45%, in line with the share reported by Stockman and Tesar [1995].

With regard to investment, we follow the methodology proposed by Burstein et al. [2004] who treat Housing and Other Construction as non-tradable investment and Products of agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, Metal products and machinery, Transport Equipment as tradable investment expenditure (Source: OECD Input-Output database [2008a]). Non tradable share of investment shown in the fourth column of Table 3 averages to 60%, in line with estimates provided by Burstein et al. [2004].

Sectoral government expenditure data were obtained from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (Source: IMF [2007]) and the OECD General Government Accounts database (Source: OECD [2008b]). Adopting Morshed and Turnovsky’s [2004] methodology, the following four sectors were treated as traded: Fuel and Energy; Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction; Transport and Communications. The sectors treated as non-traded are: Government Public Services; Defense; Public Order and Safety; Education; Health; Social Security and Welfare; Housing and Community Amenities; Recreation Cultural and Community Affairs. The non tradable component of government spending shown in the fifth column of Table 3 averages to 90%. The proportion of government spending on the traded and non-traded good are shown in the sixth and seventh column of Table 3. They average to 7% and 32%, respectively.

Markups in the non-traded sector were estimated at the industry level in each country and aggregated as follows to construct the markup: \(\mu = \sum_{j=1}^{40} \omega_j \mu_j\) where \(\omega_j\) is the nominal value-added weight of industry \(j\) in the non-traded sector. Following Roeger [1995], to estimate \(\mu\), we explore the following relationship empirically:\(^{41}\)

\[
y_{j,t} = \beta_j x_{j,t} + \varepsilon_{j,t},
\]

where the dependent variable \(y_{j,t}\) is the Solow residual - percentage change in output less the percentage change in inputs (each input is weighted by the corresponding income share in output) - and \(x_{j,t}\) is the output growth minus capital growth. Estimate of \(\mu\) is equal to \(1/(1 - \beta_j)\). Variables required to apply the Roeger’s method are the following: gross output (at basic current prices), compensation of employees, intermediate inputs at current purchasers prices, and capital services (volume) indices. All these variables are compiled from the EU KLEMS database (Source: EU KLEMS [2007]), with the exception of the user cost of capital \(r_t\) calculated as \(r_t = \pi_{t} (1 + \delta_K)\), with \(\pi_{t}\) the deflator for business non residential investment, \(i\) the long-term nominal interest rate, \(\pi_{GDP}\) the GDP deflator based inflation rate; the rate of depreciation \(\delta_K\) is set to 5%; \(\pi_{t}\), \(i\) and \(\pi_{GDP}\) were taken from the OECD Annual National Accounts database (Source OECD[2008c]). According to the estimates given in the last column of Table 3, the markup charged by the non-traded sector averages to 1.39.


\(^{41}\)To tackle the potential endogeneity of the regressor and the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term when estimating (41), we use the correction of Newey and West [1993].
Table 3: Data to Calibrate the Two-Sector Model (1970-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Non tradable Share</th>
<th>$G^j/Y^j$</th>
<th>Capital Share</th>
<th>Markup</th>
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<td>Consumption</td>
<td>Investment</td>
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Notes: $G^j/Y^j$ is the share of government spending on good $j$ in output of sector $j$; $\theta^T$ is the share of capital income in output of sector $j = T, N$; $\mu$ is the markup charged by the non-traded sector.
References


FISCAL SHOCKS IN A TWO SECTOR OPEN ECONOMY WITH ENDOGENOUS MARKUPS

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

July 2012
A Short-Run Static Solutions

In this section, we compute short-run static solutions. It is worthwhile noting that in this paper, we assume that the non-traded sector is imperfectly competitive and charges a markup denoted by $\mu$. We also allow for the markup to be endogenous in section 6 in the text. In order to isolate the influence of markup variations on variables, i.e. the competition channel, we express variables in terms of the markup; hence, we treat $\mu$ as an exogenous variable in computing short-run static solutions. For example, if a short-run static solution is given by $x = x(\bar{\lambda}, P, \mu)$ with $\bar{\lambda}$ the shadow value of wealth, $P$ the relative price of non tradables and $\mu$ the markup, the variable $x$ is only affected by $\bar{\lambda}$ and $P$ in the case of fixed markup while $x$ is influenced also by the competition channel when we allow for the markup to be endogenous. In section K, we set out the model with an imperfectly competitive non-traded sector, assuming that a limited number of competitors operate within each sector. When the number of competitors is large, the imperfectly competitive non-traded sector charges a fixed markup. In section L, we set out the model with an imperfectly competitive non-traded sector, assuming that the number of firms is fixed so that profits are no longer driven down to zero.

A.1 Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption-Side

In this subsection, we compute short-run static solutions for real consumption and labor supply. Static efficiency conditions (5a) and (5b) can be solved for consumption and labor which of course must hold at any point of time:

$$C = C(\bar{\lambda}, P), \quad L = L(\bar{\lambda}, P, \mu),$$

(42)

with

$$C_{\bar{\lambda}} = \frac{\partial C}{\partial \bar{\lambda}} = -\sigma_C \frac{C}{\bar{\lambda}} < 0,$$

(43a)

$$C_P = \frac{\partial C}{\partial P} = -\alpha C \sigma_C \frac{C}{P} < 0,$$

(43b)

$$L_{\bar{\lambda}} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial \bar{\lambda}} = \sigma_L \frac{L}{\bar{\lambda}} > 0,$$

(43c)

$$L_P = \frac{\partial L}{\partial P} = \sigma_L W \frac{P}{W} = -\sigma_L L \frac{1}{P} \frac{k^T h}{\mu (k^N - k^T)} \leq 0,$$

(43d)

$$L_{\mu} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial \mu} = \sigma_L W \frac{P}{W} = \sigma_L L \frac{1}{P} \frac{k^T P h}{(\mu)^2 (k^N - k^T)} \geq 0,$$

(43e)

where $\sigma_C$ and $\sigma_L$ correspond to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption and labor, respectively.

Denoting by $\phi$ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the non tradable good and inserting short-run solution for consumption (42) into intra-temporal allocations between non tradable and tradable goods, we solve for $C^T$ and $C^N$:

$$C^T = C^T(\bar{\lambda}, P), \quad C^N = C^N(\bar{\lambda}, P),$$

(44)

with

$$C^T_{\bar{\lambda}} = -\sigma_C \frac{C^T}{\bar{\lambda}} < 0,$$

(45a)

$$C^T_P = \alpha_C \frac{C^T}{P} (\phi - \sigma_C) \leq 0,$$

(45b)

$$C^N_{\bar{\lambda}} = -\sigma_C \frac{C^N}{\bar{\lambda}} < 0,$$

(45c)

$$C^N_P = -\frac{C^N}{P} [(1 - \alpha C) \phi + \alpha C \sigma_C] < 0,$$

(45d)

where we used the fact that $-\frac{P C_P}{P_C} = \phi (1 - \alpha_C) > 0$ and $P_C C = C^N$. 
A.2 Short-Run Static Solutions for Production-Side

Capital-Labor Ratios

From static optimality conditions (8a) and (8b), we may express sector capital-labor ratios as functions of the real exchange rate:

\[ k^T = k^T (P, \mu), \quad k^N = k^N (P, \mu), \] (46)

with

\[
\begin{align*}
    k^T_P &= \frac{\partial k^T}{\partial P} = \frac{h}{\mu f_{kk} (k^N - k^T)}, \\
    k^T_\mu &= \frac{\partial k^T}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{P h}{(\mu)^2 f_{kk} (k^N - k^T)}, \\
    k^N_P &= \frac{\partial k^N}{\partial P} = \frac{\mu f}{P^2 h_{kk} (k^N - k^T)}, \\
    k^N_\mu &= \frac{\partial k^N}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{f}{P h_{kk} (k^N - k^T)}. 
\end{align*}
\] (47)

Wage

Equality \( f (k^T) - k^T f_k (k^T) \) \( \equiv W \) can be solved for the wage rate:

\[ W = W (P, \mu), \] (48)

with

\[
\begin{align*}
    W_P &= \frac{\partial W}{\partial P} = -k^T f_{kk} k^T_P = -k^T \frac{h}{\mu (k^N - k^T)} \lesssim 0, \\
    W_\mu &= -\frac{\partial W}{\partial \mu} = -k^T f_{kk} k^T_\mu = k^T \frac{P h}{(\mu)^2 (k^N - k^T)} \gtrsim 0. 
\end{align*}
\] (49)

Labor

Substituting short-run static solutions for labor (42) and capital-labor ratios (46) into the resource constraints for capital and labor (9), we can solve for traded and non-traded labor as follows:

\[ L^T = L^T (K, P, \lambda, \mu), \quad L^N = L^N (K, P, \bar{\lambda}, \mu), \] (50)

with

\[
\begin{align*}
    L^T_K &= \frac{\partial L^T}{\partial K} = \frac{1}{k^T - k^N} \lesssim 0, \\
    L^T_P &= \frac{\partial L^T}{\partial P} = \frac{1}{\mu (k^N - k^T)^2} \left[ \frac{L^T h}{f_{kk}} + \frac{\mu^2 L^N f}{P^2 h_{kk}} - \sigma_L L \frac{1}{W} k^T k^N h \right] < 0, \\
    L^T_\mu &= \frac{\partial L^T}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{1}{[\mu (k^N - k^T)]^2} \left[ \frac{L^T Ph}{f_{kk}} + \frac{\mu^2 L^N f}{P h_{kk}} - \sigma_L L \frac{1}{W} k^T k^N Ph \right] > 0, \\
    L^T_\lambda &= \frac{\partial L^T}{\partial \lambda} = \sigma_L L \frac{k^N}{k^N - k^T} \gtrsim 0, \\
    L^N_K &= \frac{\partial L^N}{\partial K} = \frac{1}{k^N - k^T} \gtrsim 0, \\
    L^N_P &= \frac{\partial L^N}{\partial P} = -\frac{1}{\mu (k^N - k^T)^2} \left[ \frac{L^N h}{f_{kk}} + \frac{\mu^2 L^N f}{P^2 h_{kk}} - \sigma_L L \frac{1}{W} (k^T)^2 h \right] > 0, \\
    L^N_\mu &= \frac{\partial L^N}{\partial \mu} = \frac{1}{[\mu (k^N - k^T)]^2} \left[ \frac{L^N Ph}{f_{kk}} + \frac{\mu^2 L^N f}{P h_{kk}} - \sigma_L L \frac{1}{W} (k^T)^2 Ph \right] < 0, \\
    L^N_\lambda &= \frac{\partial L^N}{\partial \lambda} = -\sigma_L L \frac{k^T}{k^N - k^T} \lesssim 0. 
\end{align*}
\] (51)

Output
Inserting short-run static solutions for capital-labor ratios (46) and for labor (51) into the production functions, we can solve for traded output, \( Y^T = L^T f(k^T) \), and non-traded output, \( Y^N = L^N h(k^N) \):

\[
Y^T = Y^T(K, P, \bar{L}, \mu), \quad Y^N = Y^N(K, P, \bar{L}, \mu),
\]

with

\[
Y^T_K = \frac{\partial Y^T}{\partial K} = -\frac{f}{k^N - k^T} \leq 0, \quad Y^T_P = \frac{\partial Y^T}{\partial P} = \frac{1}{\mu(k^N - k^T)^2} \left[ \frac{PL^T(h)^2}{\mu f_{kk}} + \frac{L^N(\mu f)^2}{(P)^2 h_{kk}} - \sigma_L L \frac{1}{\bar{W}} k^T k^N h f \right] < 0, \quad Y^T_{\mu} = \frac{\partial Y^T}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{1}{\mu(k^N - k^T)^2} \left[ \frac{L^T(P h)^2}{\mu f_{kk}} + \frac{L^N(\mu f)^2}{P h_{kk}} - \sigma_L L \frac{1}{\bar{W}} k^T k^N P h f \right] > 0 \quad (53a)
\]

\[
Y^N_K = \frac{\partial Y^N}{\partial K} = \frac{h}{k^N - k^T} \geq 0, \quad Y^N_P = \frac{\partial Y^N}{\partial P} = -\frac{1}{P(k^N - k^T)^2} \left[ \frac{P L^T(h)^2}{\mu f_{kk}} + \frac{L^N(\mu f)^2}{P^2 h_{kk}} - \frac{P}{\mu} \sigma_L L \frac{1}{\bar{W}} (k^T h)^2 \right] > 0, \quad Y^N_{\mu} = \frac{\partial Y^N}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{1}{\mu(k^N - k^T)^2} \left[ \frac{P L^T(h)^2}{\mu f_{kk}} + \frac{L^N(\mu f)^2}{P^2 h_{kk}} - \frac{P}{\mu} \sigma_L L \frac{1}{\bar{W}} (k^T h)^2 \right] < 0, \quad Y^N_{\lambda} = \frac{\partial Y^N}{\partial \lambda} = -\sigma_L L \frac{k^T h}{\lambda(k^N - k^T)} \leq 0, \quad (53b)
\]

From (53b) and (53f), an appreciation in the real exchange rate attracts resources from the traded to the non-traded sector which in turn raises the output of the latter. From (53a) and (53c), a rise in the capital stock raises the output of the sector which is relatively more capital intensive. From (53d) and (53h), an increase in the marginal utility of wealth raises labor supply and thereby increases output in the sector which is more labor intensive.

For clarity purpose, in the text, we write out short-run static solutions by expressing output in terms of labor supply, i.e. \( Y^T = Y^T(K, L, P) \) and \( Y^N = Y^N(K, L, P) \). The partial derivatives of sectoral output w. r. t. to labor are:

\[
Y^T_L = \frac{\partial Y^T}{\partial L} = \frac{k^N f}{k^N - k^T} \geq 0, \quad Y^N_L = \frac{\partial Y^N}{\partial L} = -\frac{k^T h}{k^N - k^T} \leq 0. \quad (54)
\]

**Useful Properties**

Making use of (53b) and (53f), (53a) and (53c), we deduce the following useful properties:

\[
Y^T_P + P Y^N_{\mu} = -\sigma_L L \frac{k^T h}{\mu(k^N - k^T)} \leq 0, \quad (55a)
\]

\[
Y^T_K + \frac{P Y^N}{\mu} = \frac{\mu f - P h}{\mu (k^T - k^N)} = \frac{P}{\mu} h_{kk} = f_k, \quad (55b)
\]

\[
Y^T_L + \frac{P Y^N}{\mu} = W, \quad (55c)
\]

\[
Y^T_{\mu} + \frac{P Y^N_{\mu}}{\mu} = \sigma_L L k^T \frac{P h}{\mu^2 (k^N - k^T)} \geq 0, \quad (55d)
\]

\[
Y^T_{\lambda} + \frac{P Y^N_{\lambda}}{\mu} = \sigma_L L \frac{(k^N f - k^T P h)}{\lambda (k^N - k^T)} = \sigma_L L \frac{1}{\lambda} W > 0, \quad (55e)
\]

where we used the fact that \( \mu f = P \left[ h - h_{kk} (k^N - k^T) \right] \) and \( k^N f - k^T P h = P \left( h - h^T k^N \right) (k^N - k^T) = \mu W (k^N - k^T) \).

In addition, using the fact that \( r^K = f_k \left[ k^T (P, \mu) \right] \), the rental rate of capital denoted by \( r^K \) can be expressed as a function of the real exchange rate \( P \) and the mark-up \( \mu \):

\[
r^K = r^K(P, \mu), \quad (56)
\]
with partial derivatives given by:
\[
\begin{align*}
r_K^P & = \frac{\partial r_K}{\partial P} = \frac{h}{\mu (kN - kT)} \geq 0, \\
r_K^\mu & = \frac{\partial r_K}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{Ph}{\mu^2 (kN - kT)} \leq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(57a) (57b)

B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions

Inserting short-run static solutions (42), (44) and (52) into (5d) and (30), we obtain:
\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{K} & = 1 \theta Y_N (K, P, \bar{\lambda}) - C_N (\bar{\lambda}, P) - \delta K K - G_N, \\
\dot{P} & = P \left\{ r^* + \delta K - \frac{h_k [P]}{\mu} \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

(58a) (58b)

Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting \( \hat{x} = \hat{K}, \hat{P} \) the long-term values of \( x = K, P \), we obtain in a matrix form:
\[
\begin{pmatrix} 
\dot{K} \\
\dot{P}
\end{pmatrix}
T = J
\begin{pmatrix} 
K(t) - \hat{K} \\
P(t) - \hat{P}
\end{pmatrix}
T,
\]

(59)

where \( J \) is given by
\[
J = \begin{pmatrix} 
b_{11} & b_{12} \\
b_{21} & b_{22}
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(60)

with
\[
\begin{align*}
b_{11} & = \frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} - \delta K = \frac{\hat{h}}{\mu (\hat{k}_N - \hat{k}_T)} - \delta K \geq 0, \\
b_{12} & = \frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} - C^N_P > 0, \\
b_{21} & = 0, \\
b_{22} & = -\frac{P h_k k^P N}{\mu} = -\frac{\hat{f}}{P (\hat{k}_N - \hat{k}_T)} = \frac{Y_T K}{\mu} \leq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(61a) (61b)

Equilibrium Dynamics

By denoting \( \nu \) the eigenvalue of matrix \( J \), the characteristic equation for the matrix of the linearized system (59) can be written as follows:
\[
\nu^2 - \frac{1}{P} \left( Y_K^T + \frac{\hat{P}}{\mu} Y_K^N - \delta K \hat{P} \right) \nu + \frac{Y_K^N}{P} \left( Y_K^N \mu - \delta K \right) = 0.
\]

(62)

The determinant denoted by \( \text{Det} \) of the linearized \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix (60) is unambiguously negative:\footnote{Starting with the equality of labor marginal products across sectors, using the fact that \( f_k = \frac{P}{\mu} h_k \) and \( h_k/\mu = r^* + \delta K \), it is straightforward to prove that \( b_{11} \) is positive in the case \( k_N > k_T \).}
\[
\text{Det} J = b_{11} b_{22} = \frac{Y_K^T}{P} \left( Y_K^N \mu - \delta K \right) < 0,
\]

(63)

and the trace denoted by \( \text{Tr} \) is given by
\[
\text{Tr} J = b_{11} + b_{22} = \frac{1}{P} \left( Y_K^T + \frac{\hat{P}}{\mu} Y_K^N \right) - \delta K = \frac{h_k}{\mu} - \delta K = r^* > 0,
\]

(64)

where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium \( \frac{h_k}{\mu} = r^* + \delta K \).

From (62), the characteristic root reads as:
\[
\nu_i \equiv \frac{1}{2} \begin{pmatrix} r^* \pm \sqrt{(r^*)^2 - 4 \frac{Y_T K}{P} \left( Y_K^N \mu - \delta K \right)} \end{pmatrix} \geq 0, \quad i = 1, 2.
\]

(65)
Using (64), then (65) can be rewritten as follows:

$$
\nu_i \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left\{ r^* \pm \left[ \frac{Y^T_N}{\mu} - \left( \frac{Y^N_K}{\mu} - \delta_K \right) \right] \right\} \geq 0, \quad i = 1, 2. \tag{66}
$$

We denote by \( \nu_1 < 0 \) and \( \nu_2 > 0 \) the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying

$$
\nu_1 < 0 < r^* < \nu_2. \tag{67}
$$

Since the system features one state variable, \( K \), and one jump variable, \( P \), the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.

**Formal Solutions**

General solutions paths are given by:

$$
K(t) - \bar{K} = B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \tag{68a}
$$

$$
P(t) - \bar{P} = \omega_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \omega_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \tag{68b}
$$

where we normalized \( \omega^j \) to unity. The eigenvector \( \omega^j \) associated with eigenvalue \( \nu_i \) is given by

$$
\omega^j = \frac{\nu_i - b_{11}}{b_{12}}, \tag{69}
$$

with

$$
b_{11} = \frac{Y^N_N}{\mu} - \delta_K = \frac{\tilde{h}}{\mu \left( \bar{k}N - \bar{k}T \right)} - \delta_K \gtrless 0, \tag{70a}
$$

$$
b_{12} = \frac{Y^N_P}{\mu} - C^N_P > 0, \tag{70b}
$$

where \( C^N_P \) is given by (45d).

**Case \( k^N > k^T \)**

This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the non-traded good sector exceeds the capital-labor of the traded sector. From (67), the stable and unstable eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:

$$
\nu_1 = -\frac{\tilde{j}}{\bar{k}N - \bar{k}T} < 0, \tag{71a}
$$

$$
\nu_2 = \frac{\tilde{h}}{\mu \left( \bar{k}N - \bar{k}T \right)} - \delta_K > 0, \tag{71b}
$$

since we suppose that \( k^N > k^T \).

We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:

$$
Y^N_K = \mu (\nu_2 + \delta_K) > 0, \tag{72a}
$$

$$
Y^T_K = \bar{P} \nu_1 < 0, \tag{72b}
$$

$$
\bar{P} h_{kk} k^N_P = -\nu_1 > 0, \tag{72c}
$$

$$
Y^N_A = -\frac{1}{\lambda} \sigma_L \bar{L} \bar{k}^T \mu (\nu_2 + \delta_K) < 0, \tag{72d}
$$

$$
Y^T_A = -\frac{1}{\lambda} \sigma_L \bar{P} \bar{k}^N \nu_1 > 0. \tag{72e}
$$

We write out eigenvector \( \omega^j \) associated with eigenvalue \( \nu_i \) (with \( i = 1, 2 \)), to determine their signs:

$$
\omega^1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{\nu_2 - \nu_1}{\nu_2^N - C^N_P} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \omega^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}. \tag{73}
$$
Case $k^T > k^N$

This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the traded good sector exceeds the capital-labor ratio of the non-traded sector. From (67), the stable and unstable eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:

\[
\nu_1 = \frac{\bar{h}}{\mu (\bar{k}^N - \bar{k}^T)} - \delta_K < 0, \\
\nu_2 = -\frac{\bar{f}}{\bar{P} (\bar{k}^N - \bar{k}^T)} > 0,
\]

(74a, 74b)

since we suppose that $k^T > k^N$.

We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:

\[
Y_N = \theta (\nu_1 + \delta_K) < 0, \hspace{1cm} (75a)
\]

\[
Y_T = \bar{P} \nu_2 > 0, \hspace{1cm} (75b)
\]

\[
\bar{P} \bar{h} k_N = -\nu_2 < 0, \hspace{1cm} (75c)
\]

\[
Y_N \bar{\lambda} = -\frac{1}{\bar{\lambda}} \sigma \bar{k}^T \mu (\nu_1 + \delta_K) > 0, \hspace{1cm} (75d)
\]

\[
Y_T \bar{\lambda} = -\frac{1}{\bar{\lambda}} \sigma \bar{P} \bar{k}^N \nu_2 < 0. \hspace{1cm} (75e)
\]

We write out eigenvector $\omega^i$ associated with eigenvalue $\nu_i$ (with $i = 1, 2$), to determine their signs:

\[
\omega^1 = \left( \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 0 \end{array} \right), \hspace{1cm} \omega^2 = \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ \frac{\nu_2 - \nu_1}{\nu_2 - \nu_1} \end{array} \right), \hspace{1cm} (76)
\]

Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets

We first linearize equation (31) around the steady-state:

\[
\dot{B}(t) = r^* (B(t) - \bar{B}) + Y_K^T (K(t) - \bar{K}) + [Y_P^T - C_P^T] (P(t) - \bar{P}).
\]

(77)

where $C_P^T$ is given by (45b).

Inserting general solutions for $K(t)$ and $P(t)$, the solution for the stock of international assets is given by follows:

\[
\dot{B}(t) = r^* (B(t) - \bar{B}) + Y_K^T \sum_{i=1}^{2} B_i \omega^{\nu_i} e^{\nu_i t} + [Y_P^T - C_P^T] \sum_{i=1}^{2} B_i \omega^{\nu_i} e^{\nu_i t}.
\]

(78)

Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:

\[
B(t) - \bar{B} = \left( B_0 - \bar{B} - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2 \right) e^{r^* t} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \Phi_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},
\]

(79)

with

\[
\Phi_i = N_i \nu_i - r^* \frac{Y_K^T + [Y_P^T - C_P^T] \omega^{\nu_i}}{\nu_i - r^*}, \hspace{1cm} i = 1, 2.
\]

(80)

Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the terms in brackets of equation (69) must be null and we must set $B_2 = 0$. We obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:

\[
B_0 - \bar{B} = \Phi_1 (K_0 - \bar{K}).
\]

(81)

The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:

\[
B(t) - \bar{B} = \Phi_1 (K(t) - \bar{K}).
\]

(82)
Case $k^N > k^T$

\[
N_1 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_2^1,
= \tilde{P}\nu_2 \left\{1 + \frac{\omega_2^1}{\tilde{P}\nu_2} \left[\sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}\tilde{K}^T(\nu_2 + \delta_K)\right]\right\} \geq 0,
\]

\[
N_2 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_2^2,
= Y_K^T = \tilde{P}\nu_1 < 0,
\]  

where (83c) follows from the fact that $\omega_2^2 = 0$. We made use of property (355) together with the fact that $C_P^T = P_C C_P - P C_P^N$ to compute $Y_P^T - C_P^T = -\tilde{P} \left(\frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} - C_P^N\right) - P_C C_P - \sigma_L \tilde{L}\tilde{K}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \geq 0$.

The sign of $\Phi_1$ is ambiguous and reflects the impact of capital accumulation on the foreign asset accumulation along a stable transitional path:

\[
\hat{B}(t) = \Phi_1 \hat{K}(t).
\]

where $\hat{K}(t) = \nu_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t}$. Following empirical evidence suggesting that the current account and investment are negatively correlated (see e. g. Glick and Rogoff [1995]), we will impose thereafter:

**Assumption 1** $\Phi_1 < 0$ which implies that $N_1 > 0$.

The condition for the assumption to hold, i.e. $N_1 > 0$, may be rewritten as follows:

\[
\nu_2 > -\frac{\omega_2^1}{\tilde{P}} \left[\sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}\tilde{K}^T(\nu_2 + \delta_K)\right].
\]

Note that, for all parametrization, we find $\Phi_1 < 0$. Using (80), $\Phi_i (i = 1, 2)$ can be written as follows:

\[
\Phi_1 = -\tilde{P} \left\{1 + \frac{\omega_2^1}{\tilde{P}\nu_2} \left[\sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}\tilde{K}^T(\nu_2 + \delta_K)\right]\right\} < 0, \quad \Phi_2 = -\tilde{P} < 0.
\]

**Case $k^T > k^N$**

\[
N_1 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_2^1,
= Y_K^T = \tilde{P}\nu_2 > 0,
\]

\[
N_2 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_2^2,
= \tilde{P}\nu_1 \left\{1 + \frac{\omega_2^2}{\tilde{P}\nu_1} \left[\sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}\tilde{K}^T(\nu_1 + \delta_K)\right]\right\} \leq 0,
\]

where (86b) follows from the fact that $\omega_2^1 = 0$. We made use of property (355) together with $C_P^T = P_C C_P - P C_P^N$ to compute $Y_P^T - C_P^T = -\tilde{P} \left(\frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} - C_P^N\right) - P_C C_P - \sigma_L \tilde{L}\tilde{K}^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) \geq 0$.

Using (80), $\Phi_i (i = 1, 2)$ can be written as follows:

\[
\Phi_1 = -\tilde{P} < 0, \quad \Phi_2 = -\tilde{P} \left\{1 + \frac{\omega_2^2}{\tilde{P}\nu_1} \left[\sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}\tilde{K}^T(\nu_1 + \delta_K)\right]\right\} < 0.
\]

**C Derivation of the Current Account Equation**

In this section, we derive the current account equation. Substituting the definition of lump-sum taxes $Z$ by using (10), the market clearing condition for non-traded goods (13) into (3) we get:

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{B} &= r^*B + r^K \hat{K}(t) + WL - P_C C - PI - Z, \\
&= r^*B + (r^K + WL) - P_C C - P \left(\frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} - C_P^N - G^N\right).
\end{align*}
\]
D Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case of Elastic Labor Supply

In this section, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by maintaining the assumption of an elastic labor supply. Since we assume free entry, then we set $\Pi^N = 0$ into eq. (20).

Inserting first the appropriate short-run static solutions, the steady-state of the economy is obtained by setting $\dot{\bar{K}}, \bar{P}, \bar{B} = 0$ and is defined by the following set of equations:

$$\frac{h_k \left[ k^N \left( \bar{P} \right) \right]}{\mu} = r^* + \delta_K,$$

$$\frac{Y^N \left( \bar{K}, \bar{P}, \bar{\lambda} \right)}{\mu} - C^N \left( \bar{\lambda}, \bar{P} \right) - G^N - \delta_K \bar{K} = 0,$$

$$r^* \bar{B} + Y^T \left( \bar{K}, \bar{P}, \bar{\lambda} \right) - C^T \left( \bar{\lambda}, \bar{P} \right) - G^T = 0,$$

and the intertemporal solvency condition

$$\left( B_0 - \bar{B} \right) = \Phi \left( K_0 - \bar{K} \right).$$

The steady-state equilibrium composed by these four equations jointly determine $\bar{P}, \bar{K}, \bar{B}$ and $\bar{\lambda}$.

We totally differentiate the system (88) evaluated at the steady-state which yields in a matrix form:

$$\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{h_{kk} k^N}{\mu} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\left( \frac{Y^N}{\mu} - C^N \bar{P} \right) & \frac{Y^N}{\mu} - \delta_K & \left( \frac{Y^N}{\mu} - C^N \bar{\lambda} \right) & 0 \\
\left( Y^T \bar{P} - C^T \bar{P} \right) & Y^T \bar{K} & \left( Y^T \bar{\lambda} - C^T \bar{\lambda} \right) & r^* \\
0 & \Phi_1 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
d\bar{P} \\
d\bar{K} \\
d\bar{\lambda} \\
d\bar{B}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
0 \\
dG^N \\
dG^T \\
d0
\end{pmatrix}.$$ (89)

The determinant denoted by $D$ of the matrix of coefficients is given by:

$$D \equiv \frac{h_{kk} k^N}{\mu} \left\{ \left( \frac{Y^N}{\mu} - \delta_K \right) \left( \frac{Y^T \bar{\lambda} - C^T \bar{\lambda}}{\mu} \right) - \left( \frac{Y^N}{\mu} - C^N \bar{\lambda} \right) \left[ Y^T \bar{K} + r^* \Phi_1 \right] \right\}.$$ (90)

We have to consider two cases, depending on whether the non-traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the traded sector:

$$D = -\frac{\nu_1 \nu_2}{\bar{\lambda} P} \left( \sigma_L \bar{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \nu_1 \bar{C} \bar{C} \right) > 0, \text{ if } k^T > k^N,$$

$$D = -\frac{\nu_1 \nu_2}{\bar{\lambda} P} \left\{ \left( \sigma_L \bar{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \nu_1 \bar{C} \bar{C} \right) + \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \left( \sigma_C \bar{C} \bar{C} - \sigma_L \bar{L} \bar{K} \bar{T} \left( \nu_2 + \delta_K \right) \right)^2 \right\} > 0.$$ (91b)

where we used the fact that and $f k^N - Phk^T = W \left( k^N - k^T \right)$ together with $-P \left[ k^N \nu_1 + k^T \left( \nu_1 + \delta_K \right) \right]$ is equal to $W$ if $k^T > k^N$ or $-P \left[ k^N \nu_1 + k^T \left( \nu_2 + \delta_K \right) \right]$ is equal to $W$ if $k^N > k^T$.

In the traded sector which is perfectly competitive, we have $Y^T = F_L \bar{L}^T + r^K \bar{K}^T = W \bar{L}^T + r^K \bar{K}^T$. Instead, in the non-traded sector which is imperfectly competitive we have: $PZ^N = P_{L \mu} L^N + P_{K \mu} K^N$ or $P_{\mu} Z^N = P_{Y \mu} Y^N + P_{H \mu} H^K K^N = WL^N + r^K K^N$. 

8
D.1 A Permanent Rise in $G^T$

Case $k^N > k^T$

If $k^N > k^T$, the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in $G^T$ are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^T} &= \frac{\sigma_C \tilde{\nu}_1 \nu_2}{P\lambda} \frac{\sigma_C \tilde{C} \nu_1 \nu_2}{D} < 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^T} &= \frac{\nu_1 \nu_2}{P\nu_2} > 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{P}}{dG^T} &= 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T} &= \frac{\nu_1}{P\lambda D} \left( \sigma_C \tilde{C} \nu_1 \nu_2 \right) - \sigma_L \tilde{K} \frac{\nu_1 \nu_2}{P\nu_2} < 0,
\end{align*}
\]

Case $k^T > k^N$

If $k^T > k^N$, the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in $G^T$ are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^T} &= -\frac{\sigma_C \tilde{\nu}_1 \nu_2}{\left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} \right)} < 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^T} &= \frac{\hat{\lambda}}{\left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} \right)} > 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{P}}{dG^T} &= 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T} &= \frac{\sigma_L \tilde{K} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{C} \nu_1 \nu_2}{\sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}} > 0,
\end{align*}
\]

D.2 A Permanent Rise in $G^N$

Case $k^N > k^T$

If $k^N > k^T$, the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in $G^N$ are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^N} &= \frac{\sigma_C \tilde{\nu}_1 \nu_2}{\lambda D} \left[ 1 + \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \frac{\omega_1}{\nu_2} \left( \sigma_C \tilde{C} \nu_1 \nu_2 \right) \right] < 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N} &= -\frac{\nu_1 \nu_2}{D} \left[ 1 + \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \frac{\omega_1}{\nu_2} \left( \sigma_C \tilde{C} \nu_1 \nu_2 \right) \right] > 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{P}}{dG^N} &= 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} &= \frac{\nu_1}{\lambda DP} \left( \sigma_L \tilde{K} \tilde{\nu} \tilde{P} \nu_1 - \sigma_C \tilde{C} \tilde{P} \right) > 0, \\
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^N} &= -\frac{\nu_1}{\lambda DP} \left( \sigma_L \tilde{K} \tilde{\nu} \tilde{P} \nu_1 - \sigma_C \tilde{C} \tilde{P} \right) \left[ 1 + \frac{\omega_1}{\nu_2} \left( \sigma_C \tilde{C} \nu_1 \nu_2 \right) \right] < 0,
\end{align*}
\]

Case $k^T > k^N$
If \( k^T > k^N \), the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in \( G^N \) are:

\[
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^N} = -\frac{\sigma_c \tilde{C} \tilde{P}}{(\sigma_L \tilde{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \bar{P} \tilde{C})} < 0, \quad (95a)
\]

\[
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N} = \frac{\lambda \tilde{P}}{(\sigma_L \tilde{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \bar{P} \tilde{C})} > 0, \quad (95b)
\]

\[
\frac{d\tilde{P}}{dG^N} = 0, \quad (95c)
\]

\[
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} = \frac{-\sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^N \nu_2 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \bar{P} \tilde{C} \right)} \lesssim 0, \quad (95d)
\]

\[
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^N} = \frac{\tilde{P} \left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^N \nu_2 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T \right)}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \bar{P} \tilde{C} \right)} \gtrsim 0. \quad (95e)
\]

### D.3 Rewriting the Long-Run Effects

In this subsection, we rewrite expressions of steady-state changes (94) following a permanent fiscal expansion, i.e. after a rise in \( G^N \), when \( k^N > k^T \). To begin with, it is useful to introduce some notations:

\[
\tilde{\Psi} = \left[ \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{k}^T \left( \nu_2 + \delta_K \right) - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N \right] \gtrsim 0, \quad (96)
\]

where \( \tilde{\Psi} > 0 \) if labor supply is elastic enough.

Using notation (96), determinant \( D \) given by (91b) can be rewritten as follows:

\[
D = -\frac{\nu_1 \nu_2}{P \lambda} \left[ \left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \bar{P} \tilde{C} \right) + \frac{r^* \omega_1^2}{\nu_2} \tilde{\Psi}^2 \right] > 0. \quad (97)
\]

If \( k^N > k^T \), the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in \( G^N \) are:

\[
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N} = -\frac{\lambda \left[ \tilde{P} - \frac{r^* \omega_1^2}{\nu_2^2} \tilde{\Psi} \right]}{\left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \bar{P} \tilde{C} \right) + \frac{r^* \omega_1^2}{\nu_2^2} \tilde{\Psi}^2} > 0, \quad (98a)
\]

\[
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} = -\frac{\sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{k}^N \tilde{P} \nu_1 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T}{\nu_2 \left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C \bar{P} \tilde{C} \right) + \frac{r^* \omega_1^2}{\nu_2^2} \tilde{\Psi}^2} > 0, \quad (98b)
\]

Eq. (98a) corresponds to eq. (26) in the text.

### D.4 Impact Effects

This section estimates the impact effects of a permanent fiscal expansion. The stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path in \((K, P)\)-space. The capital stock, the real exchange rate, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:

\[
K(t) = K(t) = \tilde{K} + B_1 e^{\rho t}, \quad (99a)
\]

\[
P(t) = \tilde{P} + \omega_1^2 B_1 e^{\rho t}, \quad (99b)
\]

\[
B(t) = \tilde{B} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\rho t}, \quad (99c)
\]

where \( \omega_1^2 = 0 \), \( \Phi_1 = -\tilde{P} \) if \( k^T > k^N \) and with

\[
B_1 = K_0 - \tilde{K} = -d\tilde{K},
\]

where we used the fact that \( K \) is initially predetermined, i.e., \( K(0) = K_0 \).
We derive below the initial reactions of investment and the current account.

Differentiating (381a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time \( t = 0 \), and substituting (98b), the initial response of investment is:

\[
\left. \frac{dI(0)}{dGN} \right|_{perm} = -\nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dGN} = \nu_1 \frac{\nu_2 \left( \sigma_L \hat{L} \tilde{P} k^T \nu_1 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T \right)}{\nu_2 \left( \sigma_L \hat{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C \tilde{C} \right)} > 0.
\] (100)

Eq. (100) corresponds to eq. (27) in the text. Using the fact that \( \Phi_1 = -\tilde{P} \), the initial reaction of the current account is:

\[
\left. \frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N} \right|_{perm} = -\nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} = -\left( \frac{\tilde{P} - \omega_1^2 \tilde{\Psi}}{\nu_2} \right) \left. \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \right|_{perm},
\]

where we used the notation \( \tilde{\Psi} \) given by eq. (96) to rewrite \( \Phi_1 \) given by (85).

Differentiating (381a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time \( t = 0 \), and substituting (95d), the initial response of investment is:

\[
\left. \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \right|_{perm} = -\nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} = \frac{\nu_2 \left( \sigma_L \hat{L} \tilde{P} \nu_2 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T \right)}{\nu_2 \left( \sigma_L \hat{W} \tilde{L} + \sigma_C \tilde{C} \right)} \geq 0.
\] (101)

Eq. (101) corresponds to eq. (25) in the text. Using the fact that \( \Phi_1 = -\tilde{P} \), the initial reaction of the current account is:

\[
\left. \frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N} \right|_{perm} = -\tilde{P} \nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} = -\left( \tilde{P} \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \right|_{perm} \right. \leq 0.
\]

E. Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case of Inelastic Labor Supply

In this section, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by assuming that labor supply is inelastically supplied.

We have to consider two cases, depending on whether the non-traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the traded sector:

\[
D = -\frac{\nu_1 \nu_2 P \tilde{C} \sigma_C}{P \lambda} > 0, \text{ if } k^T > k^N,
\] (102a)

\[
D = -\frac{\nu_1 P \tilde{C} \sigma_C}{P \lambda} \left[ \nu_2 + \alpha_C \frac{r^* \tilde{C}^N}{P \sigma_C \omega_1^2} \right] > 0, \text{ if } k^N > k^T.
\] (102b)

The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (102b) is positive if the following inequality holds:

\[
\nu_2 > -\alpha_C \frac{r^* \tilde{C}^N}{P \sigma_C \omega_1^2}.
\] (103)

From (51f), this inequality is satisfied since \( \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} < 1 \).

E.1 Long-Run Effects of a Rise in \( G^T \)

Case \( k^N > k^T \)
\[
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^T} = -\frac{1}{\hat{P}_C \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{(\nu_2)^2} \frac{\hat{C}^N}{F} \sigma_C \omega_N^2 \right]} < 0, \quad (104a)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^T} = \frac{\alpha_C \tilde{\lambda}}{\sigma_C \hat{P} \hat{C}^N \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{(\nu_2)^2} \frac{\hat{C}^N}{F} \sigma_C \omega_N^2 \right]} > 0, \quad (104b)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{P}}{dG^T} = 0, \quad (104c)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{L}}{dG^T} = \frac{-\alpha_C}{\hat{P}_h \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{(\nu_2)^2} \frac{\hat{C}^N}{F} \sigma_C \omega_N^2 \right]} < 0, \quad (104d)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T} = \frac{-\alpha_C}{\hat{P} \nu_2 \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{(\nu_2)^2} \frac{\hat{C}^N}{F} \sigma_C \omega_N^2 \right]} > 0, \quad (104e)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} = \frac{-\alpha_C}{\nu_2 \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{(\nu_2)^2} \frac{\hat{C}^N}{F} \sigma_C \omega_N^2 \right]} < 0. \quad (104f)
\]

Case \(k^T > k^N\)

\[
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^T} = -\frac{1}{\hat{P}_C} < 0, \quad (105a)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^T} = \frac{\alpha_C \tilde{\lambda}}{\sigma_C \hat{P} \hat{C}^N} > 0, \quad (105b)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{P}}{dG^T} = 0, \quad (105c)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{L}}{dG^T} = \frac{-\alpha_C}{\hat{P}_h} > 0, \quad (105d)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T} = \frac{-\alpha_C}{\hat{P} \nu_1} > 0, \quad (105e)
\]
\[
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} = \frac{-\alpha_C}{\nu_2} < 0. \quad (105f)
\]

E.2 Long-Run Effects of a Rise in \(G^N\)

Case \(k^N > k^T\)
\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d \tilde{C}}{d G^N} &= -\frac{\tilde{P}}{\tilde{P}_C} \left[ 1 + \frac{r^*}{(v_2)^2} \frac{\tilde{C}_N}{P} \sigma_C \omega^1 \right] < 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{\lambda}}{d G^N} &= \frac{\alpha_c}{\sigma_C \tilde{C}_N} \left[ 1 + \frac{r^*}{(v_2)^2} \frac{\tilde{C}_N}{P} \sigma_C \omega^1 \right] > 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{P}}{d G^N} &= 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{L}^T}{d G^N} &= \frac{(1 - \alpha_C)}{\tilde{h}} \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{(v_2)^2} \frac{\tilde{C}_N}{P} \sigma_C \omega^1 \right] < 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{K}}{d G^N} &= \frac{(1 - \alpha_C)}{\nu_2} \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{(v_2)^2} \frac{\tilde{C}_N}{P} \sigma_C \omega^1 \right] > 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{B}}{d G^N} &= -\frac{\tilde{P} (1 - \alpha_C)}{\nu_2} \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{(v_2)^2} \frac{\tilde{C}_N}{P} \sigma_C \omega^1 \right] < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Case \( k^T > k^N \)

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d \tilde{C}}{d G^N} &= -\frac{\tilde{P}}{\tilde{P}_C} < 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{\lambda}}{d G^N} &= \frac{\alpha_c \tilde{\lambda}}{\sigma_C \tilde{P}_C \tilde{C}_N} > 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{P}}{d G^N} &= 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{L}^T}{d G^N} &= -\frac{(1 - \alpha_C)}{\tilde{h}} < 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{K}}{d G^N} &= \frac{(1 - \alpha_C)}{\nu_1} < 0, \\
\frac{d \tilde{B}}{d G^N} &= -\frac{\tilde{P} (1 - \alpha_C)}{\nu_1} > 0.
\end{align*}
\]

\section*{F Derivation of Formal Solutions after Temporary Fiscal Shocks with Inelastic Labor Supply}

In this section, we provide the main steps to derive formal solutions for key variables after temporary fiscal shocks, by applying the procedure developed by Schubert and Turnovsky [2002]. For simplicity purpose, we assume that \( \theta = 1 \) and \( \delta_K = 0 \) since our objective is to derive transitional dynamics analytically.

\subsection*{F.1 Steady-State}

As in Schubert and Turnovsky [2002], we define a viable steady-state \( i \) starting at time \( T_i \) to be one that is consistent with long run solvency, given the stocks of capital, \( K_{T_i} \) and foreign bonds, \( B_{T_i} \). We rewrite the system of steady-state equations for an arbitrary period
The new consistent procedure consists in two steps. In a first step, we solve the system (108a)-(108c) for $\bar{P}_i, \bar{K}_i$ and $\bar{B}_i$, as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, $\lambda_i$, the government expenditure on the traded and non-traded goods, i.e. $G^T$ and $G^N$. Totally differentiating equations (108a)-(108c) yields in matrix form:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{\partial \bar{P}_i}{\partial \lambda_i} \\
\frac{\partial \bar{K}_i}{\partial \lambda_i} \\
\frac{\partial \bar{B}_i}{\partial \lambda_i}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{h_{kk}k_P^N}{P_C^*} & 0 & 0 \\
(Y_P^N - C_P^N) & Y_K^N & 0 \\
(Y_T^N - C_T^N) & Y_K^T & r^*
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{d\bar{P}_i}{d\lambda_i} \\
\frac{d\bar{K}_i}{d\lambda_i} \\
\frac{d\bar{B}_i}{d\lambda_i}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
P_C\bar{C}_i^N \left( \frac{\bar{k}_i^N - \bar{k}_T^N}{h_i} \right) \\
-P_C\bar{C}_i^N \left( \frac{\bar{k}_i^N - \bar{k}_T^N}{h_i} \right) \\
-P_C\bar{C}_i^N \left( \frac{\bar{k}_i^N - \bar{k}_T^N}{h_i} \right)
\end{pmatrix}
$$

(109)

The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth $\lambda_i$ and fiscal policy parameters, $G^T_i, G^N_i$, determine the following steady-state values:

$$
P_i = \text{constant,}
$$

(110a)

$$
\bar{K}_i = K \left( \lambda_i, G^N_i \right),
$$

(110b)

$$
\bar{B}_i = B \left( \lambda_i, G^T_i, G^N_i \right),
$$

(110c)

with partial derivatives given by:

$$
K_{\lambda} = \frac{\partial K_i}{\partial \lambda_i} = \frac{h_{kk}k_P^N}{P_C^*} \frac{d\bar{P}_i}{d\lambda_i} = -\sigma_C \frac{\bar{C}_i^N}{\lambda_i} \left[ \frac{\bar{k}_i^N - \bar{k}_T^N}{h_i} \right] \leq 0,
$$

(111a)

$$
B_{\lambda} = \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial \lambda_i} = \frac{h_{kk}k_P^N}{P_C^*} \left( -P_C^* Y_K^T + (1 - \alpha) P_C Y_K^T \right),
$$

(111b)

and

$$
K_{G^T} = \frac{\partial \bar{K}_i}{\partial G^T_i} = 0,
$$

(112a)

$$
B_{G^T} = \frac{\partial \bar{B}_i}{\partial G^T_i} = \frac{1}{r^*} > 0,
$$

(112b)

and

$$
K_{G^N} = \frac{\partial \bar{K}_i}{\partial G^N_i} = \frac{h_{kk}k_P^N u_{cc}^*}{G} = \left[ \frac{\bar{k}_i^N - \bar{k}_T^N}{h_i} \right] \geq 0,
$$

(113a)

$$
B_{G^N} = \frac{\partial \bar{B}_i}{\partial G^N_i} = -\frac{h_{kk}k_P^N u_{cc}^* Y_K^T}{G} = \left[ \frac{\bar{k}_i^N - \bar{k}_T^N}{h_i} \right] \frac{1}{r^*} > 0,
$$

(113b)

where $G = h_{kk}k_P^N u_{cc}^* Y_K^N r^*$ which simplifies as follows:

$$
G = \frac{\bar{f}_i}{P^2 \left( \bar{k}_i^N - \bar{k}_T^N \right)^2 u_{cc}^* r^*} < 0.
$$

(114)
The **second step** consists to determine the equilibrium change of $\tilde{\lambda}_i$ by taking the total differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (108d):

$$[B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda] \, \lambda_i = d B T_i - \Phi_1 dK T_i - [B G^N - \Phi_1 K G^N] \, d G_i^N - B G T d G_i^T,$$

(115)

from which may solve for the equilibrium value of $\tilde{\lambda}_i$ as a function of initial stocks at time $T_i$ and government spending:

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = \lambda (K T_i, B T_i, G_T^T, G^N),$$

(116)

with

$$\lambda_K \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{\lambda}_i}{\partial K T_i} = - \frac{\Phi_1}{[B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda]} < 0,$$

(117a)

$$\lambda_B \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{\lambda}_i}{\partial B T_i} = \frac{1}{[B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda]} < 0,$$

(117b)

$$\lambda_{G_T} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{\lambda}_i}{\partial G_T^T} = - \frac{B_{G_T}}{[B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda]} > 0,$$

(117c)

$$\lambda_{G^N} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{\lambda}_i}{\partial G^N} = - \frac{[B G^N - \Phi_1 K G^N]}{[B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda]} > 0.$$

(117d)

From (117), we obtain the following properties:

$$\lambda_B [B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda] = 1,$$

(118a)

$$\lambda_B B_{G_T} = -\lambda_{G_T},$$

(118b)

$$\lambda_B [B G^N - \Phi_1 K G^N] = -\lambda_{G^N}.$$  

(118c)

### F.3 Formal Solutions for Temporary Fiscal Shocks

We assume that the small open economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, denoted by the subscript $i = 0$:

$$K_0 = \tilde{K}_0 = K (\tilde{\lambda}_0, G_i^N) = K (\lambda (K_0, B_0, G_0^T, G_0^N), G_0^N),$$

(119a)

$$B_0 = \tilde{B}_0 = B (\tilde{\lambda}_0, G_0^N, G_0^N) = B (\lambda (K_0, B_0, G_0^T, G_0^N), G_0^T, G_0^N),$$

(119b)

$$\lambda_0 = \tilde{\lambda}_0 = \lambda (K_0, B_0, G_0^T, G_0^N).$$

(119c)

We suppose now that government expenditure changes unexpectedly at time $t = 0$ from the original level $G_0^T$ (resp. $G_0^N$) to level $G_1^T$ (resp. $G_1^N$) over the period $0 \leq t < T$, and reverts back at time $T$ permanently to its initial level, $G_T^T = G_2^T = G_0^T$ (resp. $G_T^N = G_2^N = G_0^N$).

**Period 1** $(0 \leq t < T)$

Whereas the fiscal expansion is implemented, the economy follows unstable transitional paths:

$$K(t) = \tilde{K}_1 + B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},$$

(120a)

$$P(t) = \tilde{P}_1 + \omega_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \omega_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},$$

(120b)

$$B(t) = \tilde{B}_1 + \left( B_0 - \tilde{B}_1 \right) - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2 \right) e^{\nu_1 t} +$$

$$+ \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \Phi_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},$$

(120c)

with the steady-state values $\tilde{K}_1$ and $\tilde{B}_1$ given by the following functions (set $i = 1$ into (110b)-(110c)):

$$\tilde{K}_1 = K (\tilde{\lambda}_1, G_1^N),$$

(121a)

$$\tilde{B}_1 = B (\tilde{\lambda}, G_1^T, G_1^N),$$

(121b)

where the marginal utility of wealth remains constant over periods 1 and 2 at level $\tilde{\lambda}_1 = \tilde{\lambda}_2 = \tilde{\lambda}$ after its initial jump at time $t = 0$. 

15
Period 2 ($t \geq T$)

Once government spending reverts back to its initial level, the economy follows stable paths

\begin{align*}
K(t) &= \tilde{K}_2 + B_t^i e^{\nu_1 t}, \quad (122a) \\
P(t) &= \tilde{P}_2 + \omega_1^i B_t^i e^{\nu_1 t}, \quad (122b) \\
B(t) &= \tilde{B}_2 + \Phi_1 B_t^i e^{\nu_1 t}, \quad (122c)
\end{align*}

with the steady-state values $\tilde{K}_2$ and $\tilde{B}_2$ given by the following functions (set $i = 2$ into (110b)-(110c)):

$$
\tilde{K}_2 = K(\bar{\lambda}, G_2^N), \quad (123a) \\
\tilde{B}_2 = B(\bar{\lambda}, G_2^T, G_2^N). \quad (123b)
$$

During the transition period 1, the economy accumulates capital and foreign assets. Since this period is unstable, it would lead the nation to violate its intertemporal budget constraint. By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable and must satisfy the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the zero-root constraint. By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable and must satisfy the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the zero-root constraint requires the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth to adjust once-and-for-all when the shock hits the economy. So $\lambda$ remains constant over the periods 1 and 2.

The aim of the two-step method is to calculate the deviation of $\lambda$ such that the country satisfies one single and overall intertemporal budget constraint, given the new relevant initial conditions, $K_T$ and $B_T$, prevailing when the shock ends and accumulated over the unstable period. Therefore, for the country to remain intertemporally solvent, we require:

$$
B_T - \tilde{B}_2 = \Phi_1 \left( K_T - \tilde{K}_2 \right). \quad (124)
$$

In order to determine the three constants $B_1$, $B_2$, and $B_1^i$, and the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth, we impose three conditions:

1. Initial conditions $K(0) = K_0$, $B(0) = B_0$ must be met.
2. Economic aggregates $K$ and $P$ remain continuous at time $T$.
3. The intertemporal solvency constraint (124) must hold implying that the net foreign assets remain continuous at time $T$.

Set $t = 0$ in solution (120a), and evaluating first at time $t = T$, equate (120a) and (122a), (120b) and (122b):

\begin{align*}
\tilde{K}_1 + B_1 + B_2 &= K_0, \quad (125a) \\
\tilde{K}_1 + B_1 e^{\nu_1 T} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 T} &= \tilde{K}_2 + B_1^i e^{\nu_1 T}, \quad (125b) \\
\tilde{P}_1 + \omega_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 T} + \omega_2^i B_2 e^{\nu_2 T} &= \tilde{P}_2 + \omega_1^i B_1^i e^{\nu_1 T}, \quad (125c)
\end{align*}

where we used the continuity condition.

Evaluating $K_T$ and $B_T$ from respectively (120a) and (120c), substituting into (124), and using functions of steady-state values $\tilde{K}_1$ and $\tilde{B}_1$ given by (119) (for $i = 0$), (121) (for $i = 1$), and (123) (for $i = 2$), the intertemporal solvency condition can be rewritten as

$$
B \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_1^T, G_1^N \right) + \left[ B \left( \lambda_0, G_0^T, G_0^N \right) - B \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_1^T, G_1^N \right) \right] e^{\nu_1 T} + \Phi_1 B_1 + \Phi_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 T} - B \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_2^T, G_2^N \right) = \Phi_1 \left[ K \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_1^N \right) + B_1 e^{\nu_1 T} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 T} - K \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_2^N \right) \right]. \quad (126)
$$

Then, we approximate the steady-state changes with the differentials:

\begin{align*}
\tilde{K}_1 - K_0 &\equiv K \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_1^N \right) - K \left( \lambda_0, G_0^N \right) = K_\lambda d\lambda + K_{GN} dG^N, \quad (127a) \\
\tilde{K}_2 - K_1 &\equiv K \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_2^N \right) - K \left( \lambda, G_1^N \right) = -K_{GN} dG^N, \quad (127b) \\
\tilde{B}_1 - \tilde{B}_0 &\equiv B \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_1^T, G_1^N \right) - B \left( \lambda_0, G_0^T, G_0^N \right) = B_\lambda d\lambda + B_{GT} dG^T + B_{GN} dG^N, \quad (127c) \\
\tilde{B}_2 - \tilde{B}_1 &\equiv B \left( \bar{\lambda}, G_2^T, G_2^N \right) - B \left( \lambda, G_1^T, G_1^N \right) = -B_{GT} dG^T - B_{GN} dG^N, \quad (127d)
\end{align*}
where $d\bar{\lambda} \equiv \bar{\lambda} - \lambda_0$.

By substituting these expressions in (125) and (126), we obtain finally

\[ B_1 + B_2 = -K_{\bar{\lambda}} d\bar{\lambda} - K_{GN} dG^N, \]  
(128a)

\[ B_1 e^{-v_1 T} + B_2 v_2 - B_1 e^{-v_1 T} = -K_{GN} dG^N, \]  
(128b)

\[ \omega_2^1 B_1 e^{-v_1 T} + \omega_2^2 B_2 e^{-v_2 T} - \omega_2^1 B_1 e^{-v_1 T} = 0, \]
(128c)

and

\[ B_1 T_1 + B_2 T_2 + B_3 d\bar{\lambda} = \Omega_1, \]  
(129)

where we set

\[ T_1 \equiv \Phi_1, \]  
(130a)

\[ T_2 \equiv \Phi_2 + (\Phi_1 - \Phi_2) e^{-v_1 T}, \]  
(130b)

\[ \Omega_1 \equiv \left[ (v_2 - \Phi_1 K_{\nu_1}) e^{-r^* T} - v_2 \right] d\nu_1 \quad j = T, N, \]  
(130c)

where $K_{GT} = 0$.

**Case $k^N > k^T$**

We write out some useful expressions

\[ K_{\bar{\lambda}} = -\frac{\bar{C}^N}{\lambda} \frac{\sigma_C}{\nu_2} < 0, \]  
(131a)

\[ K_{GN} = \frac{1}{\nu_2} > 0, \]  
(131b)

\[ B_{\bar{\lambda}} = -\frac{P_0 \bar{C}}{\lambda} \frac{\sigma_C}{\nu_2 r^*} \left[ (1 - \alpha_C) \nu_2 - \alpha_C \nu_1 \right] < 0, \]  
(131c)

\[ B_{GN} = -\frac{P_1}{\nu_2 r^*} > 0, \]  
(131d)

\[ (B_{\bar{\lambda}} - \Phi_1 K_{\bar{\lambda}}) = -\frac{P_0 \bar{C}}{\lambda} \frac{\sigma_C}{\nu_2 r^*} \left[ \nu_2 + \alpha_C \frac{r^* \bar{C}^N}{\nu_2 P} \sigma_C \omega_2 \right] < 0, \]  
(131e)

\[ (B_{GN} - \Phi_1 K_{GN}) = \frac{P_1}{\nu_2 r^*} \left[ \nu_2 + \frac{r^* \bar{C}^N}{\nu_2 P} \sigma_C \omega_2 \right] > 0, \]  
(131f)

\[ \Phi_2 = -\frac{P_0 \bar{C}}{\lambda} \frac{\sigma_C}{\nu_2} \left[ \nu_2 + \alpha_C \frac{r^* \bar{C}^N}{\nu_2 P} \sigma_C \omega_2 e^{-v_1 T} \right], \]  
(131g)

\[ B_{\bar{\lambda}} - \Phi_2 K_{\bar{\lambda}} = -\frac{P_0 \bar{C}}{\lambda} \frac{\sigma_C}{r^* \nu_2} \left[ \nu_2 + \alpha_C \frac{r^* \bar{C}^N}{\nu_2 P} \sigma_C \omega_2 e^{-v_1 T} \right] < 0, \]  
(131h)

\[ \Omega_1 K_{\bar{\lambda}} + B_{\bar{\lambda}} K_{GN} dG^N = -\frac{P_0 \bar{C}}{\lambda} \frac{\sigma_C}{r^* \nu_2} \left\{ \alpha_C \left[ \nu_2 + \frac{r^* \bar{C}^N}{\nu_2 P} \sigma_C \omega_2 \right] e^{-r^* T} + (1 - \alpha_C) \nu_2 \right\} dG^N < 0, \]  
(131i)

and $B_{GT} = 1/r^* > 0$. We used the fact that $\tilde{k}^T \nu_2 + \tilde{k}^N \nu_1 = -\frac{W}{P}$ and the following expression:

\[ \Omega_1 = -\frac{1}{r^*} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) dG^T + \frac{P}{r^* \nu_2} \left\{ \nu_1 + \left[ \nu_2 + \frac{r^* \bar{C}^N}{\nu_2 P} \sigma_C \omega_2 \right] e^{-r^* T} \right\} dG^N. \]  
(132)

**Case $k^T > k^N$**
We write out some useful expressions

\[ K_\lambda = -\tilde{C}_N \sigma_C \lambda / \nu_1 > 0, \tag{133a} \]
\[ K_{G^N} = 1 / \nu_1 < 0, \tag{133b} \]
\[ B_\lambda = -P_C \tilde{C} \sigma_C \lambda / \nu_1 r^* [(1 - \alpha_C) \nu_1 - \alpha_C \nu_2] < 0, \tag{133c} \]
\[ B_{G^N} = -\tilde{P} \nu_2 / \nu_1 r^* > 0, \tag{133d} \]
\[ (B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda) = -P_C \tilde{C} \sigma_C \lambda / r^*/ > 0 \tag{133e} \]
\[ (B_{G^N} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N}) = -\tilde{P} / r^*/ > 0 \tag{133f} \]
\[ \Upsilon_2 = -\tilde{P} \left[ 1 + \frac{\tilde{C}_N \sigma_C \omega_2^2 (1 - e^{-\nu_1 T})}{\nu_1} \right] < 0, \tag{133g} \]
\[ B_\lambda - \Upsilon_2 K_\lambda = -P_C \tilde{C} \sigma_C \lambda / r^*/ \nu_1 \left[ \nu_1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^* \tilde{C}_N}{\nu_1} \frac{\omega_2^2}{P} \sigma_C \omega_1 \right] > 0 \tag{133h} \]
\[ \Omega_1 K_\lambda + B_\lambda K_{G^N} dG^N = -P_C \tilde{C} \sigma_C \lambda / r^*/ \nu_1 \left[ (1 - \alpha_C) + \alpha_C e^{-r^* T} \right] > 0, \tag{133i} \]

and \( B_G r^* > 0 \). We used the fact that \( \tilde{k}^T \nu_1 + \tilde{k}^N \nu_2 = -\frac{W}{P} \) and the following expression:

\[ \Omega_1 = -\frac{1}{r^*} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) dG^T + \frac{\tilde{P}}{r^* \nu_1} \left( \nu_2 + \nu_1 e^{-r^* T} \right) dG^N. \tag{134} \]

**Case \( k^N > k^T \)**

The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:

\[ \frac{B_1}{dG^T} \left| temp \right. = \lambda_G T \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) > 0, \tag{135a} \]
\[ \frac{B_2}{dG^T} = 0, \tag{135b} \]
\[ \frac{B_1'}{dG^T} = \frac{B_1}{dG^T}, \tag{135c} \]
\[ \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \left| temp \right. = \lambda_G T \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) > 0, \tag{135d} \]

where, from (128a), \( \frac{B_1}{dG^T} \) can be written also as follows

\[ \frac{B_1}{dG^T} = -K_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \left| temp \right.. \tag{136} \]

The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non-traded good are given
by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_1}{dG^N} &= - \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) - \alpha_C \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \right] \\
&\quad \times \nu_2 \left[ 1 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \frac{C^N_P}{P} \sigma_C \omega_2^1 \right] \\
&\quad - (1 - \alpha_C) \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) + \alpha_C \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) < 0, \quad (137a)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_2}{dG^N} &= - \frac{e^{-\nu_2 T}}{\nu_2} < 0, \quad (137b)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B'_1}{dG^N} &= 0, \quad \frac{B'_2}{dG^N} = 0, \quad (137c)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} &= \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} + \frac{u_{cc} \tilde{P}}{\nu_2^*} \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) \frac{\nu_2 (e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T})}{\nu_2 + \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \frac{C^N_P}{P} \sigma_C \omega_2^1} \\
&= \lambda_{GN} \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) - \frac{\nu_2 (e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T})}{\nu_2 + \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \frac{C^N_P}{P} \sigma_C \omega_2^1} \leq 0, \quad (137d)
\end{align*}
\]

where we used expression (106b) to obtain (137d). From (128a), \( \frac{B_1}{dG^T} \) and \( \frac{B_2}{dG^T} \) can also be written as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_1}{dG^T} + \frac{B_2}{dG^T} &= -K \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - K_{GN} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{B_2}{dG^T} = -K_{GN} e^{-\nu_2 T}. \quad (138)
\end{align*}
\]

**Case** \( k^T > k^N \)

The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_1}{dG^T} &= \frac{\alpha_C}{\nu_1 P} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) < 0, \quad (139a)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_2}{dG^T} &= 0, \quad (139b)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B'_1}{dG^T} &= \frac{B_1}{dG^T}, \quad (139c)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} &= \lambda_{GT} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) > 0. \quad (139d)
\end{align*}
\]

The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non-traded good are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_1}{dG^N} &= - \frac{1}{\nu_1} \left[ (1 - \alpha_C) + \alpha_C e^{-r^* T} \right], \\
&= - \frac{1}{\nu_1} \left[ (1 - \alpha_C) \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) + e^{-r^* T} \right] > 0, \quad (140a)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_2}{dG^N} &= 0, \quad (140b)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B'_1}{dG^N} &= \frac{B_1}{dG^N} + K_{GN} e^{-\nu_1 T} \\
&= - \frac{1}{\nu_1} \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_1 T}) - \alpha_C \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \right] < 0, \quad (140c)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} &= \lambda_{GN} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) > 0. \quad (140d)
\end{align*}
\]

**G  Transitional Dynamics after a Rise in \( G^N \)**

In this section, we investigate in details the dynamics of key variables after a permanent and temporary rise in \( G^N \), considering both cases: \( k^T > k^N \) and \( k^N > k^T \). Transitional
The sign of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth can be determined by noticing that eq. (142) tends towards zero if we let \( T \) tend towards zero and tends towards \( \lambda_{GN} \) if we let \( T \) tend towards \( \infty \). In addition, the term in square brackets is an increasing and monotonic function of parameter \( T \). Therefore, the change in \( \lambda \) after a temporary rise in government spending lies in the range \([0, \lambda_{GN}]\). Consequently, we can deduce that expression (142) has a positive sign.

Using the functions (110), we deduce the long run changes for the real consumption, the stock of physical capital, and the stock of traded bonds:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\bar{C}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} &= \frac{C_\lambda}{dG^N} \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} < 0, \\
\frac{d\bar{K}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} &= \frac{K_\lambda}{dG^N} \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} < 0, \\
\frac{d\bar{B}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} &= \frac{B_\lambda}{dG^N} \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} < 0,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( C_\lambda < 0, K_\lambda < 0, \) and \( B_\lambda < 0. \)

The change of the period 1 steady-state value \( \bar{K}_1 \) compared to its initial (given) value \( \bar{K}_0 \) is given by:

\[
\frac{d\bar{K}_1}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} = \frac{K_\lambda}{dG^N} \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} + K_{GN},
\]

\[
= \left( 1 - \alpha_C \right) + \alpha_C \left[ 1 + \frac{r^*}{(\nu_2)^2} \frac{\lambda^*}{P} \sigma_C \omega_1 \right] \frac{\nu_1 T}{\nu_2} > 0,
\]

where we have substituted expressions of \( K_\lambda < 0 \) given by (131a), \( \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \Big|_{\text{temp}} > 0 \) given by (142) and \( K_{GN} > 0 \) given by (131b).
The change of the period 1 steady-state value $\tilde{B}_1$ compared to its initial (given) value $\tilde{B}_0$ is given by:

$$
\frac{d\tilde{B}_1}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} = B_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} + B_{GN}, \tag{145}
$$

where we have substituted expressions of $B_\lambda < 0$ given by (131c), $\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} > 0$ given by (142) and $B_{GN} > 0$ given by (131d). We cannot sign eq. (145) because it is the result of two opposite effects. The first term on the RHS of (145) is negative and is an increasing function of parameter $T$ and may be dominated by the second term $B_{GN}$ which is positive. We can infer that the shorter-lasting the rise in government expenditure, the more likely a higher steady-state value $\tilde{B}_1$ compared to its initial (given) value $\tilde{B}_0$.

It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long run changes in the stock of international assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:

$$
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = B_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} + B_{GN} \geq B_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} = \frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}}, \tag{146}
$$

where $B_{GN} > 0$, $B_\lambda < 0$ and $\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = \lambda_{GN} > 0$. The key factor that determines the magnitude of the long run change in the stock of foreign assets is the period of implementation of the government policy. More specifically, simulations indicate that there exists a time $T = \hat{T}$ for which the two changes are equal. For high durations of the policy, i.e. $T > \hat{T}$, the deterioration of the net foreign asset position features a greater magnitude after a temporary fiscal expansion compared to a permanent policy. This result is reversed when the public policy is implemented over a short period, say $T < \hat{T}$.

From steady-state changes following permanent and temporary rise in government expenditure on the non-traded good, we can deduce the following inequalities regardless of the length of the shock:

$$
\begin{align*}
\tilde{K}_{\text{temp}} &< K_0 < \tilde{K}_{\text{perm}} < \tilde{K}_1, \tag{147a} \\
\tilde{B}_{\text{temp}} &< \tilde{B}_{\text{perm}} < B_0, \quad \text{if } T > \hat{T}, \tag{147b} \\
B_{\text{perm}} &< B_{\text{temp}} < B_0, \quad \text{if } T < \hat{T}. \tag{147c}
\end{align*}
$$

**Case $k^T > k^N$**

The equilibrium change of $\tilde{\lambda}$ is:

$$
\frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} = \lambda_{GN} \left(1 - e^{-r^*T}\right) > 0. \tag{148}
$$

From (148), we see that the change of $\tilde{\lambda}$ after a temporary change in $G^N$ is smaller than that after a permanent increase in $G^N$ but goes in the same direction. Hence we deduce the following inequality:

$$
0 < \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} < \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}}. \tag{149}
$$

From (110), we deduce steady-state changes of consumption, the stock of physical capital,
and the stock of traded bonds:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} & = C_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} < 0, \quad (150a) \\
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} & = K_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} > 0, \quad (150b) \\
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} & = B_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} < 0, \quad (150c)
\end{align*}
\]

where \(C_\lambda < 0\), \(K_\lambda > 0\), and \(B_\lambda < 0\).

Changes of the period 1 steady-state values \(\tilde{K}_1\) and \(\tilde{B}_1\) compared to their initial (given) values \(K_0\) and \(B_0\) are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\tilde{K}_1}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} & = K_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} + K_{G^N}, \\
& = (1 - \alpha_C) + \alpha_C e^{-r^*T} < 0, \quad (151a) \\
\frac{d\tilde{B}_1}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} & = B_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N_{\text{temp}}} + B_{G^N}, \\
& = -\frac{\tilde{P}}{r^*\nu_1} \left\{ (1 - \alpha_C) r^* - [(1 - \alpha_C) \nu_1 - \alpha_C \nu_2] e^{-r^*T} \right\} > 0, \quad (151b)
\end{align*}
\]

where we have evaluated the signs of (151a)-(151b) by making use of (133a)-(133d) and (107b).

From (149), because the change in the equilibrium value of \(\tilde{\lambda}\) following a temporary change in \(G^N\) is smaller than that after a permanent increase in \(G^N\), by making use of (150b)-(150c), (141b)-(141c), and (151a)-(151b), we are able to deduce the following inequalities:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{K}_1 < \tilde{K}_{\text{perm}} < K_0 < \tilde{K}_{\text{temp}}, & \quad (152a) \\
\tilde{B}_{\text{temp}} < B_0 < \tilde{B}_{\text{perm}} < \tilde{B}_1, & \quad (152b)
\end{align*}
\]

**G.2 Transitional Dynamics after a Permanent Increase in \(G^N\)**

**Case \(k^N > k^T\)**

The initial jump of \(P\) is obtained by setting \(t = 0\) in (120b) and by differentiating with respect to \(G^N\):

\[
\frac{dP(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = -\omega_1^2 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} > 0. \quad (153)
\]

From the short run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of the relative price of the non-traded good, we get the initial jump of consumption:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{dC(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} & = C_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} + C_P \frac{dP(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = -\frac{\tilde{P}}{P_C} \frac{\nu_2 + \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \tilde{C}^{G^N} \sigma C_\omega^2}{\nu_2 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \tilde{C}^{G^N} \sigma C_\omega^2} \frac{\tilde{C}^{G_N} \sigma C_\omega^1}{\nu_2 + \alpha_C \frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \tilde{C}^{G^N} \sigma C_\omega^2} < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

From (154), we deduce the following inequality

\[
\frac{dC(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} < \frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = C_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} < 0. \quad (155)
\]
The rise in the marginal utility of wealth and the initial appreciation in the relative price of the non-traded good lowers \( C(0) \) below its steady-state value. Along the stable adjustment, real consumption rises:

\[
\dot{C}(t) = -C \sigma_C \alpha_C \frac{\dot{P}(t)}{P(t)} > 0,
\]

where the relative price of the non-traded good depreciates along the stable adjustment when the non-traded sector is relatively more capital intensive. Otherwise, the relative price of the non-traded good’s and thus the real consumption’s temporal paths are flat.

The dynamics of the key economic variables after a permanent rise in government spending falling on the non-traded good are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{K}(t) &= -\nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} \nu_1 t dG^N > 0, \\
\dot{P}(t) &= -\nu_1 \omega_2 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} \nu_1 t dG^N < 0, \\
\dot{B}(t) &= -\nu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} e^{\nu_1 t} dG^N < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the long run changes of \( \tilde{K} \) and \( \tilde{B} \) are opposite to those after a permanent rise \( G^T \).

**Case** \( k^T > k^N \)

If \( k^T > k^N \), the initial change in the real consumption is solely affected by the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and jumps immediately to its new lower steady-state level:

\[
\frac{dC(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} = C_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} = \frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} < 0.
\]

Over time, investment decreases and the stock of international assets rises:

\[
\begin{align*}
I(t) &= -\nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} \nu_1 t dG^N < 0, \\
CA(t) &= -\nu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} e^{\nu_1 t} dG^N > 0.
\end{align*}
\]

As will be useful later, we calculate the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal expansion in the \((K, B)\)-space by differentiating the solutions for \( B(t) \) and for \( K(t) \) w.r.t time:

\[
\frac{dB(t)}{dK(t)} = \frac{\nu_1 \Phi_1 B_1}{\nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^N} e^{\nu_1 t}} = -\tilde{P} < 0.
\]

where we used the fact that \( \Phi_1 = -\tilde{P} \).

**G.3 Transitional Dynamics after a Temporary Increase in \( G^N \)**

**Case** \( k^N > k^T \)

First, we evaluate the constants \( B_1/dG^N \) and \( B_2/dG^N \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_1}{dG^N} &= -\frac{B_2}{dG^N} - K_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} - K_{G^N}, \\
&= -\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) + \left( \frac{\alpha_C}{1 - \alpha_C} \right) \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) \right] < 0. \quad (161a) \\
\frac{B_2}{dG^N} &= -K_{G^N} e^{-\nu_2 T} = -\frac{e^{-\nu_2 T}}{\nu_2} < 0. \quad (161b)
\end{align*}
\]
By evaluating the formal solution for \( P(t) \) at time \( t = 0 \), differentiating with respect to \( G^N \), and remembering that \( d\bar{P}_1/dG^N = 0 \), we get the initial jump of \( P \):

\[
\frac{dP(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} = \omega_1^2 B_1 - \omega_2^2 \frac{d\bar{K}}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) - \omega_2^2 \frac{\alpha_C}{\nu_2 + \frac{C^N}{\bar{P}} \sigma C \omega_2^2} \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right)
\]

where we have inserted the steady-state change of the capital stock after a permanent fiscal expansion falling on the non-traded good given by (106c). From (162), we can see that the magnitude of the initial appreciation in the real exchange after a temporary fiscal expansion may be magnified if the policy is implemented during a long period, i.e., for \( T > \frac{1}{\nu_1} \ln |\alpha_C| \).

By making use of the short run static solution (42) for \( C \), we obtain the response of real consumption at time \( t = 0 \):

\[
\frac{dC(0)}{dG^N} = C_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dC^N} + C_P \frac{dP(0)}{dG^N} < 0. \quad (163)
\]

It is now convenient to evaluate the magnitude of the downward jump of real consumption after a temporary rise in \( G^N \) compared with that after a permanent fiscal expansion by computing the following expression:

\[
\frac{dC(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} - \frac{dC(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} = C_\lambda \left[ \frac{d\lambda}{dC^N}_{\text{temp}} - \frac{d\lambda}{dC^N}_{\text{perm}} \right] + C_P \left[ \frac{dP(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} - \frac{dP(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{perm}} \right] \geq 0. \quad (164)
\]

From (164), we deduce the following inequality:

\[
\frac{dC(0)}{dG^N} < 0. \quad (166)
\]

The initial response of the investment flow following a temporary rise in \( G^N \) is given by:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N} = -\nu_1 \left\{ (1 - \alpha_C) \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) + \alpha_C \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) \right\} - e^{-\nu_2 T},
\]

The sign of expression (167) is not clear-cut. As investment plays the role of clearing the non-traded goods market, its sign depends on the jumps of the relative price of the non-traded good and of the marginal utility of wealth. On the one hand, the relative price of the non-traded good appreciates which raises the return on domestic capital by reducing \( k^N \). On the other hand, the increase in \( P \) raises the capital user cost. The latter effect is larger, the shorter-living the fiscal shock.

To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of investment after a temporary rise in \( G^N \), we first linearize the non-traded good market clearing condition in the neighborhood of the steady-state:

\[
I(t) - \bar{I} = Y^N_R \left( K(t) - \bar{K} \right) + (Y^N_P - C^N_P) \left( P(t) - \bar{P} \right).
\]

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Using the fact that \( d \tilde{I} = Y_K^N d \tilde{K} + (Y_P^N - C_P^N) d \tilde{P} - C_N^N d \tilde{\lambda} \big|_{\text{temp}} - d G^N \), and evaluating the expression above at time \( t = 0 \), we get:

\[
\frac{d I(0)}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} = (Y_P^N - C_P^N) \frac{d P(0)}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} + \sigma_C \frac{\tilde{C}^N}{\lambda} \frac{d \lambda}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} - 1. \tag{168}
\]

Using the fact that \( d \tilde{P} = 0 \), we evaluate the initial jump of \( P \) which is given by:

\[
\frac{d P(0)}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} = \omega_2^1 \frac{d B_1}{d G^N} = -\omega_2^1 \left[ K_G^N \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) + K_{\lambda} \frac{d \lambda}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} \right],
\]

\[
= \omega_2^1 \left[ \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) + \sigma_C \frac{\tilde{C}^N}{\nu_2} \frac{d \lambda}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} \right], \tag{169}
\]

where we substituted \( K_G^N = 1/\nu_2 \) and \( K_{\lambda} = -\sigma_C \frac{\tilde{C}^N}{\lambda} \). Substituting (169) into (168) and using the fact that \( \omega_2^1 = \frac{\nu_1 - \nu_2}{(Y_P^N - C_P^N)} \), the initial reaction of investment finally rewrites as:

\[
\frac{d I(0)}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} = \left( \nu_2 - \nu_1 \right) \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) + \sigma_C \frac{\tilde{C}^N}{\nu_2} \frac{d \lambda}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} - 1. \tag{170}
\]

By differentiating the formal solution (120c) over period 1 for \( B(t) \) with respect to time, then evaluating the resulting expressions at \( t = 0 \), and differentiating with respect to \( G^N \), we obtain the initial response of the current account following a temporary fiscal expansion:

\[
\frac{d CA(0)}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} = r^* \left\{ - \left[ \frac{d B_1}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2 \right] \right\}
\]

\[
+ \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{d G^N} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{d G^N}. \tag{171}
\]

In order to simplify the solution (171), we rewrite the term in square brackets as follows:

\[
- \left[ \frac{d B_1}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2 \right] = - \left[ B_{\lambda} - \Phi_1 K_{\lambda} \right] \frac{d \lambda}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} - \left[ B_G^N - \Phi_1 K_G^N \right] + \left[ \Phi_1 - \Phi_2 \right] \frac{B_2}{d G^N},
\]

\[
= \frac{\lambda_G^N}{\lambda_B} \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) - \frac{\nu_2}{\nu_2} \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) + \frac{\lambda_G^N}{\nu_2} \frac{1}{\sigma_C \omega_2^1} K_G^N e^{-\nu_2 T},
\]

\[
= \frac{\lambda_G^N}{\lambda_B} e^{\nu_2 T} - \frac{P}{r^*} e^{-r^* T} - \frac{P}{\nu_2 r^*} \left[ \frac{\nu_2 + \nu_2}{\nu_2} \right] e^{-r^* T},
\]

\[
= - \frac{P}{r^*} e^{-r^* T} < 0, \tag{172}
\]

where we have substituted the expression of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth given by (137d), we made use of properties (118), expression (131f) and inserted these useful expressions:

\[
\frac{B_1}{d G^N} = \frac{B_2}{d G^N} - K_{\lambda} \frac{d \lambda}{d G^N}_{\text{temp}} - K_G^N < 0,
\]

\[
\Phi_1 - \Phi_2 = - \frac{1}{\nu_2} \tilde{C}^N \sigma_C \omega_2^1 > 0,
\]

\[
\frac{B_2}{d G^N} = -K_G e^{-\nu_2 T} < 0,
\]

\[
\frac{B_G^N - \Phi_1 K_G^N}{\nu_2 + \nu_2} = \frac{P}{\nu_2 r^*} > 0.
\]
By inserting (172) into (171), the expression of the initial response of the current account reduces to:

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \nu_1 \tilde{P} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\nu_2} \frac{\tilde{C}^N}{P} \sigma_{G^N} \right) \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{perm}} \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) + \left( \frac{\alpha_C}{1 - \alpha_C} \right) (e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T}) \right] \\
- \tilde{P} e^{-r^* T} + \tilde{P}_e^{-\nu_2 T} \nu_2 \nu_1 \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{perm}} \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) + \left( \frac{\alpha_C}{1 - \alpha_C} \right) (e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T}) \right] \\
- \tilde{P} e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} < 0,
\]

(173)

where we simplified several expressions as follows:

\[
K_{\lambda} \frac{u_{CC} \tilde{P}}{P_C^2} \nu_2 = \frac{\tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N}{P_C^2} = \alpha_C > 0,
\]

\[
\nu_2 \phi_2 - \nu_1 \phi_1 = -\tilde{P} \nu_2 + \tilde{P} \nu_1 \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\nu_2} \frac{\tilde{C}^N}{P} \sigma_{G^N} \right) < 0.
\]

To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of the current account after a temporary rise in \(G^N\), we use eq. (161a):

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -\tilde{P} \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) + \nu_1 \phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N},
\]

\[
= -\tilde{P} \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) - \nu_1 \phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N}\bigg|_{\text{perm}} \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) + \left( \frac{\alpha_C}{1 - \alpha_C} \right) (e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T}) \right],
\]

\[
= -\tilde{P} \left( e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) - \nu_1 \phi_1 \frac{(1 - \alpha_C)}{\nu_2 (1 - \alpha_C \tilde{P})} \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) + \left( \frac{\alpha_C}{1 - \alpha_C} \right) (e^{-r^* T} - e^{-\nu_2 T}) \right] < 0,
\]

(174)

where \(0 < \tilde{P} \equiv -\frac{r^*}{\nu_2} \frac{\tilde{C}^N}{P} \sigma_{G^N} < 1\).

Now, we investigate the dynamics for \(K(t)\) and \(P(t)\) over the unstable period \((0, T)\), say period 1:

\[
\dot{K}(t) = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} e^{\nu_1 t} dG^N + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N} e^{\nu_2 t} dG^N \geq 0,
\]

(175a)

\[
\dot{P}(t) = \nu_1 \omega_2^1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} e^{\nu_1 t} dG^N < 0,
\]

(175b)

where \(B_1/dG^N < 0, B_2/dG^N < 0,\) and \(\omega_2 < 0\). As it can be seen from (175a), investment dynamics are the result of two opposite forces. If the initial investment flow is positive, it must be negative at time \(t\) along the trajectory:

\[
\dot{t} = \frac{1}{\nu_1 - \nu_2} \ln \left[ -\frac{\nu_2 B_2 / dG^N}{\nu_1 B_1 / dG^N} \right],
\]

(176)

where the term in square brackets is less than one under the condition that the initial investment flow is positive (see eq. (167)), otherwise the trajectory for investment is monotonic.

The current account dynamics over period 1 are described by the following equation:

\[
CA(t) = \tilde{P} e^{-\nu_2 (T-t)} \left( 1 - e^{-\nu_1 (T-t)} \right) + \nu_1 \phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} e^{\nu_1 t} dG^N < 0.
\]

(177)

We turn now to the analysis of transitional dynamics over the stable period 2. By making use of standard methods, the adjustments of the stock of physical capital, the
relative price of non-tradables \( P \) and the stock of international assets are driven by the following equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{K}(t) &= \nu_1 \frac{B_1'}{dG^N} dG^N e^{\nu_1 t} > 0, \quad (178a) \\
\dot{P}(t) &= \nu_1 \omega_2 \frac{B_1'}{dG^N} dG^N e^{\nu_1 t} < 0, \quad (178b) \\
\dot{B}(t) &= \nu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{B_1'}{dG^N} dG^N e^{\nu_1 t} < 0. \quad (178c)
\end{align*}
\]

Evaluate (178c) at time \( t^+ \), and calculate \( dCA(T) = CA(T^+) - CA(T^-) \), we can see that the current account is continuous in the neighborhood of time \( T \). Thus we have \( CA(T^-) = CA(T^+) \). Performing the same procedure of investment, we obtain:

\[
\frac{dI(T)}{dG^N} = -\nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N} e^{\nu_2 T} = 1. \quad (179)
\]

When the policy is removed at time \( T \), i.e. government spending falls by an amount equals to \( dG^N(T) \equiv G_2^N - G_1^N \equiv -dG^N \), investment must rise to guarantee that the market-clearing condition holds at time \( T \).

**Case** \( k^T > k^N \)

Like after a permanent fiscal expansion, an unexpected transitory rise in government spending on the non-traded good leaves unaffected the relative price of the non-traded good both in the short run and in the long run. To evaluate the investment dynamics, we differentiate the solution for \( K(t) \) given by (120a) with respect to time, evaluate the resulting expression at time \( t = 0 \), and then differentiate with respect to \( G^N \), keeping in mind that \( B_2/dG^N = 0 \) if \( k^T > k^N \):

\[
\left. \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \right|_{\text{temp}} = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} = -\nu_1 \frac{1}{\nu_1} \left[ (1 - \alpha_C) \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) + e^{-r^* T} \right],
\]

\[
= \alpha_C \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) - 1 < 0,
\]

\[
\left. \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \right|_{\text{perm}} = \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) - e^{-r^* T} < 0. \quad (180)
\]

Applying standard methods, the initial response of the current account following a temporary fiscal expansion on the non-traded good is given by:

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N} \left|_{\text{temp}} = r^* \left\{ -\frac{d\hat{B}_1}{dG^N} \left|_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} \right\} + \nu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} \right\},
\]

\[
= \hat{P} \left( 1 - \alpha_C \right) \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) > 0, \quad (181)
\]

where \( \nu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} = \hat{P} \left[ (1 - \alpha_C) \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) + e^{-r^* T} \right]. \)

In deriving (181), we have also simplified the term in square braces as follows:

\[
\left. \frac{d\hat{B}_1}{dG^N} \right|_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} = -\left\{ \left( B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda \right) \left. \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \right|_{\text{temp}} + \left( B_{G^N} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N} \right) \right\},
\]

\[
= \frac{\lambda_{G^N}}{\lambda_B} e^{-r^* T} = -\frac{\hat{P}}{r^*} e^{-r^* T} < 0. \quad (182)
\]

We investigate the dynamics of the stocks of physical capital and traded bonds by taking the time derivative of formal solutions prevailing over period 1:

\[
I(t) = K(t) = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} dG^N e^{\nu_1 t},
\]

\[
= -\nu_1 \left. \frac{dK}{dG^N} \right|_{\text{perm}} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) dG^N e^{\nu_1 t} - e^{-r^* T} dG^N e^{\nu_1 t} < 0, \quad (183)
\]
From (186) and (190b), we deduce that the current account is continuous in the neighborhood of $t = \hat{t}$ such that the current account changes of sign:

$$\dot{\hat{t}} = -\frac{1}{\nu_2} \ln \left[ \frac{e^{-r^* T}}{(1 - \alpha_C) (1 - e^{-r^* T}) + e^{-r^* T}} \right],$$

where the term in square brackets is positive and lower than one. Over period 1, the current account improves first while the negative investment flow more than outweighs the smoothing effect. At time $\hat{t}$, these two effects cancel each other and after this date, the current account deteriorates as the smoothing behavior predominates, such that $CA(T^-) < 0$. To see it more formally, we evaluate (184) at time $T^-$:

$$CA(T^-) = \tilde{P} e^{\nu_1 t} \left[ (1 - e^{-\nu_1 t}) - \alpha_C \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \right] dG^N < 0. \quad (186)$$

At time $T^-$, the investment flow is also negative:

$$I(T^-) = -e^{-\nu_2 T} \left[ 1 - (1 - \alpha_C) \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \right] < 0. \quad (187)$$

We have now to compare the slope of the trajectory after a transitory fiscal expansion over period $0 \leq t < \hat{t}$ in the $(K, B)$-space with the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal expansion:

$$\frac{dB(t)}{dK(t)} = -\frac{-\tilde{P} e^{-r^*(T-t)} + \nu_1 \Phi_1 B_1 \frac{dG^N}{dK} e^{\nu_1 t}}{\nu_1 \frac{dG^N}{dK} e^{\nu_1 t}},$$

where we have substituted the expression of the constant $B_1/dG^N$. Over period $0 \leq \hat{t} < t$, the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative. Thus the slope of the trajectory is negative in the $(K, B)$-space. Comparing the terms in numerator and in denominator of (188), it is straightforward to show that the slope in absolute terms is lower than $\tilde{P}$. Therefore, the slope is negative and lower (in absolute terms) than the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal expansion (equal to $-\tilde{P}$).

We turn now to the investigation of transitional dynamics of key macroeconomic variables over the stable period, say period 2. By adopting the standard procedure, we get:

$$I(t) = \dot{K}(t) = \nu_1 \frac{B'_1}{dG^N} dG^N e^{\nu_1 t} > 0 \quad (189a)$$

$$CA(t) = \dot{B}(t) = \nu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{B'_1}{dG^N} dG^N e^{\nu_1 t} < 0. \quad (189b)$$

Since the period 2 is a stable period, the dynamics are monotonic. If we can determine the sign of (189) at time $t = T^+$, we are able to evaluate the transitional dynamics over the entire period:

$$I(T^+) = -\left[ (1 - \alpha_C) (e^{\nu_1 T} - e^{-\nu_2 T}) - (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) \right] dG^N > 0, \quad (190a)$$

$$CA(T^+) = -\tilde{P} \left[ (1 - \alpha_C) (e^{\nu_1 T} - e^{-\nu_2 T}) - (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) \right] dG^N < 0. \quad (190b)$$

From (186) and (190b), we deduce that the current account is continuous in the neighborhood of $T$, such that $CA(T^-) = CA(T^+) < 0$. At the opposite, from (187) and (190a), we see that investment is not continuous in the neighborhood of $T$ since at this date, it
In the text, we consider only an increase in $T$. To keep analytical tractability, we assume that labor supply is fixed, i.e., we set $\sigma_L = 0$. Hence, we provide details on the dynamics of key variables after a permanent and temporary rise in $G^T$, considering both cases: $k^T > k^N$ and $k^N > k^T$. Transitional paths are depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for $k^T > k^N$ and $k^N > k^T$, respectively.

### Figure 2: Permanent Vs. Temporary Increase in $G^j - k^T > k^N$

must clear the non-tradable market. To see it formally, we write the non-tradable clearing market condition at time $T^-$ and at time $T^+$:

$$I (T^-) = Y^N \left[ K (T^-), P (T^-) \right] - C^N \left[ \lambda (T^-), P (T^-) \right] - G_N^N < 0,$$

$$I (T^+) = Y^N \left[ K (T^+), P (T^+) \right] - C^N \left[ \lambda (T^+), P (T^+) \right] - G_2^N > 0,$$

where $G_2^N = G_0^N$. Goods market equilibrium is subject to two discrete perturbations: one at time $t = 0$ when the government raises the public spending, the other at time $t = T$ when the policy is permanently removed. Since capital is a predetermined variable, it cannot jump neither at time $t = 0$ or at time $t = T$. In addition, the marginal utility of wealth jumps at time $t = 0$ and remains constant from thereon. So we get $\bar{\lambda} = \lambda (T^-) = \lambda (T^+)$. Finally, when the tradable good sector is relatively more capital intensive, a rise in government spending leaves unaffected the relative price of the non-traded good both in the short-run and in the long run, such that $\bar{P} = P (T^-) = P (T^+)$. With output constrained at time $T$ by the capital stock and by the relative price of the non-traded good, it therefore follows from (191) that for the market-clearing condition to hold, we must have

$$dI (T) = d\dot{K} (T) = -dG^N (T) = dG^N > 0,$$

where $dG^N (T) \equiv G_2^N - G_1^N \equiv G_0^N - G_1^N \equiv -dG^N$. Thus, the non-traded goods market equilibrium is maintained though the investment in physical capital, $\dot{K} (T)$. Since at time $T$, government expenditure reverts back to its original level, the investment flow changes of sign and turns out to be positive as a greater share of the non tradable production ($Y^N$) may be allocated to investment ($I$) since the global consumption ($C^N + G^N$) falls.

### H Transitional Dynamics after a Rise in $G^T$

In the text, we consider only an increase in $G^N$. In this section, we analyze the effects of an increase in $G^T$. Hence, we provide details on the dynamics of key variables after a permanent and temporary rise in $G^T$, considering both cases: $k^T > k^N$ and $k^N > k^T$. Transitional paths are depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for $k^T > k^N$ and $k^N > k^T$, respectively. To keep analytical tractability, we assume that labor supply is fixed, i.e. we set $\sigma_L = 0$. Since these two parameters do not affect qualitatively the results, we further assume that the non-traded sector is perfectly competitive, i.e. we set $\mu = 1$, and we set the rate of depreciation of physical capital to zero.
Figure 3: Permanent Vs. Temporary increase in $G^T - k^T > k^T$

$k^N > k^T - dG^T - T < \hat{T}$

Figure 4: Permanent Vs. Temporary Increase in $G^N - k^N > k^T$

$k^N > k^T - dG^N - T > \hat{T}$
H.1 Long-Run Effects

It is convenient to determine first the long run changes of the real consumption, the stock of physical capital and the stock of foreign assets following a permanent rise in government spending on the traded good by differentiating (42) and (110):

\[
\frac{d\bar{C}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} = C_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} < 0, \quad (193a)
\]

\[
\frac{dK}{dG^t}_\text{perm} = K_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} \leq 0 \quad \text{depending on whether } k^N \geq k^T, \quad (193b)
\]

\[
\frac{dB}{dG^t}_\text{perm} = B_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} + B_{G^T} \geq 0 \quad \text{depending on whether } k^N \geq k^T, \quad (193c)
\]

where \(C_{G^T} = 0\) and \(K_{G^T} = 0\). Expressions of the steady-state changes are given by the set of equations (104) and (105).

We compare the once-for-all jump of the marginal utility of wealth after a permanent increase in public spending on the traded good with respect to its change after a permanent rise:

\[
\frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} \left(1 - e^{-r^*T}\right) = \lambda_{G^T} \left(1 - e^{-r^*T}\right) > 0. \quad (194)
\]

We now evaluate the long run changes of key economic variables after a temporary fiscal shock by differentiating (42) and (110). Since the signs of expressions depend crucially on the sectoral capital intensities, we consider two cases.

**Case** \(k^N > k^T\)

When the non-traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroeconomic aggregates in the long run are given by:

\[
\frac{d\bar{C}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = C_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = C_\lambda \left(1 - e^{-r^*T}\right) \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} < 0, \quad (195a)
\]

\[
\frac{d\bar{K}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = K_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = K_\lambda \left(1 - e^{-r^*T}\right) \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} < 0, \quad (195b)
\]

\[
\frac{d\bar{B}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = B_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = B_\lambda \left(1 - e^{-r^*T}\right) \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{perm} < 0, \quad (195c)
\]

where \(C_\lambda < 0, K_\lambda < 0\) (if \(k^N > k^T\), and \(B_\lambda < 0\).

The changes of the period 1 steady-state values \(\bar{K}_1\) and \(\bar{B}_1\) compared to their initial (given) values \(K_0\) and \(B_0\) are given by:

\[
\frac{d\bar{K}_1}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = K_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} < 0, \quad (196a)
\]

\[
\frac{d\bar{B}_1}{dG^t}_\text{temp} = B_\lambda \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^t}_\text{temp} + B_{G^T} > 0, \quad (196b)
\]

where \(K_\lambda < 0, B_\lambda < 0\) and \(B_{G^T} > 0\). From (193b)-(193c), (195b)-(195c), and (196a)-(196b), we are able to deduce the following inequalities:

\[
\bar{K}_{\text{perm}} < \bar{K}_1 = \bar{K}_{\text{temp}} < \bar{K}_0, \quad (197a)
\]

\[
\bar{B}_{\text{temp}} < \bar{B}_0 < \bar{B}_{\text{perm}} < \bar{B}_1. \quad (197b)
\]

**Case** \(k^T > k^N\)

When the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroeco-
nomic aggregates in the long run are given by

\[
\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = C^*_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = C^*_\lambda \left(1 - e^{r^* T}\right) \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} < 0, \quad (198a)
\]

\[
\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = K^*_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = K^*_\lambda \left(1 - e^{r^* T}\right) \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} > 0, \quad (198b)
\]

\[
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = B^*_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = B^*_\lambda \left(1 - e^{r^* T}\right) \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} < 0. \quad (198c)
\]

It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long run changes in the stock of international assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:

\[
\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} = B^*_\lambda G^T + B_G^T \geq B^*_\lambda G^T \left(1 - e^{r^* T}\right) = \frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}}. \quad (199)
\]

The key factor that determines the magnitude of the long run change in the stock of foreign assets is the period of implementation of the government policy. More specifically, there exists a time \( T = \tilde{T} \) for which the two changes are equal which is given by

\[
\tilde{T} = \frac{1}{r^*} \ln \left[ -\frac{B^*_\lambda G^T}{B_G^T} \right]. \quad (200)
\]

As the fiscal shock is more persistent, i.e. \( T > \tilde{T} \), the external asset position deteriorates more than after a permanent fiscal shock. We can summarize our results as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{B}_\text{temp} &< \tilde{B}_\text{perm} < B_0 & \text{if } T > \tilde{T}, \quad (201a) \\
\tilde{B}_\text{perm} &< \tilde{B}_\text{temp} < B_0 & \text{if } T < \tilde{T}. \quad (201b)
\end{align*}
\]

The changes of the period 1 steady-state values \( \tilde{K}_1 \) and \( \tilde{B}_1 \) compared to their initial (given) values \( K_0 \) and \( B_0 \) are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\tilde{K}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} &= K^*_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} > 0, \quad (202a) \\
\frac{d\tilde{B}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} &= B^*_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} + B_G^T \geq 0, \quad (202b)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( K^*_\lambda > 0, B^*_\lambda < 0 \) and \( B_G^T > 0 \). The sign of (202b) is indeterminate but we are able to determine the length of fiscal shock, denoted by \( \tilde{T} \), for which the steady-state change (202b) is equal to zero:

\[
\tilde{T} = -\frac{1}{r^*} \ln \left[ \frac{B^*_\lambda G^T + B_G^T}{B^*_\lambda G^T} \right]. \quad (203)
\]

The existence of time \( \tilde{T} \) relies upon inequality \( B^*_\lambda G^T < B^*_\lambda G^T + B_G^T < 0 \) which in turn implies that the term in square brackets is positive and less than unity. Consequently, we get the following inequality:

\[
\tilde{B}_1 \leq B_0 \quad \text{depending on whether } T \geq \tilde{T}. \quad (204)
\]

From (193b)-(193c), (198b)-(198c), (201) and (202a)-(202b), we are able to deduce the following inequalities:

\[
\begin{align*}
K_0 &< \tilde{K}_1 = \tilde{K}_\text{temp} < \tilde{K}_\text{perm}, \quad (205a) \\
\tilde{B}_\text{perm} &< \tilde{B}_\text{temp} < B_0 \quad \text{if } T < \tilde{T}, \quad (205b) \\
\tilde{B}_\text{temp} &< \tilde{B}_\text{perm} < \tilde{B}_0 \quad \text{if } T > \tilde{T}. \quad (205c)
\end{align*}
\]

where we assume that \( \tilde{T} < \tilde{T} \).
H.2 Transitional Dynamics after a Permanent Increase in $G^T$

As shown previously, the stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path in $(K, P)$-space. The capital stock, the relative price of the non-traded good, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:

\begin{align*}
K(t) &= \tilde{K} + B_1 e^{\mu_1 t}, \quad (206a) \\
P(t) &= \bar{P} + \omega_2 B_1 e^{\mu_1 t}, \quad (206b) \\
B(t) &= \tilde{B} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\mu_1 t}, \quad (206c)
\end{align*}

where $\omega_2^1 = 0$ if $k^T > k^N$ and with

$$B_1 = K_0 - \tilde{K} = -\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T}dG^T,$$

where we made use of the constancy of $K$ at time $t = 0$ (i.e., $K_0$ is predetermined).

**Case** $k^N > k^T$

Using the fact that the steady-state value of the relative price of the non-traded good remains affected by a permanent rise in $G^T$, the initial jump of $P$ is given by

$$\left.\frac{dP(0)}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} = -\omega_2^1 \left.\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} < 0. \quad (207)$$

From the short run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of $P$, we get the response of real consumption at time $t = 0$:

\[
\left.\frac{dC(0)}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} = C_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^T}\left|_{\text{perm}} + C_P \frac{dP(0)}{dG^T}\left|_{\text{perm}} = -\frac{\left[1 + \alpha_C \frac{1}{\mu_2} \frac{C^N}{P^2} \sigma_C \omega_2^2\right]}{P_C \left[1 + \alpha_C \frac{\bar{r}_1}{\mu_2^2} \frac{C^N}{P^2} \sigma_C \omega_2^2\right]} ,
\right. \left.\right. \frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^T}\left|_{\text{perm}} < 0, \quad (208)\right.
\]

where $0 < \left[1 + \alpha_C \frac{1}{\mu_2} \frac{C^N}{P^2} \sigma_C \omega_2^2\right] < 1$. Therefore, we deduce the following inequality

\[
\left.\frac{d\tilde{C}}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} = C_\lambda \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^T}\left|_{\text{perm}} < \left.\frac{dC(0)}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} < 0. \quad (209)\right.
\]

Irrespective of sectoral capital intensities, a rise in $G^T$ induces a once-for-all upward jump of the marginal utility of wealth which reduces real consumption. If $k^N > k^T$, the initial fall of $C$ is moderated by the depreciation in $P$ at time $t = 0$ and falls by less than in the long run.

Differentiating solutions (206), with respect to time, one obtains:

\begin{align*}
\dot{K}(t) &= -\mu_1 \left.\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T < 0, \quad (210a) \\
\dot{P}(t) &= -\mu_1 \omega_2 \left.\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T > 0, \quad (210b) \\
\dot{B}(t) &= -\mu_1 \Phi_1 \left.\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T > 0, \quad (210c)
\end{align*}

where $\Phi_1 < 0$ and $\left.\frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T}\right|_{\text{perm}} < 0$.

Along the stable adjustment, real consumption decreases:

$$\dot{C} = -\sigma_C \alpha_C \frac{\dot{P}}{P} < 0, \quad (211)$$
where \( r^* - \alpha_G \frac{\dot{P}}{P} \) corresponds to the consumption-based real interest rate. After its initial depreciation, the relative price of the non-traded good appreciates to revert back to its initial value. This appreciation lowers the consumption-based real interest rate below the world interest rate which stimulates real consumption.

**Case** \( k^T > k^N \)

Differentiating solutions (206), with respect to time, one obtains

\[
\hat{K}(t) = -\mu_1 \frac{d\hat{K}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T > 0, \tag{212a}
\]

\[
\dot{P}(t) = 0, \tag{212b}
\]

\[
\dot{B}(t) = -\mu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{d\hat{K}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T < 0, \tag{212c}
\]

where \( \Phi_1 < 0 \) and \( \frac{dK}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} > 0 \).

### H.3 Transitional Dynamics after a Temporary Increase in \( G^T \)

**Case** \( k^N > k^T \)

By evaluating formal solution for \( P(t) \) and differentiating with respect to \( G^T \), we get the initial jump of \( P \)

\[
\frac{dP(0)}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -\omega_2 \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \frac{d\hat{K}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} < 0. \tag{213}
\]

By adopting a similar procedure, we obtain the initial response of the investment flow following a temporary rise in government spending on the traded good:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \frac{dI(0)}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} < 0. \tag{214}
\]

By differentiating the formal solution (206c) over period 1 for \( B(t) \) with respect to time, remembering that \( B_2/dG^T = 0 \), then evaluating this at \( t = 0 \), and differentiating with respect to \( G^T \), we obtain the initial response of the current account following a fiscal expansion:

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -r^* \left[ \frac{d\hat{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{d\hat{K}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} \right] + \mu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^T}.
\]

The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (118), and the fact that \( B_{G^T} = -\lambda_{G^T}/\lambda_B \):

\[
- \left[ \frac{d\hat{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{d\hat{K}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} \right] = - \left[ B_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} + B_{G^T} - \Phi_1 K_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} \right],
\]

\[
= - \left[ \frac{\lambda_{G^T}}{\lambda_B} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) - \frac{\lambda_{G^T}}{\lambda_B} \right],
\]

\[
= -B_{G^T} e^{-r^* T}. \tag{215}
\]

Inserting this expression, and remembering that \( \frac{d\dot{B}}{dG^T} = \Phi_1 \frac{d\hat{K}}{dG^T} \), we obtain the reaction of the current account at time \( t = 0 \):

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = -e^{-r^* T} - \mu_1 \Phi_1 K_\lambda \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \lambda_{G^T},
\]

\[
= -e^{-r^* T} - \mu_1 \frac{d\dot{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \leq 0. \tag{216}
\]
The initial current account response is the result of two conflicting forces: (i) a smoothing effect which deteriorates the current account, and (ii) the negative investment flow which improves the external asset position. From (216), there exists a critical value of shock’s length, \( \bar{T} > 0 \), such that the current account response is zero on impact, i.e. \( \dot{B}(0) = 0 \). Solving (216) for \( \bar{T} \), we get:

\[
\bar{T} = \frac{1}{\mu_2} \ln \left[ \frac{1 - \mu_1 \frac{d\dot{B}}{dT}_{\text{perm}}}{-\mu_1 \frac{d\dot{B}}{dT}_{\text{perm}}} \right], \tag{217}
\]

where the term in square brackets is higher than one.

The dynamics for \( K \) and \( P \) over period 1 are derived by taking the time derivative of equations (120a) and (120b):

\[
\dot{K}(t) = \mu_1 B_1 \frac{dG}{dT} e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T = -\mu_1 \frac{d\dot{K}}{dT}_{\text{perm}} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T < 0, \tag{218a}
\]

\[
\dot{P}(t) = \mu_1 \omega_1 B_1 \frac{dG}{dT} e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T = -\omega_1 \mu_1 \frac{d\dot{K}}{dT}_{\text{perm}} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T > 0, \tag{218b}
\]

where we used the fact that \( B_1/dG_T = -\frac{d\dot{K}}{dT}_{\text{perm}} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \).

While the \( P \) and \( K \) go in the same direction as after a permanent rise in \( G_T \), differentiation with respect to time of eq. (120c) shows that the current account may change of sign over period 1:

\[
CA(t) = \dot{B}(t) = -e^{-r^* (T - t)} dG_T - \mu_1 \frac{d\dot{B}}{dT}_{\text{perm}} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T \leq 0. \tag{219}
\]

We have now to determine the conditions under which the current account dynamics displays a non monotonic behavior. Equation (219) reveals that the stock of international assets reaches a turning point during its transitional adjustment at time \( \hat{T} \) given by

\[
\hat{T} = \frac{1}{\mu_2} \ln \left[ -\mu_1 \frac{d\dot{B}}{dT}_{\text{perm}} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) e^{r^* T} \right]. \tag{220}
\]

The necessary condition for \( \hat{T} > 0 \) corresponds to:

\[
0 < e^{-r^* T} < -\mu_1 \frac{d\dot{B}}{dT}_{\text{perm}} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \iff \frac{dCA(0)}{dT}_{\text{temp}} > 0. \tag{221}
\]

If the fiscal expansion lasts a short period, i.e. \( T < \hat{T} \), the current account initially deteriorates and the stock of foreign assets decreases monotonically until time \( T \). If the fiscal expansion lasts a time period longer than \( \hat{T} \), the current account initially improves before reaching a turning point at time \( \hat{T} \). Subsequently, the current account deteriorates until time \( T \).

Once the government policy has been removed at time \( T \), the relative price of the non-traded good keeps on depreciating and the capital stock converges towards its new lower steady-state value:

\[
\dot{K}(t) = \mu_1 B_1' \frac{dG}{dT} e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T < 0, \tag{222a}
\]

\[
\dot{P}(t) = \mu_1 \omega_1 B_1' \frac{dG}{dT} e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T > 0, \tag{222b}
\]

where \( B_1'/dG_T = B_1/dG_T > 0 \). Over period 2, the current account improves unambiguously as it can be seen from the time derivative of solution (122c):

\[
\dot{B}(t) = \mu_1 \Phi_1 B_1' \frac{dG}{dT} e^{\mu_1 t} dG_T > 0. \tag{223}
\]
Case $k^T > k^N$

If $k^T > k^N$, the dynamics for $P$ are flat as after a permanent fiscal expansion since the constant $B_2/dG^T$ is zero, i.e. $\hat{p}(t) = 0$. The investment flow is positive over period 1

$$I(t) = \dot{K}(t) = \mu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^T} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T = -\mu_1 K_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \quad e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T > 0. \quad (224)$$

Differentiating eq. (120c) with respect to time and remembering that $B_2/dG^T = 0$ yields the transitional path for $B(t)$:

$$CA(t) = -r^* \left[ \frac{d\tilde{B}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} - \Phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} \right] e^{r^* t} dG^T + \mu_1 \Phi_1 b_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^T} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T. \quad (225)$$

By evaluating this expression at $t = 0$, and differentiating with respect to $G^T$, we obtain the initial response of the current account following a fiscal expansion:

$$\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} = -r^* \left[ \frac{d\tilde{B}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} - \Phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} \right] + \mu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^T}.\quad (226)$$

The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (118), and the fact that $B_G = -\lambda_G / \lambda_B$:

$$- \left[ \frac{d\tilde{B}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} - \Phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} \right] = - \left[ B_\lambda \frac{d\lambda}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} + \lambda_G + \Phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}_1}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} \right],$$

$$= - \left[ \frac{\lambda_G}{\lambda_B} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) - \frac{\lambda_G}{\lambda_B} \right],$$

$$= - B_G e^{-r^* T}. \quad (226)$$

Inserting expression (226) and remembering that $\frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} = \Phi_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^T}$, we obtain the reaction of the current account at time $t = 0$:

$$\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^T} \bigg|_{temp} = -e^{-r^* T} - \mu_1 K_\lambda \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \lambda_G,$$

$$= - \left[ e^{-r^* T} + \mu_1 \frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{perm} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \right] < 0. \quad (227)$$

If $k^T > k^N$, both the smoothing effect and the positive investment flow lead to a decumulation of foreign assets. Consequently, the current account deteriorates initially and the stock of internationally traded bonds keeps on decreasing over period 1:

$$CA(t) = \dot{B}(t) = -e^{-r^* (T-t)} dG^T - \mu_1 \frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^T} \bigg|_{perm} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T < 0. \quad (228)$$

Over period 2, the stocks of physical capital keeps on decreasing and the current account deteriorates monotonically:

$$I(t) = \mu_1 \frac{B'_1}{dG^T} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T > 0, \quad (229a)$$

$$CA(t) = \mu_1 \Phi_1 \frac{B'_1}{dG^T} e^{\mu_1 t} dG^T < 0, \quad (229b)$$

where $B'_1/dG^T = B_1/dG^T < 0.$

I The Effects of Temporary Fiscal Shocks: The Case of Elastic Labor Supply

In this section, we derive formal solutions by assuming elastic labor supply. We consider a traded sector alternatively more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector.

36
We first solve the system (88a)-(88c) for $\tilde{P}$, $\tilde{K}$ and $\tilde{B}$ as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, $\tilde{\lambda}$ and government spending $G^N$. Totally differentiating equations (88a)-(88c) yields in matrix form:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{h_{\lambda\lambda} k^N}{\mu} & 0 & 0 \\
\left(\frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} - C_P^N\right) & 0 & 0 \\
\left(Y_T^P - C_P^N\right) & Y_K^T & r^* \\
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
d\tilde{P} \\
d\tilde{K} \\
d\tilde{B} \\
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
0 \\
-\left(\frac{Y_N^N}{\mu} - C_N^N\right) d\lambda + dG^N \\
-\left(Y_N^T - C_T^N\right) d\tilde{\lambda} \\
\end{pmatrix}.
$$

(230)

Steady-state values of $K$ and $B$ can be expressed as functions of the shadow value of wealth and government spending $G^N$:

$$
\tilde{K} = K (\tilde{\lambda}, G^N),
$$

(231a)

$$
\tilde{B} = B (\tilde{\lambda}, G^N),
$$

(231b)

with partial derivatives given by:

$$
K_{\lambda} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial \tilde{\lambda}} = -\left(\frac{Y_N^N}{\mu} - C_N^N\right),
$$

(232a)

$$
B_{\lambda} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial \tilde{\lambda}} = \frac{Y_K^T \left(\frac{Y_N^N}{\mu} - C_N^N\right) - \left(\frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} - \delta_K\right) \left(Y_N^T - C_T^N\right)}{r^* \left(\frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} - \delta_K\right)}.
$$

(232b)

We sign expressions depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector:

$$
K_{\lambda} = \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial \lambda} = -\frac{1}{\lambda \nu_1} \left[\sigma \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K)\right] > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad k^T > k^N,
$$

(233a)

$$
K_{\lambda} = \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial \lambda} = -\frac{1}{\lambda \nu_2} \left[\sigma \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K)\right] \geq 0 \quad \text{if} \quad k^N > k^T,
$$

(233b)

$$
B_{\lambda} = \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{\sigma_C \left(\tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \nu_2 - \tilde{C}^T \nu_1\right) + \nu_2 \tilde{P} \sigma_L \left[k^N \nu_1 - \tilde{k}^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K)\right]}{r^* \nu_1 \lambda} \quad \text{if} \quad k^T > k^N,
$$

(233c)

$$
B_{\lambda} = \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial \lambda} = \frac{\sigma_C \left(\tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \nu_1 - \tilde{C}^T \nu_2\right) + \nu_1 \tilde{P} \sigma_L \left[k^N \nu_2 - \tilde{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K)\right]}{r^* \nu_2 \lambda} \quad \text{if} \quad k^N > k^T,
$$

(233d)

and

$$
K_{G^N} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial G^N} = \frac{1}{\nu_1} < 0 \quad \text{if} \quad k^T > k^N,
$$

(234a)

$$
K_{G^N} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial G^N} = \frac{1}{\nu_2} > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad k^N > k^T,
$$

(234b)

$$
B_{G^N} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial G^N} = -\frac{Y_K^T}{\left(\frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} - \delta_K\right) r^*} = -\frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{r^* \nu_1} > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad k^T > k^N,
$$

(234c)

$$
B_{G^N} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial G^N} = -\frac{Y_K^T}{\left(\frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} - \delta_K\right) r^*} = -\frac{\tilde{P} \nu_1}{r^* \nu_2} > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad k^N > k^T.
$$

(234d)
Adopting the same procedure as described in section K.7, we derive formal expressions below for constants $B_1, B_2$ and $B'_1$ when $k^T > k^N$. We were unable to derive useful formal expressions with the reversal of capital intensities. Yet, in the latter case, analytical results derived by assuming inelastic labor supply are in line with numerical results and thereby elastic labor supply does not affect qualitatively the results.

**Case** $k^T > k^N$

The solutions after a rise in $G^N$ are:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{B_1}{dG^N} &= -\frac{\sigma_C \left( \hat{P} \hat{C}N e^{-r^*T} + \hat{C}^T \right) - \sigma_L \hat{L} \hat{P} \left( \nu_2 \hat{k}N + (\nu_1 + \delta_K) \hat{k}T e^{-r^*T} \right)}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right)}, \\
&= -\frac{\left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right) + (1 - e^{-r^*T}) \hat{P} \left( \sigma_L \hat{k}T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \hat{C}N \right)}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right)} \geq 0, \\
\frac{B_2}{dG^N} &= 0, \\
\frac{B'_1}{dG^N} &= \frac{B_1}{dG^N} + K_{GN} e^{-\nu_1 T} \\
&= -\frac{\left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right) (1 - e^{-\nu_1 T}) + (1 - e^{-r^*T}) \hat{P} \left( \sigma_L \hat{k}T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \hat{C}N \right)}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right)} \equiv 0, \\
d\lambda_{GN} \bigg|_{temp} &= \lambda_{GN} \left( 1 - e^{-r^*T} \right) > 0,
\end{align*}
$$

(235a)

(235b)

(235c)

(235d)

where $\lambda_{GN}$ represents the change in the equilibrium value of the shadow value of wealth after a permanent increase in $G^N$ (see eq. (95b)). Eq. (235d) corresponds to eq. (30) in the text.

General solutions for $K$ and $P$ are:

$$
\begin{align*}
K(t) - \hat{K} &= B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \\
P(t) - \hat{P} &= \omega_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \omega_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},
\end{align*}
$$

(236a)

(236b)

Differentiating eq. (236a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time $t = 0$ and differentiating w.r.t. $G^N$, we obtain the initial response of investment following a temporary rise in government spending on the non-traded good:

$$
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{temp} = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N}.
$$

Substituting (235a) and using the fact that $\frac{B_2}{dG^N} = 0$, the initial reaction of investment is:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{temp} &= -\nu_1 \left[ \frac{\left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right) + (1 - e^{-r^*T}) \hat{P} \left( \sigma_L \hat{k}T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \hat{C}N \right)}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right)} \right], \\
&= -\left[ 1 + \left( 1 - e^{-r^*T} \right) \frac{\sigma_L \hat{k}T \hat{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \hat{P} \hat{C}N}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_C P_C \hat{C} + \sigma_L \hat{W} \hat{L} \right)} \right] \leq 0.
\end{align*}
$$

(237)

Eq. (237) corresponds to eq. (31) in the text. Since the length of the shock $T$ plays a key role in driving the initial response of investment, it is useful to determine the critical length $\bar{T}$ such that when $T < \bar{T}$, government spending crowds out investment. Investment
falls when
\[- \left[ 1 + \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \frac{\left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \right)}{\sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L}} \right] < 0,\]

\[e^{-r^* T} > 1 + \frac{\sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N}{\sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N},\]

\[T < - \frac{1}{r^*} \ln \left[ \frac{\left( \sigma_C \tilde{C}^T - \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \tilde{P} \nu_2 \right)}{\left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \right)} \right] = \hat{T},\]

where we used the fact that \(\tilde{W} + \tilde{P} \tilde{k}^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) = -\tilde{P} k^N \nu_2\). The term in brackets in positive but smaller than one. When \(T\) is smaller than the critical length \(\hat{T}\), then investment is crowded-out by public spending.

The general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:

\[B(t) = \tilde{B} + \left[ \left( B_0 - \tilde{B} \right) - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2 \right] e^{r^* t} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \Phi_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \quad (238)\]

Differentiating eq. (238) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time \(t = 0\) and differentiating w.r.t. \(G^N\), we obtain the initial response of the current account after a temporary rise in \(G^N\):

\[\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} = r^* \left[ - \frac{\tilde{B}_1}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} - \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N} \right] + \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N}.\]

Using the fact that

\[- \frac{d\tilde{B}_1}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} - \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N}
\]

\[= - \left( (B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda) \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} + (B_{G^N} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N}) \right),\]

\[= \frac{\lambda_{G^N}}{\lambda_B} e^{-r^* T} = -\tilde{P} e^{-r^* T}, \quad (239)\]

the initial reaction of the current account can be rewritten as follows:

\[\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N}_{\text{temp}} = -\tilde{P} e^{-r^* T} - \nu_1 \tilde{P} \frac{B_1}{dG^N},\]

\[= \tilde{P} \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \left[ 1 + \frac{\left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \right)}{\sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L}} \right] \leq 0,\]

\[= -\tilde{P} e^{-r^* T} + \tilde{P} \left[ 1 + \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \frac{\sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \right)}{\sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma_L \tilde{W} \tilde{L}} \right] \leq 0, \quad (240)\]

where we used the fact that \(\Phi_1 = -\tilde{P}\). Eq. (240) corresponds to eq. (32) in the text.

**Case** \(k^N > k^T\)

While we are unable to derive full expressions for temporary shocks if the non traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector when considering elastic labor supply, we are able to provide useful (i.e., interpretable) expressions which are included and discussed in the text. Below, we provide details about the derivations of these useful expressions.
The solutions after a rise in $G^N$ are:

\[
\frac{B_1}{dG^N} = -\frac{B_2}{dG^N} - K_{\lambda} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - K_{G^N} = -\frac{1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}}{\nu_2} - K_{\lambda} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} \quad (241a)
\]

\[
\frac{B_2}{dG^N} = -\frac{e^{-\nu_2 T}}{\nu_2}, \quad \frac{B_1'}{dG^N} = B_1 \frac{1}{dG^N}, \quad \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \lambda_{G^N} \left(1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}\right) + \frac{\Phi_1 - \Phi_2}{\nu_2} \left( e^{-\nu_2 T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) > 0, \quad (241d)
\]

where we computed the following relationship to sign (241d)

\[
\Phi_1 - \Phi_2 = -\frac{\omega_1}{\nu_2} \left[ \sigma_C \hat{C}^N - \sigma_L \hat{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right] < 0. \quad (242)
\]

The sign of (242) holds when labor supply is elastic enough (i.e., for plausible values of $\sigma_L$).

Using the fact that \( \frac{1}{(B_{\lambda} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N})} \), eq. (241d) can be rewritten as follows:

\[
\frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \lambda_{G^N} \left(1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}\right) + \frac{\Phi_1 - \Phi_2}{\nu_2} \left( e^{-\nu_2 T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) > 0,
\]

\[
= \lambda_{G^N} \left(1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}\right) + \frac{r^* (\Phi_1 - \Phi_2) \left( e^{-\nu_2 T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right)}{\nu_2 P - r^* (\Phi_1 - \Phi_2)} > 0, \quad (243)
\]

where \( B_{G^N} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N} \) is given by

\[
B_{G^N} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N} = \frac{\hat{P}}{r^*} + \frac{\omega_1}{(\nu_2)^2} \left[ \sigma_C \hat{C}^N - \sigma_L \hat{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right],
\]

\[
= \frac{\hat{P}}{r^*} - \frac{\Phi_1 - \Phi_2}{\nu_2} > 0.
\]

Eq. (243) corresponds to eq. (33) in the text.

To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of investment after a temporary rise in $G^N$, we proceed as in section G. Hence, we first linearize the non-traded good market clearing condition in the neighborhood of the steady-state:

\[
I(t) - \tilde{I} = \frac{Y_K}{\mu} \left( K(t) - \hat{K} \right) + \left( \frac{Y_P}{\mu} - C_P^0 \right) \left( P(t) - \hat{P} \right).
\]

Using the fact that \( d\tilde{I} = \frac{Y_K}{\mu} d\hat{K} + \left( \frac{Y_P}{\mu} - C_P^0 \right) d\hat{P} + \left( \frac{Y_N}{\mu} - C_N^0 \right) d\lambda \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - dG^N \), and evaluating the above expression at time \( t = 0 \), we get:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \left( \frac{Y_P}{\mu} - C_P^0 \right) \frac{dP(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} + \frac{\left[ \sigma_C \hat{C}^N - \sigma_L \hat{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right]}{\lambda} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - 1. \quad (244)
\]

Using the fact that \( d\hat{P} = 0 \), we evaluate the initial jump of $P$ which is given by:

\[
\frac{dP(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \omega_1 \frac{dB_1}{dG^N} = \omega_1 \left[ K_{G^N} \left(1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}\right) + K_{\lambda} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} \right],
\]

\[
= \omega_1 \left[ \frac{(1 - e^{-\nu_2 T})}{\nu_2} + \frac{\left[ \sigma_C \hat{C}^N - \sigma_L \hat{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right]}{\lambda \nu_2} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} \right], \quad (245)
\]

where we substituted \( K_{G^N} = 1/\nu_2 \) and \( K_{\lambda} = -\frac{1}{\lambda \nu_2} \left[ \sigma_C \hat{C}^N - \sigma_L \hat{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right] \) (see (233b)). Substituting (245) into (244), using the fact that \( \omega_1 = -\frac{\nu_1 - \nu_2}{(\mu \sigma_L)} \), and collecting terms,
the initial reaction of investment can be rewritten as:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} = \left( \frac{\nu_2 - \nu_1}{\nu_2} \right) (1 - e^{-\nu_2 T}) + \frac{\nu_1}{\nu_2} \left[ \sigma_G \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}kT (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right] \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} - 1.
\]  

Eq. (246) corresponds to eq. (34) in the text.

By differentiating the formal solution for foreign assets over period 1 for \( B(t) \) with respect to time, then evaluating the resulting expression at \( t = 0 \), and differentiating with respect to \( G^N \), we obtain the initial response of the current account following a temporary fiscal expansion:

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} = \nu_1 \left\{ -\frac{\tilde{B}_1}{dG} + \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG} - \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG} \right\} + \nu_2 \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG} + \nu_2 \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG},
\]

(247)

In order to simplify the solution (247), we rewrite the term in square brackets as follows

\[
\begin{align*}
- \frac{\tilde{B}_1}{dG} + \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG} &- \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG} \\
= &- (B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda) \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} - (B_G^N - \Phi_1 K_G^N) + [\Phi_1 - \Phi_2] \frac{B_2}{dG}, \\
= &- (B_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda) \left\{ \lambda_G^N \left( 1 - e^{-r^*T} \right) + \frac{\nu_1}{\nu_2} \left( \frac{\Phi_1 - \Phi_2}{\nu_2} \left( e^{-r^*T} - e^{-\nu_2 T} \right) \right) \right\} \\
&- (B_G^N - \Phi_1 K_G^N) - \frac{\Phi_1 - \Phi_2}{\nu_2} e^{-\nu_2 T}, \\
= &- \frac{\tilde{P}}{r^*} e^{-r^*T} < 0,
\end{align*}
\]

(248)

where we have computed the following expression to get (248):

\[ (B_G^N - \Phi_1 K_G^N) = \frac{\tilde{P}}{r^*} \left( \frac{\omega_1}{\nu_2} \right)^2 \left[ \sigma_G \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}kT (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right] > 0. \]

(249)

Inserting (248) into (247), the initial response of the current account can be rewritten as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} &= -\tilde{P} e^{-r^*T} - \nu_1 \left\{ \tilde{P} + \frac{\omega_1}{\nu_2} \left[ \sigma_G \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}kT (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right] \right\} \frac{B_1}{dG} + \nu_2 \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG}, \\
&= -\tilde{P} e^{-r^*T} - \nu_1 \left\{ \sigma_G \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}kT (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right\} \frac{B_1}{dG} - \tilde{P} \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG}, \\
&= -\tilde{P} e^{-r^*T} - \nu_1 \left\{ \sigma_G \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L}kT (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \right\} \frac{dP(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} + \frac{\tilde{P}}{r^*} \frac{dI(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}}, \quad (250)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \frac{dP(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} \) is given by (245) and \( \frac{dI(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} \) is given by (246). To get (250), we used the fact that \( \frac{dI(0)}{dG} \bigg{\bigg|}_{\text{temp}} = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG} \). Eq. (250) corresponds to eq. (35) in the text.

**J Savings**

Since the current account can be alternatively expressed as net exports plus interest earnings from traded bond holding, or as the savings less investment, we provide details for the derivation of steady-state and dynamic effects of fiscal shocks on savings.
J.1 Formal Solution for Financial Wealth

The law of motion for financial wealth \( S(t) = \dot{A}(t) \) is given by:

\[
\dot{A}(t) = r^* A(t) + W(P) L(\lambda, P) - P_C(P) C(\lambda, P) - Z, \tag{251}
\]

with \( Z = G^T + PG^N \).

The linearized version of (251) is:

\[
\dot{A}(t) = r^* \left( A(t) - \bar{A} \right) + M \left( P(t) - \bar{P} \right), \tag{252}
\]

with \( M \) given by

\[
M = \left( W_P \bar{L} + \bar{W} L_P \right) - \left( \tilde{C}^N + P_C C_P + G^N \right),
\]

\[
= \bar{L} W_P (1 + \sigma_L) - \left[ \tilde{C}^N (1 - \sigma_C) + G^N \right],
\]

\[
= - \left\{ \bar{K} (\nu_2 + \delta_K) + \sigma_L \bar{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N \right\} < 0. \tag{253}
\]

From the second line of (253), if \( \sigma_C < 1 \) as empirical studies suggest, then the term in square brackets is positive and \( M \) is negative. The last line has been computed by using the fact that \( \bar{L} = \tilde{L}^N + \bar{L}^T \) and \( \bar{K} = \tilde{k}^T \bar{L}^T + \bar{k}^N \tilde{L}^N \) which allows to simplify \( \frac{1}{\mu} \left[ \bar{Y}^N + \bar{k}^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \mu \right] \) to \( \bar{K} (\nu_2 + \delta_K) \).

The general solution for the stock of financial wealth is given by:

\[
A(t) = \bar{A} + \left[ (A_0 - \bar{A}) - \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 - \frac{M \omega_2}{\nu_2 - r^*} B_2 \right] e^{r^* t} + \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \frac{M \omega_2}{\nu_2 - r^*} B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}. \tag{254}
\]

Invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the stable solution for financial wealth:

\[
A(t) = \bar{A} + \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 e^{\nu_1 t}, \tag{255}
\]

and the intertemporal solvency condition

\[
\bar{A} - A_0 = \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} \left( \bar{K} - K_0 \right). \tag{256}
\]

J.2 Steady-State and Dynamic Effects of a Permanent Fiscal Shock

Differentiating (256) w. r. t. \( G^i \) \( (i = T, N) \), long-term changes of financial wealth are given by:

\[
\frac{d \dot{A}}{d G^i} = \frac{\omega_1}{\nu_2} \left( \bar{K} \nu_2 + \sigma_L \bar{k}^T \nu_2 - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N \right) \frac{d \bar{K}}{d G^i}. \tag{257}
\]

Differentiating (255) w. r. t. \( G^i \) \( (i = T, N) \), we get the dynamics of savings:

\[
S(t) = \dot{A}(t) = \nu_1 \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 \frac{d G^i}{d G^i} e^{\nu_1 t}, \tag{258}
\]

where \( B_1 = -\frac{d \bar{K}}{d G^i} \).

J.3 Steady-State and Dynamic Effects of a Temporary Fiscal Shock

We now evaluate the transitional dynamics of saving after a temporary shock, \( d G^i \) \( (i = T, N) \).

Case \( k^N > k^T \)

Over the unstable period 1, savings evolve as follows:

\[
S(t) = \dot{A}(t) = r^* \left[ \left( A_0 - \bar{A}_1 \right) - \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 \right] e^{r^* t} + \nu_1 \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 e^{\nu_1 t}, \tag{259}
\]

\[
S(t) = \dot{A}(t) = r^* \left[ \left( A_0 - \bar{A}_1 \right) - \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 \right] e^{r^* t} + \nu_1 \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 e^{\nu_1 t}, \tag{259}
\]

\[
S(t) = \dot{A}(t) = r^* \left[ \left( A_0 - \bar{A}_1 \right) - \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 \right] e^{r^* t} + \nu_1 \frac{M \omega_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 e^{\nu_1 t}, \tag{259}
\]
with
\[
(A_0 - \tilde{A}_1) = (B_0 - \tilde{B}_1) + \tilde{P}_0 \left( K_0 - \tilde{K}_1 \right) + K_0 \left( P_0 - \tilde{P}_1 \right).
\] (260)

Over the stable period 2, savings evolve as follows:
\[
S(t) = \dot{A}(t) = \nu \frac{M \omega_2^i}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1' e^{rt}.
\] (261)

To compute steady-state changes of the stock of financial wealth, we linearize \( A(t) = B(t) + P(t)K(t) \) in the neighborhood of the final steady-state. We have:
\[
A(t) - \tilde{A}_2 = \left( B(t) - \tilde{B}_2 \right) + \tilde{P} \left( K(t) - \tilde{K}_2 \right) + \tilde{K} \left( P(t) - \tilde{P}_2 \right).
\]

Then we evaluate at time \( t = 0 \):
\[
A_0 - \tilde{A}_2 = \left( B_0 - \tilde{B}_2 \right) + \tilde{P}_0 \left( K_0 - \tilde{K}_2 \right) + \tilde{K}_0 \left( P(0) - \tilde{P}_2 \right),
\]
where we used the fact that \( A(0) = A_0, B(0) = B_0, K(0) = K_0 \) and assumed that the small open economy starts initially from the steady-state, i.e. \( A_0 = \tilde{A}_0 = \tilde{A}, B_0 = \tilde{B}_0 = \tilde{B}, K_0 = \tilde{K}_0 = \tilde{K} \). Substituting \( P(0) - \tilde{P}_2 = \omega_2 B_0 \) into the expression above and differentiating w.r.t \( G^i \) (i.e. \( i = T, N \)), long-term changes of financial wealth are given by:
\[
\frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_T} \bigg|_{temp} = \left( B_{\lambda} + \tilde{P} K_{\lambda} \right) \frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_T} \bigg|_{temp} < 0,
\] (262a)
\[
\frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_N} \bigg|_{temp} = \left( B_{\lambda} + \tilde{P} K_{\lambda} \right) \frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_N} \bigg|_{temp} < 0,
\] (262b)
with
\[
\left( B_{\lambda} + \tilde{P} K_{\lambda} \right) = -\frac{\sigma_C P_C \tilde{C}}{\lambda r^*} < 0.
\] (263)

**Case** \( k_T > k^N \)

Since \( \omega_2^1 = 0 \) whenever the traded good sector is relatively more capital intensive, and because \( B_2/dG^i = 0 \), the transitional dynamics for saving degenerate and the financial wealth jumps immediately to its new steady-state level.

Adopting a similar procedure than previously (i.e. in the case \( k^N > k^T \)), we can calculate the long-term changes of financial wealth as follows:
\[
\frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_T} \bigg|_{temp} = \left( B_{\lambda} + \tilde{P} K_{\lambda} \right) \frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_T} \bigg|_{temp} < 0,
\] (264a)
\[
\frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_N} \bigg|_{temp} = \left( B_{\lambda} + \tilde{P} K_{\lambda} \right) \frac{d\tilde{A}}{dG_N} \bigg|_{temp} < 0,
\] (264b)
with
\[
B_{\lambda} + \tilde{P} K_{\lambda} = -\frac{\sigma_C P_C \tilde{C}}{\lambda r^*} < 0.
\] (265)

**K The Case of Endogenous Markup**

The framework builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]. While we consider the case of an endogenous markup, the framework is identical to that with a fixed markup, except that in the latter case the number of competitors is large enough so that the price-elasticity of demand is not affected by firm entry. There are two sectors in the economy: a perfectly competitive sector which produces a traded good denoted by the superscript \( T \) and an imperfectly competitive sector which produces a non-traded good denoted by the superscript \( N \). We assume that each producer of a unique variety of the non-traded good has the following technology \( X^N_j = H(\mathcal{K}_j, \mathcal{L}_j) \) where \( \mathcal{K}_j \) is the capital stock and \( \mathcal{L}_j \) is labor.
K.1 Framework

The final non-traded output, $Y^N$, is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral non-traded goods:

$$Y^N = \left[ \int_0^1 (Q^N_j)^{\omega-1} \frac{1}{\omega} dj \right]^{\frac{1}{\omega-1}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (266)

where $\omega > 0$ represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral goods and $Q^N_j$ stands for intermediate consumption of sector $j$ variety (with $j \in [0, N]$). The final good producers behave competitively, and the households use the final good for both consumption and investment.

In each of the $j$ sectors, there are $N > 1$ firms producing differentiated goods that are aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good by a CES aggregating function. The non-traded output sectoral good $j$ is given by:

$$Q^N_j = N^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \left[ \int_0^N (X^N_{i,j})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}-1} di \right]^{\epsilon-1},$$  \hspace{1cm} (267)

where $X^N_{i,j}$ stands for output of firm $i$ in sector $j$ and $\epsilon$ is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.

Denoting by $P$ and $P_j$ the relative price of the final good and of the $j$th variety of the intermediate good, respectively, the profit the final good producer is written as follows:

$$\Pi^N = P \left[ \int_0^N (Q^N_j)^{\frac{1}{\omega}-1} dj \right]^{\frac{1}{\omega-1}} - \int_0^1 P_j Q^N_j dj.$$  \hspace{1cm} (268)

Total cost minimizing for a given level of final output gives the (intratemporal) demand function for each input:

$$Q^N_j = \left( \frac{P_j}{P} \right)^{-\omega} Y^N,$$  \hspace{1cm} (269)

and the price of the final output is given by:

$$P = \left( \int_0^1 P_j^{1-\omega} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\omega}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (270)

where $P_j$ is the price index of sector $j$ and $P$ is the price of the final good.

Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one variety $X^N_{i,j}$ is a price setter. Intermediate output $X^N_{i,j}$ is produced using capital $K^N_{i,j}$ and labor $L^N_{i,j}$:

$$X^N_{i,j} = H(K^N_{i,j}, L^N_{i,j}).$$  \hspace{1cm} (271)

Denoting by $P_{i,j}$ the price of good $i$ in sector $j$, the profit function for the $j$th sector good producer denoted by $\pi^N_j$ is:

$$\pi^N_j = P_j N^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \left( \int_0^N (X^N_{i,j})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}-1} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} - \int_0^N P_{i,j} X^N_{i,j} di.$$  \hspace{1cm} (272)

The demand faced by each producer $X^N_{i,j}$ is defined as follows:

$$X^N_{i,j} = \left( \frac{P_{i,j}}{P_j} \right)^{-\epsilon} \frac{Q^N_j}{N},$$  \hspace{1cm} (273)

and the price index of sector $j$ is given by:

$$P_j = N^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \left( \int_0^N P_{i,j}^{1-\epsilon} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (274)

\footnote{By having the term $N^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}}$ in (267), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates solely on the effects of markup variation.}
Combining (269) and (273), the demand for variety $X_{i,j}^N$ can be expressed in terms of the relative price of the final non-traded good:

$$X_{i,j}^N = \left( \frac{P_{i,j}}{P_j} \right)^{-\epsilon} \left( \frac{P_j}{P} \right)^{-\omega} Y^N N.$$  \hspace{1cm} (275)

In order to operate, each intermediate good producer must pay a fixed cost denoted by $F_C$ measured in terms of the final (non-traded) good which is assumed to be symmetric across firms. Each firm $j$ chooses capital and labor to maximize profits. The profit function for the $i$th producer in sector $j$ denoted by $\pi_{i,j}^N$ is:

$$\pi_{i,j}^N \equiv P_j H(K_{N,j}, L_{N,j}) - r_K K_{N,j} - W L_{N,j} - P F C.$$  \hspace{1cm} (276)

The demands for capital and hours worked are given by the equalities of the markup-adjusted marginal revenues of capital $P_j H K_j$ and labor $P_j H L_j$, to the capital rental rate $r_K$ and the producer wage $W$, respectively.

### K.2 First-Order Conditions

The current-value Hamiltonian for the $j$-th firm’s optimization problem in the non-traded sector is:

$$H_j^N = P_j H (K_j^N, L_j^N) - r_K K_j^N - W L_j^N - p F C + \eta_j \left[H (K_j^N, L_j^N) - X_{i,j}^N \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (277)

where $X_{i,j}^N$ stands for the demand for variety $j$; firm $j$ chooses its price $P_j$ to maximize profits treating the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for are:

$$P_j H K + \eta H K = r^K,$$  \hspace{1cm} (278a)

$$P_j H L + \eta H L = W,$$  \hspace{1cm} (278b)

$$\eta_j = P_j H_j,$$  \hspace{1cm} (278c)

Combining (333a)-(333b) with (333c), by assuming that firms $j$ are symmetric, yields:

$$P_j H_K \left(1 - \frac{1}{e_j} \right) = r^K,$$  \hspace{1cm} (279a)

$$P_j H_L \left(1 - \frac{1}{e_j} \right) = W,$$  \hspace{1cm} (279b)

where we used the fact that $\frac{P_j'}{P_j X_{i,j}^N} = -\frac{1}{e_j}$.

We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate good sector produce the output level $X_{i,j}^N = X^N$ with the same quantities of labor $L_{i,j}^N = L^N$ and capital $K_{i,j}^N = K^N$. Hence, the aggregate stock of physical capital and hours worked are $K^N = NK^N$ and $L^N = NL^N$, respectively. They also set the same price $P_{i,j} = P$. Hence, eqs. (270) and (274) imply that $P = P$.

Remembering that the markup is given by $\theta = \frac{\epsilon}{e-1}$, first-order conditions can be rewritten as follows:

$$P H_K \mu = r^K,$$  \hspace{1cm} (280a)

$$P H_L \mu = W.$$  \hspace{1cm} (280b)

We follow Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] by taking into account the influence of the individual price on the sectoral price index:

$$e(N) = \epsilon - \frac{(\epsilon - \omega)}{N}, \hspace{1cm} N \in (1, \infty).$$  \hspace{1cm} (281)

As will be useful later, we calculate the partial derivatives of the price-elasticity of demand and the markup with respect to the number of firms:

$$e_N = \frac{\partial e}{\partial N} = \frac{\epsilon - \omega}{N^2} > 0, \hspace{1cm} \mu_N = \frac{\partial \mu}{\partial N} = - \frac{e_N}{(e-1)^2} = - \frac{e_N \mu}{e-1} < 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (282)
where we let $\mu = \frac{e - 1}{e} + 1$.

We further assume that free entry drives profits down to zero in all industries of the non-traded sector at each instant of time. Using constant returns to scale in production, i.e. $X = H(K, L) = H_KK + H_LL$, and the zero profit condition, in the aggregate, we have:

$$PH(K^N, L^N) - r^N K^N - WL^N - PNFC = 0. \quad (283)$$

Substituting the short-run static solution for non-traded output (52), the zero-profit condition (283) can be rewritten as:

$$Y^N(K, P, \bar{\lambda}, \mu(N)) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mu(N)}\right) = NFC. \quad (284)$$

### K.3 Short-Run Static Solution for the Number of Firms

The zero profit condition can be solved for the number of producers in the non-traded sector:

$$N = N(K, P, \bar{\lambda}), \quad (285)$$

where partial derivatives are given by:

$$N_x \equiv \frac{\partial N}{\partial x} = -\frac{Y^N \omega_{FC}}{\chi} \geq 0, \quad (286)$$

where $x = K, P, \bar{\lambda}$, $\omega_{FC} \equiv NFC/Y^N$ corresponds to the share of fixed costs in markup-adjusted output and we set

$$\chi = \frac{Y^N}{N} \left\{\left[\eta_{Y^N, \mu}(\mu - 1) + 1\right] \frac{\eta_{\mu, N}}{\mu} - \omega_{FC}\right\}. \quad (287)$$

Inspection of (287) shows that $\chi < 0$ if $\eta_{\mu, N}$ is not too large. This implies that an input inflow in the non-traded sector that raises $Y^N$ and thereby yields to profit opportunities results in firm entry which lowers the markup.

### K.4 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions

Inserting short-run static solutions for non-traded output and consumption, given by (52) and (44) respectively, into the non-traded good market-clearing condition (30), and inserting short-run static solution for capital-labor ratio in the non-traded good sector (46) into the dynamic equation for the real exchange rate (5d), and substituting the short-run static solution for the number of firms (285) yields:

$$\dot{K} = \frac{Y^N[K, P, \mu[N(K, P)]]}{\mu[N(K, P)]} - C^N(P) - \delta_K K - G^N, \quad (288a)$$

$$\dot{P} = P \left\{r^* + \delta_K - \frac{h_k(k^N[P, \mu[N(K, P)]])}{\mu[N(K, P)]}\right\}. \quad (288b)$$

For clarity purpose, we dropped variables which are constant over time from short-run static solutions.

Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting by $\bar{x} = \bar{K}, \bar{P}$ the steady-state values of $x = K, P$, we obtain in a matrix form:

$$\left(\bar{K}, \bar{P}\right)^T = J \left(K(t) - \bar{K}, P(t) - \bar{P}\right)^T, \quad (289)$$

where $J$ is given by

$$J \equiv \begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix}, \quad (290)$$
where elements evaluated at the steady-state are:

\[
b_{11} = \frac{Y^N}{\mu} \left[\frac{Y^N}{Y^N} - \frac{\mu_N}{\mu} N_K \left(1 - \frac{Y^N}{Y^N}\right)\right] - \delta_K, \tag{291a}
\]

\[
b_{12} = \frac{Y^N}{\mu} \left[\frac{Y^P}{Y^N} - \frac{\mu_N}{\mu} N_P \left(1 - \frac{Y^N}{Y^N}\right)\right] - C_P^N, \tag{291b}
\]

\[
b_{21} = \frac{P}{\mu} h_{kk} \frac{\mu N_K}{\mu} k^N \left(\frac{h_k}{h_{kk} k^N} - \frac{k_N}{k^N}\right), \tag{291c}
\]

\[
b_{22} = -\frac{P}{\mu} h_{kk} \frac{\mu N_P}{\mu} k^N \left(\frac{h_k}{h_{kk} k^N} - \frac{k_N}{k^N}\right). \tag{291d}
\]

**Equilibrium Dynamics**

The sign of the determinant denoted by \(\text{Det}\) of the \(2 \times 2\) Jacobian matrix (290) is ambiguous:

\[
\text{Det } J = b_{11} b_{22} - b_{12} b_{21}
\]

\[
= \left(\frac{Y^T}{\mu} - \delta_K\right) \left[\frac{Y^T}{P} + \frac{P}{\mu} h_{kk} k^N \frac{\mu N_p}{\mu} \left(\frac{h_k}{h_{kk} k^N} - \frac{k_N}{k^N}\right)\right]
\]

\[
- \frac{\mu N_p}{\mu} N_K \left[\frac{Y^N}{\mu} \left(1 - \frac{Y^N}{Y^N}\right) \frac{Y^T}{P} + \left(\frac{Y^P}{\mu} - C_P^N\right) \frac{P}{\mu} h_{kk} k^N \left(\frac{h_k}{h_{kk} k^N} - \frac{k_N}{k^N}\right)\right], \tag{292}
\]

and the trace denoted by \(\text{Tr}\) is given by:

\[
\text{Tr } J = b_{11} + b_{22} = \frac{Y^T}{\mu} + \frac{Y^N}{P} - \delta_K
\]

\[
- \frac{\mu N_p}{\mu} N_K \frac{Y^N}{\mu} \left[1 - \frac{Y^N}{Y^N}\right] - N_P \frac{P}{\mu} h_{kk} k^N \left(\frac{h_k}{h_{kk} k^N} - \frac{k_N}{k^N}\right),
\]

\[
= r^* - \frac{\mu N_p}{\mu} N_K \frac{Y^N}{\mu} > 0, \tag{293}
\]

where we used the fact that \(\frac{Y^T}{\mu} + \frac{Y^N}{P} = h_k^* = r^* + \delta_K\); the positive sign follows from \(N_K > 0\) and \(\mu_N < 0\). If the elasticity of the markup to the flow of entry is not too large, then determinant (292) is negative so that the condition for saddle-path stability with real-valued roots holds. Such a condition requires that the markup must be initially not too large.

Characteristic roots from \(J\) write as follows:

\[
\nu_i \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left\{\text{Tr } J \pm \sqrt{(\text{Tr } J)^2 - 4 \text{Det } J}\right\} \geq 0, \quad i = 1, 2. \tag{294}
\]

We denote by \(\nu_1 < 0\) and \(\nu_2 > 0\) the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying

\[
\nu_1 < 0 < r^* < \nu_2. \tag{295}
\]

Since the system features one state variable, \(K\), and one jump variable, \(P\), the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.

General solutions are those described by (68) with eigenvector \(\omega_\nu^i\) associated with eigenvalue \(\nu_i\) given by:

\[
\omega_\nu^i = \frac{\nu_i - b_{11}}{b_{12}}. \tag{296}
\]

**K.5 Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets**

Inserting first short-run static solutions for \(Y^T\) and \(C^T\) given by (52) and (44), respectively, substituting the short-run static solution for the number of firms given by (285), into eq.(3),
and linearizing around the steady-state gives:
\[
\dot{B}(t) = r^* \left( B(t) - \tilde{B} \right) + \left[ Y_K^T + Y^T \mu_N \dot{N} \right] \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right) + \left[ (Y_P^T + Y^T \mu_N \dot{N}_P) - C_P^T \right] \left( P(t) - \tilde{P} \right),
\]
where \( C_P^T \) is given by (45b).

Using the fact that \( P(t) - \tilde{P} = \omega_2^1 \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right) \), setting
\[
N_1 = \left[ Y_K^T + Y^T \mu_N \dot{N} \right] + \left[ (Y_P^T + Y^T \mu_N \dot{N}_P) - C_P^T \right] \omega_2^1,
\]
solving for the differential equation and invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
\[
B(t) - \tilde{B} = \Phi_1 \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right),
\]
and the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
\[
\tilde{B} - B_0 = \Phi_1 \left( \tilde{K} - K_0 \right),
\]
where we used the fact that \( B_1 = K_0 - \tilde{K} \).

**K.6 Solutions for \( L, N, \) and \( W \)**

Linearizing the short-run static solution \( N = N(K, P) \) yields the solution for the number of firms:
\[
N(t) = \tilde{N} + N_K \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right) + N_P \left( P(t) - \tilde{P} \right),
\]
\[
= \tilde{N} + (N_K + N_P \omega_2^1) \dot{B}_1 e^{\nu t} + (N_K + N_P \omega_2^2) B_2 e^{\nu t}.
\]

Linearizing the short-run static solution for labor \( L = L(P, \mu) \), using the fact that \( \mu = \mu (N) \), and substituting the appropriate solutions, the solution for \( L(t) \) reads:
\[
L(t) = \tilde{L} + L_P \left( P(t) - \tilde{P} \right) + L_{\mu} (\mu(t) - \tilde{\mu}),
\]
\[
= \tilde{L} + L_P \left[ \omega_2^1 - \frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu} \mu_N \left( N_K + N_P \omega_2^1 \right) \right] B_1 e^{\nu t} + L_P \left[ \omega_2^2 - \frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu} \mu_N \left( N_K + N_P \omega_2^2 \right) \right] B_2 e^{\nu t},
\]
where we used the fact that \( L_{\mu} = -\frac{L_P P}{\tilde{P}} \).

Linearizing the short-run static solution for the wage rate \( W = W(P, \mu) \) and substituting appropriate solutions yields:
\[
W(t) = \tilde{W} + W_P \omega_2^1 \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right) + W_{\mu} \mu_N \left( N(t) - \tilde{N} \right),
\]
\[
= \tilde{W} + W_P \left[ \omega_2^1 - \frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu} \mu_N \left( N_K + N_P \omega_2^1 \right) \right] B_1 e^{\nu t} + W_P \left[ \omega_2^2 - \frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu} \mu_N \left( N_K + N_P \omega_2^2 \right) \right] B_2 e^{\nu t},
\]
where we used the fact that \( W_{\mu} = -\frac{W_P P}{\tilde{P}} \).

**K.7 The Two-Step Procedure: Wealth Effect and Government Spending**

By analytical convenience, we rewrite the system of steady-state equations, assuming that \( \delta_K = 0 \):
\[
\frac{h_k \left[ k^{\mu} \left( \tilde{P} \right) \right]}{\mu} = r^*,
\]
\[
\frac{1}{\mu} Y^{\mu} \left( \tilde{K}, \tilde{P}, \lambda \right) - C^{\mu} \left( \lambda, \tilde{P} \right) - G^{\mu} = 0,
\]
\[
r^* \tilde{B} + Y^T \left( \tilde{K}, \tilde{P}, \lambda \right) - C^T \left( \lambda, \tilde{P} \right) - G^T = 0,
\]

Together with the intertemporal solvency condition
\[
\left( \tilde{B} - B_0 \right) = \Phi_1 \left( \tilde{K} - K_0 \right),
\]
where \( K_0 \) and \( B_0 \) correspond to the initially predetermined stocks of physical capital and foreign assets.

**Derivation of Steady-State Functions**

In a first step, we solve the system (305a)-(305c) for \( \tilde{P}, \tilde{K} \) and \( \tilde{B} \) as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, \( \bar{\lambda} \), government spending \( G^N \) together with the mark-up. Totally differentiating equations (305a)-(305c) yields in matrix form:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{h_{kk}^N}{\mu} & 0 & 0 \\
\left( \frac{Y^N_T}{\mu} - C^N_T \right) & \frac{Y^N_T}{\mu} & 0 \\
\left( Y^T_P - C^T_P \right) & Y^T_K & r^* \\
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
d\tilde{P} \\
d\tilde{K} \\
d\tilde{B} \\
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{Y^N_P}{\mu} \frac{d\mu}{d\bar{\lambda}} \\
\left( \frac{Y^N_T}{\mu} - C^N_T \right) \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{d\bar{\lambda}} - \left( \frac{Y^N_T}{R^*} - \frac{Y^N_T}{R^*} \right) d\mu + dG^N \\
\left( \frac{Y^T_T}{\lambda} - C^T_T \right) \frac{d\bar{T}}{d\bar{T}} - \left( \frac{Y^T_T}{\lambda} \right) d\mu + \frac{k}{\mu(k^N - k^T)} \\
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(306)

where we used the fact that \( \theta f = P \left[ h - h_k \left( k^N - k^T \right) \right] \) and \( \frac{h_k}{\mu} = r^* \) at the steady-state to rewrite \( r^* - h_{kk}^N \) as \( \frac{h}{\mu(k^N - k^T)} = \frac{Y^N_P}{\mu} \).

The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth \( \bar{\lambda} \), government spending \( G^N \) and the markup \( \mu \) determine the following steady-state values:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{P} & = P(\mu), \\
\tilde{K} & = K(\bar{\lambda}, G^N, \mu), \\
\tilde{B} & = B(\bar{\lambda}, G^N, \mu),
\end{align*}
\]

(307a-b-c)

with partial derivatives given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
K_{\bar{\lambda}} & = \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial \bar{\lambda}} = -\frac{1}{\lambda \nu_1} \left( \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{k}^T \nu_1 \right) > 0 \text{ if } k^T > k^N, \\
& = -\frac{1}{\lambda \nu_2} \left( \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{k}^T \nu_2 \right) > 0 \text{ if } k^N > k^T, \\
B_{\bar{\lambda}} & = \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial \bar{\lambda}} = -\frac{1}{\lambda \nu_1} \left( \tilde{f} \tilde{C}^N + \tilde{h} \tilde{C}^T + \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{f} \right) < 0, \\
\end{align*}
\]

(308a-b-c)

and

\[
\begin{align*}
K_{G^N} & = \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial G^N} = \frac{1}{Y^N_K / \mu} = \frac{1}{\nu_1} < 0 \text{ if } k^T > k^N, \\
& = \frac{1}{Y^N_K / \mu} = \frac{1}{\nu_2} > 0 \text{ if } k^N > k^T, \\
B_{G^N} & = \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial G^N} = -\frac{Y^T_T}{Y^T_K} r^* = \frac{\tilde{f}}{h r^*} > 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(309a-b-c)
and

\[ P_\mu = \frac{\partial \tilde{P}}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{\tilde{P} \tilde{P} Y_N^N}{\mu Y_K^T} = -\frac{\tilde{P} \nu_1}{\nu_2} > 0, \text{ if } k^T > k^N, \]

\[ = -\frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{\mu \nu_1} > 0, \text{ if } k^N > k^T, \tag{310a} \]

\[ K_\mu = \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial \mu} = \frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu \nu_1 \nu_2} \left[ \frac{Y_N^N}{\mu - \nu_1 C_P^N} + \frac{Y_N^N}{\mu \nu_1} < 0, \text{ if } k^T > k^N, \right. \]

\[ = \frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu \nu_1 \nu_2} \left[ \frac{Y_N^N}{\mu - \nu_2 C_P^N} + \frac{Y_N^N}{\mu \nu_2} \leq 0, \text{ if } k^N > k^T, \right. \tag{310c} \]

\[ B_\mu = \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu \nu_2} \left[ \tilde{P} \left( \frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} - C_P^N \right) + \left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \nu_1 - \frac{\nu_1}{r^*} \sigma_C \tilde{C} \right) \right] + \frac{\tilde{L}^N \tilde{f}}{\mu r^*} \geq 0, \]

\[ \text{if } k^T > k^N \]

\[ = -\frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu \nu_1} \left[ \tilde{P} \left( \frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} - C_P^N \right) + \left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T \nu_2 - \frac{\nu_2}{r^*} \sigma_C \tilde{C} \right) \right] + \frac{\tilde{L}^N \tilde{f}}{\mu r^*} \geq 0, \]

\[ \text{if } k^N > k^T \] \tag{310d}

\[ \text{if } k^N > k^T \] \tag{310f}

where we used the fact that \( h_{\tilde{L}^N k^T} = -\frac{Y_P^N}{\tilde{P} \mu} \) to derive the first equality of (310a). In addition, we made use of the following property \( Y_N^N = -\frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu Y_P^N} \) and \( Y_P^T = -\frac{\tilde{P}}{\mu Y_P^T} \) to determine (310c)-(310d) and (310e)-(310f). Finally, use has been made of property (555) to rewrite \( Y_P^T - C_P^N \) and property (55b) to simplify \( \mu Y_P^N + \mu Y_K^N \) which is equal to \( P \mu r^* \) in the long-run.

Since the change in the markup modifies the long-run levels of real consumption and labor supply through the steady-state change in the relative price of non tradables, it is convenient to rewrite their steady-state functions, i.e., their short-run static solutions (42) that hold in the long-run, in terms of \( \lambda \) and \( \mu \):

\[ C = m \left( \bar{\lambda}, \mu \right), \quad L = n \left( \bar{\lambda}, \mu \right), \tag{311} \]

where partial derivatives are given by (43) evaluated at the steady-state (that’s why we substitute respectively the notations \( m \) and \( n \) for \( C \) and \( L \)) and

\[ m_\mu = \frac{\partial \tilde{C}}{\partial \mu} = \alpha_C \sigma_C \tilde{C} \frac{\nu_1}{\nu_2} < 0, \text{ if } k^T > k^N, \]

\[ = \alpha_C \sigma_C \tilde{C} \frac{\nu_2}{\nu_1} < 0, \text{ if } k^N > k^T, \tag{312a} \]

\[ n_\mu = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial \mu} = -\frac{\sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{k}^T \tilde{P} \tilde{h} \tilde{P} r^*}{\mu \tilde{f}} < 0. \tag{312c} \]

We computed (312c) as follows: \( n_\mu = \frac{\sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{k}^T \tilde{P} Y_N^N}{\mu Y_K^N} \frac{\tilde{P} r^*}{\mu} \).

Following the same procedure, i.e. substituting the steady-state function for the real exchange rate into the static solution for wage evaluated at the steady-state, the steady-state function for wage can be rewritten as follows:

\[ W = W \left( \mu \right), \tag{313} \]

where the partial derivative w. r. t. \( \mu \) is given by:

\[ W_\mu = \frac{\partial \tilde{W}}{\partial \mu} = -\tilde{k}^T \tilde{P} \tilde{h} \tilde{P} r^* < 0, \tag{314} \]

where \( W_\mu = \tilde{k}^T \tilde{P} Y_N^N \frac{\tilde{P} r^*}{\mu} \) with \( \frac{Y_N^N}{Y_K^N} = -\frac{\tilde{k}}{\tilde{f}} < 0 \).

Finally, following a similar procedure, we may express the rental rate of physical capital as a function of \( \mu \):

\[ r^K = r^K \left( \mu \right), \tag{315} \]
where the partial derivative w. r. t. $\mu$ is given by:

$$r^K_{\mu} = \frac{\partial \tilde{r}^K}{\partial \mu} = -r^* \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_1}{\mu \nu_2} > 0, \quad \text{if} \quad k^T > k^N, \quad (316)$$

$$r^K_{\mu} = \frac{\partial \tilde{r}^K}{\partial \mu} = -r^* \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{\mu \nu_1} > 0, \quad \text{if} \quad k^N > k^T. \quad (317)$$

**Derivation of the Equilibrium Value of the Marginal Utility of Wealth**

In a second step, we determine the equilibrium change of $\bar{\lambda}$ by taking the total differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (305d):

$$[v \bar{\lambda} - \Phi_1 K \bar{\lambda}] d\bar{\lambda} = -[v_{GN} - \Phi_1 K_{GN}] dG^N, \quad (318)$$

from which may solve for the equilibrium value of $\bar{\lambda}$ as a function of government spending on the non-traded good:

$$\bar{\lambda} = \lambda (G^N), \quad (319)$$

with

$$\lambda_{GN} = \frac{\partial \bar{\lambda}}{\partial G^N} = -\frac{[v_{GN} - \Phi_1 K_{GN}]}{[v \bar{\lambda} - \Phi_1 K \bar{\lambda}]} \quad (320)$$

**L No-Entry**

In this section, we develop an alternative version of the two-sector model with a perfectly competitive sector producing a traded good and an imperfectly competitive sector producing a non-traded good. We assume that each producer $j$ of a unique variety of the non-traded good has the following technology

$$X_N^j = H(K^j, L^j)$$

with $K^j$ the capital stock and $L^j$ labor. While in section L we consider a model with free entry and endogenous markups, in this section, we solve the model by considering no-entry which implies that the markups are fixed but profits are no longer driven down to zero.

**L.1 Framework**

The final non-traded output, $Y^N$, is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral non-traded goods:

$$Y^N = \left[ \int_0^1 (Q^j_N)^{\frac{1}{N-1}} d_j \right]^{\frac{N}{N-1}}, \quad (321)$$

where $\omega > 0$ represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral goods and $Q^j_N$ stands for intermediate consumption of sector $j$ variety (with $j \in [0, N]$). The final good producers behave competitively, and the households use the final good for both consumption and investment.

In each of the $j$ sectors, there are $N > 1$ firms producing differentiated goods that are aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good by a CES aggregating function. The non-traded output sectoral good $j$ is:

$$Q^N_j = N^{-\frac{1}{N-1}} \left[ \int_0^N (X^N_{i,j})^{\frac{1}{N-1}} di \right]^{N-1}, \quad (322)$$

where $X^N_{i,j}$ stands for output of firm $i$ in sector $j$ and $\epsilon$ is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.

Denoting by $P$ and $P_j$ the relative price of the final good and of the jth variety of the intermediate good, respectively, the profit the final good producer is written as follows:

$$\Pi^N = P \left[ \int_0^1 (Q^N_j)^{\frac{1}{N-1}} d_j \right]^{\frac{N}{N-1}} - \int_0^1 P_j Q^N_j d_j. \quad (323)$$

45By having the term $N^{-\frac{1}{N-1}}$ in (322), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates solely on the effects of markup variation.
Total cost minimizing for a given level of final output gives the (intratemporal) demand function for each input:

$$Q_j^N = \left( \frac{P_j}{P} \right)^{-\omega} Y^N,$$

and the price of the final output is given by:

$$P = \left( \int_0^1 \frac{P_j^{1-\omega}}{dj} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\omega}},$$

where $P_j$ is the price index of sector $j$ and $P$ is the price of the final good.

Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one variety $\mathcal{X}_{i,j}^N$ is a price setter. Intermediate output $\mathcal{X}_{i,j}^N$ is produced using capital $K_{i,j}^N$ and labor $L_{i,j}^N$:

$$\mathcal{X}_{i,j}^N = H(K_{i,j}^N, L_{i,j}^N).$$

Denoting by $P_{i,j}$ the price of good $i$ in sector $j$, the profit function for the $j$th sector good producer denoted by $\pi_j^N$ is:

$$\pi_j^N = P_j H(K_{i,j}^N, L_{i,j}^N) - r^K K_{i,j}^N - W L_{i,j}^N - PFC,$$

where $\mathcal{X}_{i,j}^N$ stands for the demand for variety $\mathcal{X}_{i,j}^N$; firm $j$ chooses $K_{i,j}^N$ and $L_{i,j}^N$ to maximize profits treating the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for the non-traded sector write as follows:

$$P_j H + \eta_H = r^K,$$

$$P_j L + \eta_L = W,$$

$$\eta_j = P_j H_j,$$

L.2 First-Order Conditions

The current-value Hamiltonian for the $j$-th firm’s optimization problem in the non-traded sector writes as follows:

$$\mathcal{H}_j^N = P_j H(K_j^N, L_j^N) - r^K K_j^N - W L_j^N - PFC + \eta_j \left[ H(K_j^N, L_j^N) - \mathcal{X}_{j,j}^N \right],$$

where $\mathcal{X}_{j,j}^N$ stands for the demand for variety $j$; firm $j$ chooses $K_j^N$ and $L_j^N$ to maximize profits treating the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for the non-traded sector write as follows:

$$P_j H + \eta_H = r^K,$$

$$P_j L + \eta_L = W,$$

$$\eta_j = P_j H_j,$$
Combining (333a)-(333b) with (333c), by assuming that firms \( j \) are symmetric, yields:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{P}_j H_K \left( 1 - \frac{1}{e_j} \right) &= r^K, \\
\mathcal{P}_j H_L \left( 1 - \frac{1}{e_j} \right) &= W,
\end{align*}
\]

(334a) (334b)

where we used the fact that \( \frac{\mathcal{P}_j}{\mathcal{P}_j N^N} = -\frac{1}{e_j} \).

We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate good sector produce the output level \( X_{i,j}^N = X^N \) with the same quantities of labor \( L_{i,j}^N = L^N \) and capital \( K_{i,j}^N = K^N \). Hence, the aggregate stock of physical capital and hours worked are \( K^N = N K^N \) and \( L^N = N L^N \), respectively. They also set the same price \( \mathcal{P}_{i,j} = \mathcal{P} \). Hence, eqs. (325) and (329) imply that \( \mathcal{P} = \mathcal{P} \).

Defining the markup as follows \( \theta = \frac{e_j}{1 - e_j} \), first-order conditions are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\mathcal{P} H_K}{\theta} &= r^K, \\
\frac{\mathcal{P} H_L}{\theta} &= W.
\end{align*}
\]

(335a) (335b)

We further assume no-entry so that profits can be positive. Aggregating over the number of competitors, aggregate profits can be rewritten as:

\[
\Pi^N \equiv N \pi^N = PH \left( K^N, L^N \right) - r^K K^N - W L^N - P N F C.
\]

(336)

Using constant returns to scale in production, i.e. \( Y^N = H_K K_N + H_L L_N \), substituting the short-run static solution for non-traded output (52), using the fact that \( \mathcal{P} H_K / \theta = r^K \) and \( \mathcal{P} H_L / \theta = W \), we have:

\[
\Pi^N = \Pi^N \left( K, P, \bar{\lambda} \right) = P \left[ Y^N \left( K, P, \bar{\lambda} \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) - N F C \right],
\]

(337)

where the partial derivatives of aggregate profits in the non-traded sector with respect to \( K, P, \bar{\lambda} \) are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi^N_P &\equiv \frac{\partial \Pi^N}{\partial P} = \frac{\Pi^N}{P} + P Y^N_P \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) > 0, \\
\Pi^N_K &\equiv \frac{\partial \Pi^N}{\partial K} = P Y^N_K \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) \geq 0, \\
\Pi^N_{\bar{\lambda}} &\equiv \frac{\partial \Pi^N}{\partial \bar{\lambda}} = P Y^N_{\bar{\lambda}} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) \leq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

(338a) (338b) (338c)

### L.3 Equilibrium Dynamics

Inserting short-run static solutions (42), (44) and (52) into (5d) and (30), we obtain:

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{K} &= \frac{Y^N \left( K, P, \bar{\lambda} \right)}{\mu} + \frac{\Pi^N \left( K, P, \bar{\lambda} \right)}{P} - C^N (\bar{\lambda}, P) - \delta K - G^N, \\
\dot{P} &= P \left\{ r^* + \delta K - \frac{h_k \left[ k^N (P) \right]}{\mu} \right\},
\end{align*}
\]

(339a) (339b)

where we used the fact that \( Y^N - N F C = \frac{Y^N}{\mu} + \frac{\Pi^N}{\mu} \).

Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting \( \tilde{x} = \tilde{K}, \tilde{P} \) the steady-state values of \( x = K, P \), we obtain in a matrix form:

\[
\begin{pmatrix} \tilde{K} \\ \tilde{P} \end{pmatrix}^T = J \begin{pmatrix} K(t) - \tilde{K} \\ P(t) - \tilde{P} \end{pmatrix}^T,
\]

(340)
where \( J \) is given by
\[
J \equiv \begin{pmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{pmatrix},
\]
where the elements \( b_{11}, b_{12}, b_{21}, b_{22} \) are given by:
\[
b_{11} = \frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} + Y_K^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) - \delta_K = \frac{\hat{h}}{\bar{k}^N - \bar{k}^T} - \delta_K \geq 0, \quad (342a)
\]
\[
b_{12} = \frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} + \frac{\Pi^N_P}{P} - \frac{\Pi^N_Y}{P^2} - C_P^N = \frac{Y_P^N}{\mu} + Y_P^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) - C_P^N > 0, \quad (342b)
\]
\[
b_{21} = 0, \quad b_{22} = -\frac{P \hat{f} k^P}{\mu} = -\frac{\hat{f}}{\bar{P} \left( \bar{k}^N - \bar{k}^T \right)} = \frac{Y_K^T}{P} \leq 0. \quad (342c)
\]
where we used (338a) to determine (342b).

The determinant denoted by \( \text{Det} \) of the linearized \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix (341) is unambiguously negative:
\[
\text{Det} J = b_{11} b_{22} = \frac{Y_K^T}{P} \left[ \left( \frac{Y_K^N}{\mu} - \delta_K \right) + Y_K^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) \right] = \frac{Y_K^T}{P} \left( Y_K^N - \delta_K \right) < 0, \quad (343)
\]
and the trace denoted by \( \text{Tr} \) is given by
\[
\text{Tr} J = b_{11} + b_{22} = \frac{1}{\bar{P}} \left( Y_K^T + \frac{\bar{P}}{\mu} Y_K^N \right) - \delta_K + Y_K^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) = r^* + Y_K^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) > 0, \quad (344)
\]
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium \( \frac{b_K}{\mu} = r^* + \delta_K \).

The characteristic root reads as:
\[
\nu_i = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \text{Tr} J \pm \sqrt{(\text{Tr} J)^2 - 4 \text{Det} J} \right\} \geq 0, \quad i = 1, 2. \quad (345)
\]

Using (343) and (344), the characteristic root can be rewritten as follows:
\[
\nu_i = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \left( Y_K^N - \delta_K \right) + \frac{Y_K^T}{P} \pm \left[ \left( Y_K^N - \delta_K \right) - \frac{Y_K^T}{P} \right] \right\} \geq 0, \quad i = 1, 2. \quad (346)
\]

We denote by \( \nu_1 < 0 \) and \( \nu_2 > 0 \) the stable and unstable real-valued eigenvalues, satisfying
\[
\nu_1 < 0 < r^* < \nu_2. \quad (347)
\]

Since the system features one state variable, \( K \), and one jump variable, \( P \), the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.

General solutions paths are given by:
\[
K(t) - \bar{K} = B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \quad (348a)
\]
\[
P(t) - \bar{P} = \omega_1^i B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \omega_2^i B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \quad (348b)
\]
where we normalized \( \omega_1^i \) to unity. The eigenvector \( \omega_2^i \) associated with eigenvalue \( \nu_i \) is given by
\[
\omega_2^i = \frac{\nu_i - b_{11}}{b_{12}}, \quad (349)
\]
with \( b_{11} \) and \( b_{12} \) given by (342a) and (342b), respectively.

**Case** \( k^N > k^T \)

This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio in the non-traded good sector exceeds the capital-labor in the traded sector. From (346), the stable and unstable eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
\[
\nu_1 = \frac{Y_K^T}{P} = -\frac{\hat{f}}{\bar{P} \left( \bar{k}^N - \bar{k}^T \right)} < 0, \quad (350a)
\]
\[
\nu_2 = Y_K^N - \delta_K = \frac{\hat{h}}{\bar{k}^N - \bar{k}^T} - \delta_K > 0. \quad (350b)
\]
We sign several useful expressions:

\begin{align}
Y_N^K &= (\nu_2 + \delta_K) > 0, \quad (351a) \\
Y_T^K &= \tilde{P} \nu_1 < 0, \quad (351b) \\
\frac{\tilde{P} h k k^N P}{\mu} &= -\nu_1 > 0, \quad (351c) \\
Y_N^\lambda &= -\frac{1}{\lambda} \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T (\nu_2 + \delta_K) < 0, \quad (351d) \\
Y_T^\lambda &= -\frac{1}{\lambda} \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^N \nu_1 > 0. \quad (351e)
\end{align}

We write out eigenvector \( \omega^i \) associated with eigenvalue \( \nu_i \) (with \( i = 1, 2 \)), to determine their signs:

\begin{align}
\omega^1 &= \left( \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ (\nu_1 - \nu_2) \end{array} \right) \quad (+), \quad \omega^2 = \left( \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ (\nu_2 - \nu_1) \end{array} \right) \quad (+) \quad (352)
\end{align}

**Case** \( k^T > k^N \)

This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio in the traded good sector exceeds the capital-labor ratio in the non traded sector. From (346), the stable and unstable eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:

\begin{align}
\nu_1 &= Y_N^K - \delta_K = \frac{\tilde{h}}{(k^N - k^T)} - \delta_K < 0, \quad (353a) \\
\nu_2 &= Y_T^K = -\frac{\tilde{f}}{\tilde{P} (k^N - k^T)} > 0. \quad (353b)
\end{align}

We write out eigenvector \( \omega^i \) associated with eigenvalue \( \nu_i \) (with \( i = 1, 2 \)), to determine their signs:

\begin{align}
\omega^1 &= \left( \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 0 \end{array} \right) \quad (+), \quad \omega^2 = \left( \begin{array}{c} 0 \\ (\nu_2 - \nu_1) \end{array} \right) \quad (+) \quad (354)
\end{align}

As in the case of free entry and fixed marked, no entry implies that when the real exchange rate remains unaffected after a permanent fiscal shock (since \( \omega_2^1 = 0 \)) when \( k^T > N \).

We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:

\begin{align}
Y_N^K &= (\nu_1 + \delta_K) < 0, \quad (355a) \\
Y_T^K &= \tilde{P} \nu_2 > 0, \quad (355b) \\
\frac{\tilde{P} h k k^N P}{\mu} &= -\nu_2 < 0, \quad (355c) \\
Y_N^\lambda &= -\frac{1}{\lambda} \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) > 0, \quad (355d) \\
Y_T^\lambda &= -\frac{1}{\lambda} \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^N \nu_2 < 0. \quad (355e)
\end{align}

**L.4 Current Account Dynamics**

In this subsection, we derive the current account equation, the stable path for foreign assets and the intertemporal solvency condition. Substituting the definition of lump-sum taxes \( Z \) by using (10), and the market clearing condition for non-traded goods (339a) into (3) we get:

\begin{align}
\dot{B} &= r^* B + r^K K(t) + WL + \Pi^N - P_C C - PI - Z \\
&= r^* B + (r^K K + WL) + \Pi^N - P_C C - G^T - PG^N - P (Y^N - C^N - G^N - NFC) .
\end{align}

Using the fact that \( L^T, L^N = L, K^T + K^N = K \), and substituting the expression of aggregate profits in the non-traded sector, i.e., \( \Pi^N = PY^N - WL^N - r^K K^N - PNFC \), the
dynamic equation for the current account can be rewritten as follows:

\[
\dot{B} = r^* B - C^T - G^T + [WL^T + r^K K^T] + [WL^N + r^K K^N] + [PY^N - WL^N - r^K K^N - PNF]\]

\[-P [YN - NFC]\],

\[= r^* B + Y^T - C^T - G^T,\]  \hspace{1cm} (356)

Inserting general solutions for \(K(t)\) and \(P(t)\), the solution for the stock of international assets is given by follows:

\[
\dot{B}(t) = r^* \left( B(t) - \tilde{B} \right) + Y_K^T \sum_{i=1}^{2} B_i e^{\nu_i t} + \left[ Y_P^T - C_P^T \right] \sum_{i=1}^{2} B_i \omega_i e^{\nu_i t}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (357)

Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:

\[
B(t) - \tilde{B} = [\left( B_0 - \tilde{B} \right) - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2] e^{r^* t} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \Phi_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \]  \hspace{1cm} (358)

with

\[
\Phi_i = \frac{N_i}{\nu_i - r^*} = \frac{Y_K^T + \left[ Y_P^T - C_P^T \right] \omega_2}{\nu_i - r^*}, \quad i = 1, 2. \]  \hspace{1cm} (359)

Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the terms in brackets of equation (358) must be zero and we must set \(B_2 = 0\). We obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:

\[
B_0 - \tilde{B} = \Phi_1 \left( K_0 - \tilde{K} \right). \]  \hspace{1cm} (360)

The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:

\[
B(t) - \tilde{B} = \Phi_1 \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right). \]  \hspace{1cm} (361)

Case \(k^N > k^T\)

\[
N_1 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_2 \geq 0, \]  \hspace{1cm} (362a)

\[
N_2 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_2^2 < 0, \]  \hspace{1cm} (362b)

where we used the fact that \(\omega_2^2 = 0\). Hence we have:

\[
\Phi_2 = \frac{N_2}{\nu_2 - r^*} = \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_1}{\nu_2 - r^*}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (363)

Case \(k^T > k^N\)

\[
N_1 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_1 \geq 0, \]  \hspace{1cm} (364a)

\[
N_2 = Y_K^T + (Y_P^T - C_P^T) \omega_2^2 \leq 0, \]  \hspace{1cm} (364b)

where we used the fact that \(\omega_1 = 0\). Hence we have:

\[
\Phi_1 = \frac{N_1}{\nu_1 - r^*} = \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{\nu_1 - r^*}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (365)

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L.5 Savings Dynamics

The stock of financial wealth is \( A = B + PK \). Differentiating with respect to time, substituting the dynamic equations for foreign bonds (3), capital stock (4), and the real exchange rate (339b), i.e., \( \dot{A} = \dot{B} + PK + PK \), the stock of financial wealth evolves as follows:

\[
\dot{A} = r^* A + WL + \Pi^N - PC_C - Z. \tag{366}
\]

Substituting short-run static solutions for the real wage, labor supply, aggregate profits, consumption price index, consumption, eq. (366) can be rewritten as follows:

\[
\dot{A} = r^* A + W(P)L(\tilde{\lambda}, P) + \Pi^N (K, P, \tilde{\lambda}) - PC (P) C(P, \tilde{\lambda}) - G^T - PG^N, \tag{367}
\]

where we used the fact that \( Z = G^T + PG^N \). Linearizing (367) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, we have:

\[
\dot{A} = r^* \left( A(t) - \bar{A} \right) + M \left( P(t) - \bar{P} \right) + \Pi^N_K \left( K(t) - \bar{K} \right) \tag{368}
\]

where

\[
M = W_P \tilde{L} + W_L P + \Pi^N_P - PC_P \tilde{C} - PC_C P - G^N,
\]

\[
= W_P \tilde{L} (1 + \sigma_L) + \frac{\Pi^N_P}{P} + \tilde{P} Y_P^N \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) - \tilde{C}^N (1 - \sigma_C) - G^N. \tag{369}
\]

The general solution for the stock of financial wealth is:

\[
A(t) = \bar{A} + \left[ \left( A_0 - \bar{A} \right) - \frac{\Pi^N_K + M \omega^1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 - \frac{\Pi^N_K + M \omega^2}{\nu_2 - r^*} B_2 \right] e^{r^* t} \\
+ \frac{\Pi^N_K + M \omega^1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 e^{(r^* + \delta^1) t} + \frac{\Pi^N_K + M \omega^2}{\nu_2 - r^*} B_2 e^{(r^* + \delta^2) t}. \tag{370}
\]

Invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the stable solution for financial wealth:

\[
A(t) = \bar{A} + \frac{\Pi^N_K + M \omega^1}{\nu_1 - r^*} B_1 e^{r^* t}, \tag{371}
\]

and the intertemporal solvency condition

\[
\bar{A} - A_0 = \frac{\Pi^N_K + M \omega^1}{\nu_1 - r^*} \left( \bar{K} - K_0 \right). \tag{372}
\]

L.6 Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case of No-Entry

In this subsection, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by assuming that labor supply is elastically supplied. To keep things simple, we assume that the traded sector is more capital intensive, i.e. \( k^T > k^N \).

Substituting first the appropriate short-run static solutions, the steady-state of the economy is obtained by setting \( \bar{K}, \bar{P}, \bar{B} = 0 \) and is defined by the following set of equations:

\[
\frac{h_k}{\mu} \left[ k^N (\bar{P}) \right] = r^* + \delta_K, \tag{373a}
\]

\[
\frac{Y^N (\bar{K}, \bar{P}, \bar{\lambda})}{\mu} + \frac{\Pi^N (\bar{K}, \bar{P}, \bar{\lambda})}{\bar{P}} - C^N (\bar{\lambda}, \bar{P}) - \delta_k \bar{K} - G^N = 0, \tag{373b}
\]

\[
r^* \bar{B} + \bar{Y}^T (\bar{K}, \bar{P}, \bar{\lambda}) - \bar{C}^T (\bar{\lambda}, \bar{P}) - G^T = 0, \tag{373c}
\]

and the intertemporal solvency condition

\[
\left( B_0 - \bar{B} \right) = \Phi \left( K_0 - \bar{K} \right), \tag{373d}
\]
where we used the fact that $\frac{P}{\mu} + Y^N/\mu = Y^N - NFC$. The steady-state equilibrium composed by these four equations jointly determine $\bar{P}$, $\bar{K}$, $\bar{B}$ and $\bar{\lambda}$.

We totally differentiate the system (373d) evaluated at the steady-state which yields in a matrix form:

$$
\left( \begin{array}{cccc}
\frac{h_k k^N}{\mu} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
(Y_P^N - C_P^N) & Y_K^N & -\delta_K & (Y_\lambda^N - C_\lambda^N) \\
(Y_P^T - C_P^T) & Y_K^T & r^* & (Y_\lambda^T - C_\lambda^T) \\
0 & -\Phi_1 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{array} \right) 
\left( \begin{array}{c}
d\bar{P} \\
d\bar{K} \\
d\bar{\lambda} \\
d\bar{B} \\
\end{array} \right) = 
\left( \begin{array}{c}
0 \\
dG^N \\
dG^T \\
0 \\
\end{array} \right).
$$

(374)

The determinant denoted by $D'$ of the matrix (373) of coefficients is given by:

$$
D' = \frac{h_k k^N}{\mu} \left\{ \left( Y_K^N - \delta_K \right) \left( Y_K^T - C_\lambda^T \right) - \left( Y_\lambda^N - C_\lambda^N \right) \left[ Y_K^T + r^* \Phi_1 \right] \right\}
$$

(375)

Assuming $k^T > k^N$, then the determinant $D'$ reads as:

$$
D' = -\nu_1 \frac{\nu_2}{\mu} \left\{ \left( \sigma_L W \bar{L} + \sigma_C P C \bar{C} \right) + \bar{P} \left( \nu_1 + \delta_K \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) \left[ \sigma_C C^N - \sigma_L \bar{L} \bar{k}^T (r^* + \delta_K) \right] \right\} > 0.
$$

(376)

where we used the fact that $\nu_2 = r^* - \nu_1 + (\nu_1 + \delta_K) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right)$. Moreover, we computed the following expression:

$$
k^N \nu_2 + k^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) = -\frac{k^N f}{\mu (k^N - k^T)} + k^T \frac{h}{k^N - k^T},
$$

$$
= -\frac{W}{\bar{P}} + \frac{Y_\lambda^N}{\mu} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right),
$$

$$
= -\frac{W}{\bar{P}} + k^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right).
$$

(377)

The steady-state changes following an unanticipated permanent increase in $G^N$ are given by:

$$
d\bar{P} = 0,
$$

(378a)

$$
d\bar{\lambda} = -\frac{h_k k^N}{\mu} \frac{Y_K^N}{D'} (Y_K^T + r^* \Phi_1),
$$

(378b)

$$
d\bar{K} = \frac{1}{D'} \frac{h_k k^N}{\mu} (Y_\lambda^T - C_\lambda^T),
$$

(378c)

$$
d\bar{B} \quad d\bar{G}^N = \Phi_1 \frac{d\bar{K}}{d\bar{G}^N}.
$$

(378d)

Assuming that $k^T > k^N$, the steady-state changes for $K$ and $\bar{\lambda}$ can be rewritten as follows:

$$
\frac{d\bar{K}}{d\bar{G}^N} = -\frac{\bar{P}}{\nu_1} \left[ \left( \sigma_L \bar{L} \bar{k}^T \nu_2 - \sigma_C \frac{\bar{C}^T}{\bar{T}} \right) \left( \sigma_L \bar{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C P C \bar{C} \right) + \bar{\Gamma} \right] \leq 0,
$$

(379a)

$$
\frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{d\bar{G}^N} = \frac{\bar{P} \nu_2 \lambda}{(r^* - \nu_1) \left[ \left( \sigma_L \bar{W} \bar{L} + \sigma_C P C \bar{C} \right) + \bar{\Gamma} \right]} > 0,
$$

(379b)

where $0 < \frac{\nu_2}{(r^*-\nu_1)} = \frac{\nu_2}{(\nu_1 + \delta_K)(1 - \frac{1}{\mu})} < 1$ and we have set

$$
\bar{\Gamma} = \frac{\bar{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K)}{r^* - \nu_1} \left[ \sigma_C \bar{C}^N - \sigma_L \bar{L} \bar{k}^T (r^* + \delta_K) \right] > 0.
$$

(380)

Eq. (379b) corresponds to eq. (29) in the text.
L.7 Impact Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case of No-Entry

This section estimates the impact effects of a permanent fiscal expansion when the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector. The stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path in \((K, P)\)-space. The capital stock, the real exchange rate, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:

\[
\begin{align*}
K(t) &= \tilde{K} + B_1 e^{\nu_1 t}, \\
P(t) &= \tilde{P} + \omega_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t}, \\
B(t) &= \tilde{B} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t},
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\omega_1 = 0\), \(\Phi_1 = -\tilde{P} \nu_2 \frac{r^*}{r - \nu_1}\) if \(k^T > k^N\) and with

\[
B_1 = K_0 - \tilde{K} = -d \tilde{K},
\]

where we made used the fact that \(K_0\) is predetermined.

We derive below the initial reactions of investment and the current account by assuming that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector.

Differentiating (381a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time \(t = 0\), and substituting (95d), the initial response of investment is:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} = -\nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} = \frac{\tilde{P} \left( \sigma_L \tilde{L} k^N \nu_2 - \sigma_C \frac{\tilde{C}}{P} \right)}{\nu_1 \left( \sigma_L \tilde{W} + \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \tilde{r} \right)} \gtrless 0. \tag{382}
\]

Using the fact that \(\Phi_1 = -\frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{r^* - \nu_1}\), the initial reaction of the current account is:

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} = \tilde{P} \nu_1 \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} = -\tilde{P} \frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{perm}} \lesssim 0. \tag{383}
\]

L.8 Effect on Aggregate Profits of a Permanent Fiscal Expansion

Since the wealth of households depends now on the present value of profits, the wealth effect triggered by a fiscal expansion is modified compared to the case of free entry. In this subsection, we compute the change in the present discounted value of profits denoted by \(\Pi\) which is defined as follows:

\[
\Pi = \int_0^\infty \Pi^N(t) e^{-r^* t} dt. \tag{384}
\]

Substituting the short-run static solution for \(\Pi^N\) given by eq. (337) and linearizing around the steady-state, we have:

\[
\Pi^N(t) = \Pi^N + \left( \Pi^N_K + \Pi^N_P \omega_1 \right) \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right),
\]

where we used the fact that \(P(t) - \tilde{P} = \omega_1 \left( K(t) - \tilde{K} \right)\). We set

\[
\Upsilon = \Pi^N_K + \Pi^N_P \omega_1. \tag{385}
\]

Substituting the linearized version of \(\Pi^N(t)\) into eq. (384) and solving yields:

\[
\Pi = \frac{\Pi^N}{r^*} + \frac{\Upsilon B_1}{r^* - \nu_1}, \tag{386}
\]

where we substituted the stable solution for \(K(t)\) given by eq. (348a).
Differentiating (386) w.r.t. $G^N$, the change in the present value of profits is given by

$$\frac{d\Pi}{dG^N} = \frac{\Pi^N}{r^*} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} - \frac{\nu_1 \Pi^N}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)} \frac{dK}{dG^N},$$

and

$$= \frac{\frac{d\lambda}{dG^N}}{\frac{\nu_1 (\nu_1 + \delta K)}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)}} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) \left[ \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^T (r^* + \delta K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \right]$$

$$- \frac{\tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta K)}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right),$$

and

$$= \frac{\tilde{P} (1 - \frac{1}{\mu}) (\nu_1 + \delta K)}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)} \left\{ \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \left[ \frac{\sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{P} k^T (r^* + \delta K) - \sigma_C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N}{\lambda} \right] + 1 \right\} > 0,$$ \hspace{1cm} (387)

where we used the fact that $B_1 = -d\tilde{K}, \omega_2^N = 0$ which implies that $\Pi = \Pi^N$, and $d\Pi^N = \Pi^N d\lambda + \Pi^K d\tilde{K}$ to get the first line, we used the fact that $d\tilde{K} = K^N \lambda + K^N dG^N$ (see eq. (390a)), expression of $K^N$ given by eq. (391a) and the fact that

$\Pi^N = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + 1} \left( \nu_1 + \delta K \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) > 0,$ \hspace{1cm} (388a)

and

$\Pi^K = \frac{\tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta K)}{1 - \frac{1}{\mu}} < 0.$ \hspace{1cm} (388b)

Eq. (387) corresponds to eq. (28) in the text.

**L.9 The Effects of Temporary Fiscal Shocks: The Case of Elastic Labor Supply**

In this section, we derive formal solutions for temporary shocks under no-entry, by assuming elastic labor supply. The derivations of formal solutions are only possible if we assume $k^T > k^N$ since when sectoral capital intensities are reversed, we are not able to derive useful (i.e., interpretable) expressions.

We first solve the system (373a)-(373c) for $\tilde{P}, \tilde{K}$ and $\tilde{B}$ as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, $\bar{\lambda}$ and government spending $G^N$. Totally differentiating equations (373a)-(373c) yields in matrix form:

$$\begin{pmatrix} h_{kk} k^T \\ (Y_{\tilde{P}}^N - C_{\tilde{P}}^N) \\ (Y_{\tilde{P}}^N - C_{\tilde{P}}^N) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ r^* \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{d\tilde{P}}{dG^N} \\ \frac{d\tilde{K}}{dG^N} \\ \frac{d\tilde{B}}{dG^N} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ - (Y_{\tilde{\lambda}}^N - C_{\tilde{\lambda}}^N) \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N} + dG^N \\ - (Y_{\tilde{\lambda}}^T - C_{\tilde{\lambda}}^T) \frac{d\tilde{\lambda}}{dG^N} \end{pmatrix}. \hspace{1cm} (389)$$

Steady-state values of $K$ and $B$ can be expressed as functions of the shadow value of wealth and government spending $G^N$:

$$\tilde{K} = K (\tilde{\lambda}, G^N),$$ \hspace{1cm} (390a)

$$\tilde{B} = B (\tilde{\lambda}, G^N),$$ \hspace{1cm} (390b)

with partial derivatives given by:

$$K_{\tilde{\lambda}} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial \tilde{\lambda}} = - \frac{(Y_{\tilde{\lambda}}^N - C_{\tilde{\lambda}}^N)}{(Y_{\tilde{K}}^N - \delta K)},$$ \hspace{1cm} (391a)

$$B_{\tilde{\lambda}} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial \tilde{\lambda}} = \frac{Y_{\tilde{K}}^T (Y_{\tilde{\lambda}}^N - C_{\tilde{\lambda}}^N) - (Y_{\tilde{K}}^N - \delta K) (Y_{\tilde{\lambda}}^T - C_{\tilde{\lambda}}^T)}{r^* (Y_{\tilde{K}}^N - \delta K)}. \hspace{1cm} (391b)$$

We sign expressions when $k^T > k^N$:

$$K_{\tilde{\lambda}} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial \tilde{\lambda}} = - \frac{1}{\lambda \nu_1} \left[ \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N - \sigma_L \tilde{L} \tilde{K}^T (\nu_1 + \delta K) \right] > 0, \hspace{1cm} (392a)$$

$$B_{\tilde{\lambda}} \equiv \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial \tilde{\lambda}} = \left\{ \sigma_C \left[ \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N \nu_2 - C_{\tilde{\lambda}} \right] + \nu_2 \tilde{P} \sigma_L \tilde{L} \left[ k^N \nu_1 - \tilde{k}^T (\nu_1 + \delta K) \right] \right\} < 0, \text{ if } k^T > k^N. \hspace{1cm} (392b)$$
and

\[
K_{GN} = \frac{\partial \tilde{K}}{\partial G_N} = \frac{1}{Y_K - \delta_K} = \frac{1}{\nu_1} < 0, \quad (393a)
\]

\[
B_{GN} = \frac{\partial \tilde{B}}{\partial G_N} = -\frac{Y_K}{(Y_K - \delta_K) r^*} = -\frac{\tilde{P}_{\nu_2}}{r^* \nu_1} > 0. \quad (393b)
\]

To derive solutions for temporary fiscal shocks, we have to solve the following system:

\[
B_1 + B_2 = -K_\lambda d\lambda - K_{GN} dG_N, \quad (394a)
\]

\[
B_1 e^{\nu_1 T} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 T} - B_1' e^{\nu_1 T} = -K_{GN} dG_N, \quad (394b)
\]

\[
\omega_2^1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 T} + \omega_2^2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 T} - \omega_2^2 B_1' e^{\nu_1 T} = 0, \quad (394c)
\]

and

\[
B_1 \Upsilon_1 + B_2 \Upsilon_2 + B_\lambda d\lambda = \Omega_1, \quad (395)
\]

where we set

\[
\Upsilon_1 \equiv \Phi_1, \quad (396a)
\]

\[
\Upsilon_2 \equiv \Phi_2 + (\Phi_1 - \Phi_2) e^{(\nu_2 - r^*) T}, \quad (396b)
\]

\[
\Omega_1 \equiv \left[(B_{GN} - \Phi_1 K_{GN}) e^{-r^* T} - B_{GN}\right] dG_N. \quad (396c)
\]

Adopting the same procedure as described in section K.7, we derive formal expressions below for constants \(B_1, B_2\) and \(B_1'\) when \(k^T > k^N\). We were unable to derive useful formal expressions with the sector reversal of capital intensities.

**Case \(k^T > k^N\)**

When considering elastic labor and no entry, the solutions after a rise in \(G_N\) are:

\[
\frac{B_1}{dG_N} = -\left\{(\sigma_C P_C \tilde{C} + \sigma_L W \tilde{L}) + \Gamma\right\} + \frac{\tilde{P}_{\nu_2}}{r^* \nu_1} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T}\right) \left[\sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N\right] \geq 0, \quad (397a)
\]

\[
\frac{B_2}{dG_N} = 0, \quad (397b)
\]

\[
\frac{B_1'}{dG_N} = \frac{B_1}{dG_N} + K_{GN} e^{-\nu_1 T}
\]

\[
= -\frac{1}{\nu_1} \left(1 - e^{-\nu_1 T}\right) + \frac{\tilde{P}_{\nu_2}}{r^* \nu_1} \left(1 - e^{-r^* T}\right) \left[\sigma_L \tilde{L} k^T (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \tilde{C}^N\right] \geq 0, \quad (397c)
\]

\[
\frac{d\lambda}{dG_N}_{\text{temp}} = \lambda_{GN} (1 - e^{-r^* T}) > 0, \quad (397d)
\]

where \(\lambda_{GN}\) represents the change in the equilibrium value of the shadow value of wealth after a permanent increase in \(G_N\) (see eq. (379b)).

General solutions for \(K\) and \(P\) are:

\[
K(t) - \tilde{K} = B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}, \quad (398a)
\]

\[
P(t) - \tilde{P} = \omega_2^1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \omega_2^2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}. \quad (398b)
\]

Differentiating eq. (398a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time \(t = 0\) and differentiating w.r.t. \(G^N\), we obtain the initial response of investment following a temporary rise in government spending on the non-traded good:

\[
\left.\frac{dI(0)}{dG_N}\right|_{\text{temp}} = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG_N} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG_N}. \quad (398b)
\]
Substituting (397a) and using the fact that \( \frac{B_t}{dG^N} = 0 \), the initial reaction of investment is given by:

\[
\frac{dI(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N},
\]

\[
= - \left\{ 1 + \frac{\nu_2}{r^* - \nu_1} \left( 1 - e^{-r^*T} \right) \left[ \frac{\sigma L \tilde{k}^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N}{\left( \sigma C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \Gamma \right)} \right] \right\} \leq (399)
\]

Eq. (399) corresponds to eq. (37) in the text

The general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:

\[
B(t) = \bar{B} + \left[ (B_0 - \bar{B}) - \Phi_1 B_1 - \Phi_2 B_2 \right] e^{r^*t} + \Phi_1 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t} + \Phi_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},
\]

(400)

Differentiating eq. (400) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time \( t = 0 \) and differentiating w.r.t. \( G^N \), we obtain the initial response of the current account after a temporary rise in \( G^N \):

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = r^* \left[ - \frac{d\bar{B}_1}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} - \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N} \right] + \nu_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} + \nu_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N}.
\]

Using the fact that

\[
\frac{d\bar{B}_1}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} - \Phi_1 \frac{B_1}{dG^N} - \Phi_2 \frac{B_2}{dG^N} = - \left[ (\bar{B}_\lambda - \Phi_1 K_\lambda) \frac{d\bar{\lambda}}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} + (B_{G^N} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N}) \right],
\]

\[
= -(B_{G^N} - \Phi_1 K_{G^N}) e^{-r^*T} = - \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_1}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)} e^{-r^*T},
\]

(401)

the initial reaction of the current account can be rewritten as follows:

\[
\frac{dCA(0)}{dG^N} \bigg|_{\text{temp}} = - \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} e^{-r^*T} - \nu_1 \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} \frac{B_1}{dG^N},
\]

\[
= \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{r^* - \nu_1} \left( 1 - e^{-r^*T} \right) \left[ 1 + \frac{\nu_2}{r^* - \nu_1} \left( \frac{\sigma L \tilde{k}^T \tilde{P} (\nu_1 + \delta_K) - \sigma C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N}{\left( \sigma C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \Gamma \right)} \right] \right\} \leq 0,
\]

\[
= - \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} \tilde{P} e^{-r^*T}
\]

\[
+ \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} \tilde{P} \left\{ 1 + \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{(r^* - \nu_1)} \left( 1 - e^{-r^*T} \right) \left[ \frac{\sigma L \tilde{k}^T \tilde{P} \nu_1 - \sigma C \tilde{P} \tilde{C}^N}{\left( \sigma C \tilde{P} \tilde{C} + \sigma L \tilde{W} \tilde{L} + \Gamma \right)} \right] \right\} (402)
\]

where we used the fact that \( \Phi_1 = - \frac{\tilde{P} \nu_2}{r^* - \nu_1} \). Eq. (402) corresponds to eq. (38) in the text.

**L.10 Effect on Aggregate Profits of a Temporary Fiscal Expansion**

Since the wealth of households depends now on the present value of profits, the wealth effect triggered by a fiscal expansion is modified compared to that under free entry. In this subsection, we compute the change in the present discounted value of profits after a temporary fiscal expansion. Hence, the present value of profits denoted by \( \Pi \) evaluated over two sub-periods \((0, T)\) and \((T, \infty)\) is:

\[
\Pi = \int_0^T \Pi^N(t) e^{-r^*t} dt + \int_T^\infty \Pi^N(t) e^{-r^*t} dt.
\]

(403)
The linearized versions of aggregate profits in the non-traded sector over period 1 (say over $(0, T)$) and over period 2 (say over $(T, \infty)$) are:

$$\Pi^N(t) = \Pi^N_1 + \Pi^N_2 (K(t) - \bar{K}_1) = \Pi^N_1 + \Pi^N_2 B_1 e^{\nu_1 t},$$

$$\Pi^N(t) = \Pi^N_2 + \Pi^N_2 (K(t) - \bar{K}_2) = \Pi^N_2 + \Pi^N_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},$$

where we used the fact that $\omega_2 = 0$ so that the dynamics for the relative price degenerate and the fact that the constant $B_2 = 0$.

Substituting linearized versions of $\Pi^N(t)$ for periods $(0, T)$ and $(T, \infty)$ into eq. (403) and solving yields:

$$\Pi = \frac{\Pi^N_1}{r^*} (1 - e^{-r^* T}) + \frac{\Pi^N_2 B_1}{r^*} \frac{1 - e^{-(r^* - \nu_1) T}}{(r^* - \nu_1)} + \frac{\Pi^N_2 e^{-(r^* - \nu_1) T}}{r^*} + \Pi^N_2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t}. \quad (404)$$

Using the fact that $B_1 + B_2 = -K_\lambda d\lambda - K_{GN} dG^N$, with $B_2 = 0$ and $K_{GN} = 1/\nu_1$, and differentiating eq. (404) w.r.t. $G^N$, the change in the present value of profits after a temporary fiscal expansion is given by

$$\left. \frac{d\Pi}{dG^N} \right|_{temp} = \frac{\Pi^N_1}{r^*} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \mid_{temp} - \frac{\nu_1 \Pi^N_2}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \mid_{temp} - \frac{\Pi^N_2 (1 - e^{-r^* T})}{r^* (r^* - \nu_1)}$$

$$= -\frac{\Pi^N_1}{r^*} \frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \mid_{temp} \frac{(\nu_1 + \delta_K)}{\lambda r^* (r^* - \nu_1)} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\mu} \right) \left\{ \lambda_{GN} \left[ \sigma_L \bar{L} \bar{L} \bar{k}^T (r^* + \delta_K) - \sigma_C \bar{P} \bar{C}^N \right] + 1 \right\} > 0,$$

$$= \left( 1 - e^{-r^* T} \right) \left. \frac{d\Pi}{dG^N} \right|_{perm}, \quad (405)$$

where we used the fact that $d\Pi^N_1 = \Pi^N_1 - \Pi^N_0 = \Pi^N K d\lambda_1 + \Pi^N N d\lambda$ and $d\Pi^N_2 = \Pi^N K d\bar{K} + \Pi^N N d\lambda$, and $d\bar{K}_1 = \bar{K}_1 - \bar{K}_0 = K_\lambda d\lambda + K_{GN} dG^N$, and $d\bar{K} = \bar{K}_2 - \bar{K}_0 = K_\lambda d\lambda$ and collected terms to get the first line, we factorize by $\frac{d\lambda}{dG^N} \mid_{temp}$ and substitute expressions of $\Pi^N_1$ and $\Pi^N_2$ given by eq. (388) to get the second line, substitute the expression of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth given by (397d) and (379b) to get the third line. Eq. (387) shows that the change in the present value of profits is a scaled-down version of the change after a permanent fiscal shock. Eq. (387) corresponds to eq. (36) in the text.

When $k^N > k^T$, we computed the present value of profits numerically by adopting a similar procedure. First, linearizing versions of aggregate profits in the non-traded sector over period 1 (say over $(0, T)$) and over period 2 (say over $(T, \infty)$) are:

$$\Pi^N(t) = \Pi^N_1 + \Theta^1 (K(t) - \bar{K}_1),$$

$$\Pi^N(t) = \Pi^N_2 + \Theta^2 (K(t) - \bar{K}_2) = \Pi^N_2 + \Theta^2 B_2 e^{\nu_2 t},$$

where $\Theta^1 = \Pi^N_1 + \Pi^N_2 \omega_1^1$ since the relative price dynamics do no longer degenerate and $\Theta^2 = \Pi^N_2$ since $\omega_2^2 = 0$.

Substituting linearized versions of $\Pi^N(t)$ for periods $(0, T)$ and $(T, \infty)$ into eq. (403) and solving yields:

$$\Pi = \frac{\Pi^N_1}{r^*} (1 - e^{-r^* T}) + \frac{\Theta^1 B_1}{r^*} \frac{1 - e^{-(r^* - \nu_1) T}}{(r^* - \nu_1)} + \frac{\Theta^2 B_2}{r^*} \frac{1 - e^{-(r^* - \nu_2) T}}{(r^* - \nu_2)} + \frac{\Pi^N_2 e^{-(r^* - \nu_1) T}}{r^*} + \Theta^1 B_1 e^{(r^* - \nu_1) T}. \quad (406)$$
References


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