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4 nouveaux Working Papers du BETA

Les Working Papers du BETA publiés au 1er trimestre 2014 :

2014-01 « Prestige social des professions et substituabilité des filières universitaires  », Magali Jaoul-Grammare.

Résumé : Le prestige social associé à une profession, tout comme le salaire espéré, est un facteur important dans le choix d’orientation des individus. L’objectif de ce travail est de montrer que deux formations supérieures thématiquement différentes peuvent révéler un caractère substituable dès lors qu’elles sont associées à des professions prestigieuses. L’originalité de notre approche est d’avoir recours à des outils de l’analyse cliométrique afin de répondre à une problématique microéconomique. Nos résultats, appliqués au cas français, mettent en évidence une relation de substitution entre les formations juridiques et médicales dont l’évolution des études médicales semble être le point de départ.

2014-02 « Patents and innovation : Are the brakes broken, or how to restore patents’ dynamic efficiency ?  », Christian Le Bas, Julien Pénin.

Abstract : The standard view of patents emphasizes their dynamic efficiency. It considers that, by providing firms with incentives to invest in R&D and to disclose their knowledge, patents encourage innovation and increase social welfare in the long run. Yet, a growing body of literature opposes this view and asks for patent reform or even for the abolition of the patent system. In this work, which reviews the most recent literature on patents, we show that patents can have a negative impact on the dynamics of innovation. This is not due to some intrinsic properties of the patent system but to some of its recent evolutions which mean that, nowadays, too many patents are granted and that patent information is bad. The combination of those two elements explains most of the problems induced by modern patent systems such as hold-up (patent trolls), anti-commons (royalty stacking), and high transaction costs in markets for technology. We conclude by showing that realistic reforms can solve those problems and ensure that the patent system becomes again an instrument of dynamic efficiency.

2014-03 « Endogenous fertility with a sibship size effect  », Elise S. Brezis, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira.

Abstract : Since the seminal work of Becker, the dynamics of endogenous fertility has been based on the trade-off faced by parents between the quantity and the quality of their children. However, in developing countries, when child labor is an indispensable source of household income, parents actually incur a negative cost for having an extra child, so that the trade-off disappears. The purpose of this paper is to restore the Beckerian quantity-quality trade-off in the case intergenerational transfers are upstream, so as to keep fertility endogenous. We do that by adding a negative “sibship size effect” on human capital formation to the standard Becker model. With a simple specification, we obtain multiplicity of steady states or, more fundamentally, the possibility of a jump from a state with high fertility and low income to a state with low fertility and high income, triggered by a continuous increase in the productivity of human capital formation.

2014-04 « Fiscal policy, institutional quality and central bank transparency  », Meixing Dai, Moïse Sidiropoulos, Eleftherios Spyromitros.

Abstract : This paper examines monetary and fiscal interactions in a framework where the government worries about political costs of low institutional quality and central bank opacity acts as a disciplinary device leading the government to reduce distortionary taxes and public expenditures. Greater opacity could thus lower the reactions of inflation expectations and inflation but increase those of the output gap to supply shocks and the target of public expenditures, and would be beneficial in terms of less macroeconomic volatility. Under the least favourable assumptions on the effect of corruption, i.e. ‘sanding-the-wheels’ effect or weak ‘greasing-the-wheels’ effect, we have shown that there is a fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity in a game framework where the government is a Stackelberg leader. Imperfect transparency could increase corruption only if the ‘greasing-the-wheels’ effect is relatively large. These results could be reinforced by the presence of grand corruption.



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